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Introduction 
Amidst concerns that Indonesia will be divided due to violent conflicts in some provinces following 
the fall of New Order regime, a few peace agreements have successfully been reached and halted 
violence that had claimed thousands of lives and properties. One of the agreements was Malino II 
Peace Agreement that was viewed as the milestone of the termination of prolonged conflicts in 
Maluku Province. 
However, smaller and sporadic violence continues to occur in Maluku, especially in Ambon City.  
Peace researchers and activists have identified that one of the problems faced by Ambon City is post-
conflict segregation. There has, however, yet to be a study focused on the relationship between post-
conflict segregation, emerging violence and post-conflict developmental policies. Therefore, the study 
is designed to fill in the gap in such information. 
The study is conducted as part of the National Violence Monitoring System (NVMS), a 
cooperation between The Habibie Center and Deputy I Office for Environmental and Social 
Vulnerability Coordination of Coordinating Ministry for People’s Welfare, and supported by The 
World Bank. The program is funded by a grant from The Korea Economic Transitions and Peace 
Building Trust Fund. 
The researcher team would like to extend gratitude to all parties who have provided significant 
support for the study. Among them are Sana Jaffrey, Wahyu Handoyo, Adrian Morrel of The World 
Bank who have provided major inputs from the development of the initial concept of the research 
through  the final report development; Mr Willem Rampangilei, Mr Nelwan Harahap, and Ms Zuraini 
from Deputy I Office of the Coordinating Ministry for People’s Welfare who have contributed inputs 
to the development of the research concept and provided assistance during the field research in 
Ambon City; Prof. Kamanto Sunarto (FISIP-UI) and Dr. Thung Ju Lan (LIPI) who have made critical 
notes on the first draft of the research concept; Najib Azca (PSKP-UGM) and Jacky Manuputty 
(peace activists in Ambon) who have brought significant inputs into the improvement of the drafted 
initial report of the study. The research team would like to thank Institut Tifa Damai Maluku, 
especially Hilda, Loury, and Jamal for their warm cooperation during the research; to all informants/ 
respondents who delivered information during the research; to the executive board and staff of The 
Habibie Center who have fully supported the research, especially Ima, Mr Ghazali, Mr Kun, Vivi, and 
Tasha. 
Finally, we hope this research benefits our concerted efforts to build peace in. 
 
Peace,  
Team NVMS-THC 
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ITDM  : Institut Tifa Damai Maluku 
JICA  : Japan International Cooperation Agency 
Kemenko Kesra : Kementerian Koordinator Bidang Kesejahteraan  
    Rakyat (The Coordinating Ministry for People’s Welfare) 
KNIL  : Koninklijk Nederlands-Indische Leger (Royal  
    Netherlands East Indies Army) 
Komnas HAM : Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia (National Commission on Human Rights) 
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  Institute) 
MTQ  : Musabaqah Tilawatil Quran (Qoran Recital Competition) 
MoU Malino : Memorandum of Understanding (Butir-Butir  
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MUI  : Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Ulema Council) 
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PDRB  : Produk Domestik Regional Bruto (Regional Gross Domestic Product) 
PK  : Peninjauan Kembali (Judicial Review) 
Purek  : Pembantu Rektor (Vice President) 
RMS  : Republik Maluku Selatan (South Mollucan Republic) 
RPJMD : Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Daerah (Local Medium Term  
                           Development Plan) 
RPJP  : Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang (Local Long Term  
                           Development Plan) 
 
SBB  : Seram Bagian Barat (Western Seram) 
SMPN  : Sekolah Menengah Pertama Negeri (Public Junior High School) 
SNPK  : Sistem Nasional Pemantauan Kekerasan (National Violence Monitoring System) 
SWPP  : Sub Wilayah Pusat Pertumbuhan (Growth Center Sub-Region) 
TNI  : Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Military) 
UNICEF : The United Nations Children’s Fund 
UNDP  : United Nations Development Programme 
Unpatti  : Universitas Pattimura (Pattimura University) 
  
Executive Summary 
The economic crises hitting Indonesia in late 1990s had significant impacts on economic, political and 
social conditions.  Combination of such impacts triggered various violent conflicts that took place 
almost simultaneously in some regions of Indonesia. Highly-escalating violent conflicts  occurred 
quite fast such as in Aceh, Papua, East Timor (now the Democratic Republic of Timor Leste), 
Maluku, North Maluku, Central Kalimantan and Central Sulawesi. Over the course, almost all the 
conflicts experienced de-escalation, and/or were resolved significantly in late 2002, except for Aceh 
conflict which was eventually resolved in 2005 through Helsinki Agreement. Nevertheless, although 
large scale conflicts have politically been resolved, incidents of violence do not stop immediately. In 
some post-conflict areas, violence still becomes an issue, with serious potential, which requires 
anticipation. 
Based on the data of National Violence Monitoring System (NVMS) (2002-2012), out of five 
provinces that witnessed communal conflicts (West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, Maluku, North 
Maluku, and Central Sulawesi), Maluku tends to have fairly high intensity of violent conflicts. 
Especially according to NVSM data, Ambon City still becomes an area with the highest accumulated 
violent conflict rate from February 2002 to December 2012. Beside that, different from other post-
conflict areas, in which violent conflicts have transformed into a new form, in Ambon identity–based 
conflicts are still dominant. Strong identity building gets more obvious if observed from physical and 
social segregation phenomena among those of different identities.  
Based on the data and dynamic condition, The Habibie Center’s NVMS team conducted the 
research with specific goals of (1) identifying and describing the process of segregation formation in 
post-conflict Ambon; (2) identifying impacts of government policies on post-conflict segregation in 
Ambon; (3) explaining segregation effects to occurrence of violence in post-conflict Ambon; (4) 
understanding participation of institutions in overcoming violence-related segregation impacts in 
Ambon. The research used quality approach. Primary data was collected by using in-depth interview 
technique, focus group discussion (FGD), and observation. Secondary data included documents, 
reports, academic publications, magazines, and mass media, both printed and online.  
Ambon City has been long known as one of the Indonesian areas with strong segregation 
characteristic, both socially and spatially between Christian and Muslim communities. After the 1999 
social conflicts, the resolution was reached through post-conflict reconstruction policy by the local 
government. The policy had a role in creating indirect and unintended consequence, taking the form 
of new socio-spatial segregation. The birth of post-conflict segregation mainly originated from 
community displacement process and refugee problem-solving mechanism, especially through 
relocation program.  When social conflicts between Islamic and Christian communities broke out in 
Ambon (1999-2002), thousands of both community members took refuge to areas whose population 
has similar ethno-religious identity with them in order to secure safety. When the conflict abated, the 
refugees were reluctant to return to their homelands. Consequently, areas that before the conflict had 
been relatively heterogeneous, get more homogeneous ethno-religiously. 
Beside that, a huge task of Ambon City Government, and in general Maluku Provincial 
Government is to deal with refugee problems which currently become problematic such as validity of 
refugee data, absence of refugee empowerment, uneven distribution of assistance, deteriorating 
physical and health conditions of refugees, dispute over inhabited lands, population issues, return of 
civil rights to abandoned assets, land certificates, and excess of government claims that refugees 
management was completed in  2009 so that any handling efforts have been halted.  
Refugee relocation mechanism originated from some policy options offered by the government as 
part of solutions, namely returning to homeland, relocation, or staying in refuge areas. Among those 
options, relocation was the main option chosen by the refugees at that time. The relocations have 
unintentionally and indirectly contributed to construction of new segregated community 
concentrations as the refugees tended to choose the relocation sites near, or around, the community of 
identity similar to them. Three important reasons why the refugees tended to choose the relocation 
places were their status as minority group in their homeland, absence of security guarantee if they 
returned to their homeland, and failure in requesting to return to their homeland. 
Ambon City Government has determined and implemented some post-conflict development 
priorities. In general, the policy in the development priorities is to reconstruct Ambon physically, 
infrastructurally and psychically which covers thorough refugee management, reconciliation and 
restoration of brotherhood tie, opening of new heterogeneous settlement, trauma handling, children 
counseling, gatherings, Social Harmony, and development of Orang Basudara  (brotherhood) 
curriculum. Such programs have been clearly outlined in the 2006-2011 and 2011-2016 Medium 
Term Development Plans of Ambon City and particularly the 2006-2026 Long-Term Development 
Plans of Ambon City.  
In evaluative-qualitative fashion, some post-conflict reconstruction policy programs that have been 
relatively realized are reconciliation and restoring of brotherhood, both through gatherings, joint 
organizing of various religious events, and inter-faith dialogs and cooperation; construction and 
development of new heterogeneous areas; construction of public spaces for meeting such as 
reconstruction of Mardika Field; Social Harmony; development of Orang Basudara (brotherhood) 
curriculum; development of border areas; trauma handling. 
Based on the research data analysis, there are some critical-evaluative notes addressed to such 
developmental programs and other unimplemented programs. Firstly, the 2006 Social Harmony 
Program suffered from many fund leaks and did not accord the society target, as well as had many 
project results that have been damaged and not functional. Secondly, trauma handling did not run 
optimally. Moreover, the constructed Center for Trauma is not functional any longer. Thirdly, public 
spaces development for inter-community meeting only focused on Mardika Field, and there is almost 
no development of other public spaces.  Fourthly, development of Orang Basudara (brotherhood) 
curriculum was still in the concept/ idea and no real implementation was done. Fifthly, construction/ 
renovation of traditional markets which are very strategic for meeting spaces was not fully realized. 
Sixthly, development of border areas which often constitute the hot spots of violent conflicts has yet to 
be executed at all, both economically and socio-culturally. Seventhly, post-conflict children assistance 
tended to sporadic-ceremonial. Eighthly, frequency of joint organizing of religious events was still 
low. Then, two other problems that require special attention are different perceptions among society 
segments on the urgency of permanent posts construction in border areas and presence of the 
Indonesian Military (TNI) under Bawah Kendali Operasi (BKO) in Ambon. Apart from that, common 
perception on discriminatory access to education especially to higher education and employment 
would require special attention. 
Generally, post-conflict condition and situation in Ambon are said to run relatively well, and 
particularly, inter-community relationship and interaction may be said to run quite well. Well-restored 
relationship is strengthened by shared awareness on conflicts and inter-community cooperation in 
managing conflicts/ violence which occur after the conflict. Nevertheless, it should be admitted that 
certain society segments still feel trauma, fear, or discomfort when they enter or visit particular areas 
where the majority of the population used to be their enemies, especially at nights. Therefore, trauma 
handling and mutual trust building between communities require special attention and treatment. 
Increased post-conflict segregation has contributed to and played a certain role in the emerging 
cases of violence. Field findings show that many post-conflict violent incidents occurred in border 
areas between Islamic and Christian communities. Some elements have been identified as the 
triggering factors of such violence, and have some connection with, or constitute indirect effects from, 
segregation. Some of the elements are intervention from external parties including provocation or 
playing both communities off against each other; social disharmony between new comers and 
indigenous people; suspicion between groups resulting from post-conflict effects; vulnerability of 
border areas as hot spots of emerging violence; easy mobilization of society by using religious 
sentiments. 
Leadership aspect is an integral part of the effort to maintain harmony and prevent post-conflict 
violence. This aspect generally can be divided into three categories, namely leadership of religious 
leaders, leadership of local leaders, and leadership of traditional figures. Participation of religious 
leaders in Ambon in the effort to maintain harmony and prevent post-conflict violence is a necessity, 
due to their strategic position in the society, even though such participation is not fully able to prevent 
violence yet. From Christian community’s perspective, efforts to prevent the spread of violence have 
been supported by centralized Church leadership in the congregation. Unfortunately this is not easy to 
be found in Muslim community due to various people affiliations to religious leaders and Islamic 
organizations. This has caused the society’s initiative to be more dominant that that of the leaders in 
Muslim community. 
Local figures that hold positions both formal and informal ones, possess important influences in 
the society under their responsibility. Even, religious difference with the community does not prevent 
them from carrying out the tasks without any discrimination. The leaders exist within the Muslim and 
Christian communities, and actively engage in conflict prevention. Beside that, ethnic-based leaders 
play major roles in influencing their communities, especially for political interest. Similarly with 
traditional leaders, they also have strategic roles in maintaining peace and prevent violence. They do 
this by issuing announcement and disseminating it to the public. However, there are some challenges 
faced by traditional leaders, such as limited legitimacy in the areas with pluralistic demographic 
characteristics, many traditional leaders getting involved in political activities so that they cannot 
represent traditional communities, and absence of Latupati rule that binds all kings, making problems 
in the society hard to resolve. 
Various society efforts to prevent post-conflict violence include those in the social, cultural, 
religious, political and economic aspects. Efforts in the social, cultural and religious aspects covers 
involvement of another religious community in organizing religious events, disseminating peace 
values in religion through education channels, involvement of youth and interfaith figures in 
observation of religious holidays, strengthening of youth roles and initiatives through media, as well 
as strengthening of local wisdom to settle violence. The political aspect generally covers political 
division of power, while the economic aspect is mainly carried out through society initiatives to set up 
temporary, surprise markets in another community area to support intensified interaction and 
communications 
Lastly, strategic efforts to deal with post-conflict segregation and violence have also been 
conducted by various civil society organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGO). The 
organizations’ initiatives are normally based on orientation of each organization, which can be 
differentiated into religious, socio-educational, and economic initiatives. Religious organizations, both 
Islamic and Christian, such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, Indonesian Ulema Council 
(MUI), Maluku Protestant Church (GPM), and Maluku Interfait Institute (LAIM) much emphasize 
peace messages and de-radicalization in their speeches, sermons, as well as various religious 
activities. Socio-educational initiatives included the gathering of kings from Latupati Council to 
discuss  to-do actions in order that the September 11, 2011 incident did not get widespread, 
recruitment of peace activists to minimize tension in border areas, advocacy of gender perspective and 
child protection budget, facilitation to conflict-related trauma healing activities, counseling for violent 
perpetrators, as well as establishment of Peace Goes to School, Early Childhood Care and 
Development center (PAUD), and others. Economic aspects focused more on the utilization of 
cooperation with foreign agencies to develop segregated areas, such as strengthening of women’s 
micro enterprise through credit disbursement.  
  
C H A P T E R  I  
Preface 
B A C K G R O U N D  
Prolonged large-scale violence in the transition period of the New Order to Reform Era has 
reduced. However, until today potential conflicts are still major issue in Indonesia. Many problems 
which previously triggered big conflicts still have the potential for recurrence of violence in post-
conflict areas. Beside that, other forms of episodic conflicts- land and natural resource disputes, local 
leadership elections (pilkada), and thugs— continue to take place in various provinces, both those 
previously hit by big conflicts and not. Therefore, Indonesian post-conflict society is very vulnerable 
to recurrence of violence, even when peace has been built. As emphasized by Collier, Hoeffler, and 
Soderbom (2006), in the post-conflict society, violence often recurs with averagely 40% of the whole 
risk of conflict occurrence in a decade. Such estimation is even higher than conflict risk which is 
generally faced by poor countries.1 Therefore, it can be imagined how much violent potential will 
recur in post-conflict areas in Indonesia.  
The fall of the New Order (ORBA), marked with President Soeharto being dethroned in 1998, 
created a historical moment which Bertrand called (2008) “critical juncture”, in which violent 
conflicts occurred and grew dramatically and almost simultaneously in various areas across Indonesia 
(Bertrand, 2004). A violent conflict took place for the first time between Dayak tribe and Madurese 
migrants  in December 1996. In the initial process of democratization, various violent conflicts in 
some areas of Indonesia escalated quite fast, namely in Aceh, Papua, East Timor, Maluku,2 Central 
Kalimantan, and Sulawesi.3 Almost all of the conflicts experienced de-escalation or were resolved in 
late 2002, except Acehnese conflict. 
Out of five provinces which experienced communal conflicts—West Kalimantan, Central 
Kalimantan, Maluku, North Maluku, and Central Sulawesi— Maluku Province tends to have fairly 
high intensity of violent conflicts. The province’s violent conflict trend tended to increase during 
2002-2012 (see Graphic 1). 
NVMS data shows the size of accumulated violence in all districts of Maluku Province. From 
Graphic 2 above, we can see that Ambon City still becomes an area with the highest accumulated rate 
of violent conflict during February 2002 to December 2012. If compared to the total violent incidents 
in Maluku Province, the violence percentage in Ambon City is more dominant than in other areas, 
namely 50% of violent incidents; 38% deaths; 54% injuries; 43% damaged buildings. From the total 
violent incidents in Ambon City, data shows there are causes of the violence (see Graphic 3). 
Based on Graphic 3 above, identity-related violence is still dominant, although peace agreement 
between conflicting communities during the major conflict was reached in early 2002. As viewed 
from the identity perspective, one aspect that often generates intercommunity violence is religion. In 
the last 10 years data shows that violence between religious followers are is still a high-rate conflict. 
(Graphic 4) 
The data below shows that inter-religious violence increased sharply in 2011 after a relatively low 
level of violence before it. 
Reflected on the above data, identity factor still becomes a significant element that can influence 
the emergence of violence in Ambon. The strengthening of identity is felt more real if seen from 
segregation phenomenon—both physically and socially- between parties of different identities, for 
example through determination of area border owned by a group or relocation of settlement of a party 
previously involved in a dispute. Although segregation between groups in Ambon has existed through 
                                                             
1 Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom, 2006. 
2 For brief information on Ambon conflict, see Box 1. 
 
3 Bertrand 2008, page 425. 
 
history, the frequent phenomenon is not only the strengthened historical segregation, but also the birth 
of new segregation resulting from government policies and conflict resolution efforts. Relocation 
process which was one of the government policies in managing the 1999 post-conflict refugees has 
created unintended consequence, namely birth of new community concentrations separate to each 
other. This segregation existence is a phenomenon which would raise many questions, especially if 
related to post-conflict condition and its connection to recurring violence. 
Therefore, the National Violence Monitoring System (NVMS) team from The Habibie Center 
understands that segregation problem in Ambon constitutes a case worth studying, in a view of 
Ambon status as one of the areas that once had a huge conflict. Particularly, the research has the goals 
of: 
1. Identifying and describing the process of segregation formation in post-conflict Ambon;  
2. Identifying impacts of government policies on post-conflict segregation in Ambon; 
3. Explaining segregation effects to the emergence of violence in post-conflict Ambon; 
4. Understanding participation of agencies in overcoming violence-related segregation 
impacts in Ambon. 
The benefits of the research can be divided into two: academic and practical benefits. 
Academic Benefits: 
1. In general, the research will become additional important literature and/or fill in the 
literature gap on segregation study in Indonesia. 
2. In particular, the research will provide or offer specific perspective in segregation study, 
namely post-conflict, or consequence of post-conflict developmental reconstruction 
policies.  
Practical Benefits: 
1. Availability of information on segregation, emergence process and its impact on violent  
conflicts recurring after conflict, as well as involvement of non-governmental organization 
both local and national ones. 
2. Availability of inputs and recommendations on the need of policy change in overcoming 
segregation and its impacts on post-conflict violence emergence. 
3. Availability of reference for development agencies, policy makers, NGOs, local and 
central governments, as well as other developmental stakeholders that work for 
development and conflict management in Ambon. 
C O N C E P T  A N D  L I T E R A T U R E  R E V I E W  
CONCEPT OF SEGREGATION 
Segregation can be understood as segmentation of society based on group identity, for example 
ethnicity, religion, geographic origin, and others. The factors constitute separating elements4 which 
are generally found in socio-cultural society which was and was not previously hit by conflicts and 
violence. Segregation phenomenon is also excess of disturbed societal stability which is related to 
domination and marginalization of a societal group, for example in a bid to access resources. (see 
Qadeer, 2003; Reskin & Bielby, 2005).  
Segregation can take place in voluntary and forced fashion. The first type of segregaton occurs 
when the society tends to choose to live among the people with the same ethnicity, religion or 
geographical origin. For Indonesia case, the above identity-based enclaves are mainly found in 
various areas such as Kampung Jawa (Javanese Kampong), Kampung Melayu (Malay Kampong), 
Kampung Arab (Arabic Kampong), Pecinan (Chinese Area) and others (see Chang, 2002; Kosasih, 
2010). The second type of segregation may happen, for instance, due to government policies5 which 
                                                             
4 Separating elements (and unifying elements) are concepts loaned from Bakhtin (1984) on centrifugal and centripetal forces of narratives. 
 
5 Reasons for and consequences of segregation due to government policies in other countries, for example the Netherlands and Nambia, can 
be seen in Barbra (2009). 
 
intentionally construct enclaves in transmigration areas in Kalimantan and Sumatra for Javanese 
and Balinese people who joined the program. 
Segregation keeps on moving in the framework of community’s social formation. It means 
segregation phenomenon is not static, but it can have its own dynamics. Historical factors can also 
strengthen or weaken segregation, beside any internal and external pressure which later can change 
the shape of segregation in community’s social formation, such as social conflicts, natural disasters 
and others (Djajadi, 2004). 
Segregation can take two forms namely spatial segregation and social segregation (Barbra, 
2009). Although both segregation forms can be seen separately, there are many cases in which 
combination of both (socio-spatial segregation) takes place. According to Barbra, spatial 
segregation and unbalanced control over landscape are the reflection from social gap formation 
because, for instance, perceived culture is different. The social gap itself is an effort taken in 
voluntary or forced fashion to accommodate the interests of each group or authority. A classical 
example from forced segregation with social-spatial form can be seen in the establishment of 
special reservations for native Americans and resettlement of Mollucans, ex Royal Netherlands East 
Indies Army (Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger/KNIL), as well as Dutch supporters in the 
Netherlands. Voluntary segregation with socio-spatial form can be seen in the Amish community 
settlement in the U.S. 
Beside the physical-spatial and social segregation approach, there is more psychological 
segregation approach, namely segregation in the form of thinking map related to settlement area. 
Concept and/or mapping of segregation is often called “segregation in mind” (perceived segregation). 
In the Ambon context, for example, since long time ago Batu Merah or Waihaong negeri6 has been 
perceived as Salam (Islamic) area, although another community’s members of a different religion live 
there. Karang Panjang or Kudamati, for example, is perceived as Sarani (Christian) area although in 
the area live people of a different religion. Nevertheless, such segregation patterns do not necessarily 
threaten social integrity since they are still relatively managed through various safety valves in the 
form of local institutions that have participated in minimizing conflict potential due to the existing 
differences.7 
For Indonesian case, the phenomenon of societal grouping in one area is one of the conflict excess 
—seen, for instance, in the shifted settlement configuration which tends to group in an area with the 
same identity, such as groupings of Muslims and Christians in post-conflict North Maluku (Rozi et 
al., 2006). Not only that, markets as interaction space for different communities are affected by 
conflicting group separation, such as Jailolo Market which soon after the conflict ended is dominated 
by Christian community (Rozi et al.). Beside that, in less conducive situation after the conflict, almost 
all villages in North Tobelo subdistrict have experienced segregation in almost all sectors of life, 
including markets and schools (see Djana et al., 2004). 
Conflicts also bring about the strengthening of previous segregation. For example, strengthened 
segregation based on ethnicity and religion after the conflict in Poso (Diprose, 2007) and strengthened 
area exclusivity based on group identity by setting up barricades that separate their area from other 
areas in Ambon (Pariella, 2007). Beside that, impacts of conflicts in other areas because of the coming 
of internally displaced persons/IDP can trigger segregation which was less obvious, such as the arrival 
of East Timorese refugees in East Nusa Tenggara (Sunarto, Nathan, & Hadi, 2005).  
Although it has already been mentioned that for certain reasons post-conflict segregation must 
be executed for de-escalation of violence,8 however at the same time segregation also generates 
negative impacts. For example, efforts to support peaceful and fair development are often hampered 
by  post-conflict segregation (Hadi, 2005). Government officers also encounter difficulty in locating 
                                                             
6 For Ambon City people, village or usually called negeri is a community unit based on customary law with territorial border and 
autonomous authority as well as led directly by a kind or Latupati. 
 
7 T. D. Pariela, response paper in Semi-Workshop NVMS-THC, Ambon, 23 October 2013. 
 
8 In this case it should be underlined that post-conflict segregation to deescalate violence does not settle the root causes of conflicts and is 
merely temporary halt in violence. 
 
“neutral” areas (Mawdsley, Tanuhandaru, & Holman, 2002) to discuss, for instance, development 
programs. Therefore, segregation can also hinder intervention efforts done by the government to 
build peace in post-conflict areas. 
Literature review on the above segregation offers a description of some issues. Firstly, community 
stability can be disturbed, by, one of which is conflict. The stability recovery requires a long period 
especially in post-conflict times, moreover if there are internal and external pressure which hampers 
the process of stabilization. Secondly, segregation can take place because of being forced and 
voluntary, in which previous and current government policies can be the driving factor for 
segregation. If related to post-conflict condition, the research strives to focus on forced segregation. 
Thirdly, spatial and social segregations as well as the combination of both are commonly found in the 
effort to identify forms of segregation. For this, socio-spatial segregation in post-conflict condition 
becomes the key focus on the research, especially if related to government policies which give basis 
for the emergence of the segregation, and how the segregation is related to the occurrence 
(recurrence) of violence among previously-conflicting parties.  
SEGREGATION AND VIOLENCE IN POST-CONFLICT AREAS 
Despite being frequently questioned, ethnic segregation can reduce violence intensity among used-
to-fight groups (Weidmann & Salehyan, 2010). Some researches show that creation of partition, or 
physical segregation between ethnic groups is the best way to build peace (see Chapman & Roeder, 
2007; Kaufmann, 1996; Sambanis, 2000). This needs to be implemented because when identity grows 
stronger due to violence, conflicting groups will not find it easy to trust one another and live together 
peacefully. With segregation, the inter-group contacts can be minimized and independent enclaves 
can be built. On the contrary, weak segregation can improve contacts, competitions, and frequencies 
of violence between used-to-fight groups (Olzak, Shanahan, & McEneaney, 1996). 
For Indonesian case, creation of partition or physical segregation can be implemented to prevent 
continued violence so that one of the fighting parties must be relocated to other areas. For instance, in 
ethnic conflict cases in West Kalimantan Madurese ethnic community was forced to move and settle 
down in other areas to escape violence against them. In this case, Madurese people must be 
segregated geographically and inhibit areas specially set for them. Due to low intensity of interaction 
with other groups, the relocated refugees tended to be avoided from potential new riots (Kusdijono, 
2006). 
However, effect contrary to the above finding is obtained from the International Contact Group 
report (2012). ICG reported that in Ambon case the absence of attention to the violence’s systemic 
root, one of which is segregation, could cause violence to occur very easily. Such statement is 
supported by the field fact that showed a few inter-group incidents in Ambon. For example, inter-
group violence occurred in the torch relay at the 193th Pattimura Anniversary in May 2012. This 
incident showed that segregation did not reduce the level of violence because inter-group interaction 
intensity was still high, given Maluku geographic and demographic conditions.  
The above explanation shows that although segregation can reduce the level of violence, it does 
not mean that violence can be fully avoided. Previous studies show positive and negative 
relationship between segregation and violence in post-conflict areas. It can be concluded that the 
existence of segregation in post-conflict areas shows that the society in the areas are still vulnerable 
to violence resulting from residue of previous violence or new conflict potential. Therefore, 
violence management measures in post-conflict segregation areas constitute an issue to look into, 
especially if connected to policy intervention efforts which are an important part in pushing 
reconciliation process in conflict areas. 
POST-CONFLICT SEGREGATION AND GOVERNMENT RECONSTRUCTION POLICY 
The people living in post-conflict situations are faced with two major challenges, namely the 
recovery of economy which has been damaged due to conflicts and conflict risk reduction to 
overcome post-conflict peace fragility which can bring about recurring violence (Collier, Hoeffler, & 
Söderbom, 2006). Economic recovery through assistance program and reformed policies has been 
executed. However, the execution must be supported by conflict risk reduction because absent 
violence is an important point in building peace efforts (Holtzman, Elwan, & Scott, 1998). Therefore, 
government capacity in implementing the policies becomes very strategic. For example, effective and 
timely implementation of control (policing) has given major impact on the long-term violence 
reduction (Weidmann & Salehyan, 2010). The government capacity itself can be seen into three 
categories: military capacity, bureaucratic/ administrative capacity, and political institutional 
coherence and quality (Hendrix, 2010). Given the wide categories, the research will only focus on 
bureaucratic/ administrative capacity, especially in carrying out government-developed policies. 
Some measures have been taken to overcome segregation impacts in some post-conflict areas in 
Indonesia; two of them are policies on regional proliferation and relocation of refugees. For example, 
in 1999 the government agreed to the establishment of two new districts, Bengkayang and Landak, 
from the ‘mother’ districts, Sambas and Pontianak respectively. The main consideration of the district 
proliferation was based on the ethnicity factor, although the assumption was rejected by the 
government. However, demographic facts showed that the proliferation has been one of the steps to 
overcome conflicts by attempting segregation initiatives: two new districts are Dayak ethnic areas, 
while the two ‘mother’ districts are Malay areas. Nowadays, Bengkayang and Landak, which used to 
be conflict-prone areas, become areas with no tension (Tasanaldy, 2007). In this case, regional 
proliferation program by the government was consciously taken by ignoring reintegration factor. The 
implication is that state-sponsored reconciliation and reintegration processes do not happen just 
because the government’s policy even hampers such processes. Nevertheless, such policy has proven 
to create calm situation in the areas that used to be vulnerable to ethnic conflicts. (Tasanaldy, 2007).  
Beside that, the central government through the National Coordinating Board for Disaster and IDP 
Management (Bakornas PBP) formed through Presidential Decree (Keppres) No. 3 Year 2001 along 
with the West Kalimantan government through Joint Team for Post Sambas Social Riot Madurese 
IDPs Management (TGPPPKSS) issued a policy on relocating madurese refugees following the 
communal clashes in West Kalimantan. The policy execution turned out to present less-promising 
results at least due to two things: such policy was formulated poorly and lack of coordination took 
place among policy-executing agencies (Susetyo, 2003). As a result, low infrastructure quality (for 
example, roads and houses) and limited access of refugees to resources (for instance, quality land and 
soil type) brought about unrealized goal of forced segregation policy (Kusdijono, 2006). Even though 
spatial segregation in the policy did prevent involvement of refugees in new violence due to low 
frequency of interaction with external people, but the social segregation caused the Madurese refugees 
not to have the capacity to participate fully in developmental efforts. 
In the Maluku and North Maluku contexts, the government has issued a policy that underlines the 
need for overall rehabilitation in post-conflict areas. People’s walfare approach can be seen in the 
consideration section of the Presidential Instruction (Inpres) which clearly prioritizes harmonizing 
efforts of social relationship between groups that used to fight. The above intended policy is the 
Instruction of the President of the Republic of Indonesia No. 6 Year 2003 on Accelerated 
Development Recovery of Post-Conflict Maluku and North Maluku. In other words, the Inpres  
becomes the legal basis for the implementation of post-conflcit development reconstruction in 
Ambon, and generally in Maluku and North Maluku Provinces. 
According to Bappenas (2010), conducive condition has been built in Maluku and North Maluku. 
Beside that, such Inpres is deemed important for peace recovery by “building the local government 
capacity and capability, rehabilitation implementation, dialog initiatives and effective 
communications as well as community facilitation” (g. II. 6-9). According to Bappenas (2009), in 
rebuilding trust among the conflicting groups, the government conducted “facilitation initiatives to 
socio-cultural agencies in conflicting areas of Poso, Maluku, and North Maluku” (p. 02-10). This has 
been done in partnership with NGOs, community-based organizations, and universities. 
Nevertheless, there are some concerns in the field. Santoso (2006) reported that one of the 
concerns was triggered by the completion of fund support from the Inpres, while the field condition 
was not yet conducive so that refugee issues were ignored and could trigger new conflicts. The fund 
distribution—or in bigger scale, control over income per capita (see Fearon & Laitin, 2003)—had 
contribution to the low potential for civil violence in areas with people of various ethnicity and 
religions. Beside that, Maluku Refugee Coalition (KPM) Coordinator Pieter Pattywaellapia (quoted 
in Santoso, 2006) mentioned that social reintegration processes among the segregated society at 
conflict time was not yet successfully recovered due to local government transparency issues. 
Next, social blending which constitutes signs of social, economic and social relationship 
improvements becomes a challenge for policy makers and government agencies as well as non-
governmental organizations in a bid to maintain post-conflict recovery process amidst segregation, 
especially based on the studies conducted in Central Sulawesi and North Maluku regions (Huber et 
al., 2004). Horizontal inequality and social/political exclusion aspects in getting access to 
employment, education and political participation are closely related to the recovery of social 
relations which are hampered by segregation (Diprose, 2009). Beside that, awareness among 
conflicting parties to revitalize or re-institutionalize their traditional values set aside during the 
conflicts can support reconciliation process, especially for those who experienced force segregation 
and relocation following the violence in Ambon (Adam, 2008).  
Based on the above findings it can be concluded that government policies related to conflict 
resolution which have generated segregation between the conflicting parties show various results and 
tend to deviate far from the spirit of the policies’ issuance. Some studies above are accompanied 
evaluative researches on government-issued policies, but do not specifically focus on the segregation 
aspects and resulting consequences. Therefore, the research also attempts to reveal the consequences 
of the government policies which end up with segregation, especially if related to violence that still 
may occur in post-conflict regions. 
Beside that, theoretically the raised question is until when Ambon is considered as post-conflict 
area.  Is there any timeframe or particular indicators in which Ambon is no longer called as post-
conflict area? To get rid of post-conflict status and enter normalization phase, an area need to reach 
three conditions/ indicators: (1) intervention from external parties are no longer needed; (2) 
governance process and economic activities generally run in independent fashion; (3) internal and 
external relationship has run normally based on norms, tradition, and custom as before. Every post-
conflict area has different dynamics and capacity to reach those three indicators—one area is likely to 
reach them relatively fast, while another one reach them very slowly. Thus, in this context, particular 
limit/ timeframe should not become the basis.9 
With reference to those three indicators, based on our field findings, Ambon is not fully rid of 
post-conflict status yet due to some reasons. Among them are external interventions including the 
unfinished settlement of refugee’s rights— as marked by the presence of BKO troops, planned 
additional reinforcement of BKO troops by Maluku Provincial Government, etc.—although overall 
such intervention relatively reduces. Beside that, even though  in general internal relationship has 
run relatively well, there are still particular segments of society that feel unsafe/ uncomfortable to 
travel to particular areas and in particular time. One good side is that local government process and 
economic activities are said to run relatively well. So, it is still fairly reasonable to utilize post-
conflict concept in the research. 
R E S E A R C H  M E T H O D O L O G Y  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUE  
The research uses qualitative approach. The data used here include primary and secondary data. 
The primary data are principally collected through in-depth interviews, focus group discussion, and 
observation. Interviews are used to build rapport and understanding with respondets so that they can 
focus on disclosing their own perspectives on what they have gone through (Denzin, 2001; Wiseman 
& Aaron, 2001; and Beale, Cole, Hillege, McMaster, & Nagy, 2004; Patton 2002). Typology and 
interview respondent candidates can be seen from the explanation on section “Sampling Strategy”. 
Interview data will be transcribed according to the format in Annex 1 “Form Interview Transcript”. 
The research adopts some recommendations from Kumar (1989), especially concerning conceptual 
framework development, interview guideline preparation, and selection of key informants. Guideline 
for general questions for interview can be seen in Annex 2. 
                                                             
9 See Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) (May 2012). 
 
The research uses focus group discussion (FGD) in collecting data. FGD is open-ended interviews 
with a group of informants (totaling five to eight persons) in which the informants are given 
opportunity to provide their inputs on the focused issues presented by researchers (Patton, 2002). 
According to Kumar (1987), FGD is useful in data collection for the purpose of assessment on an 
innovation, monitoring and evaluating, as well as interpreting available quantitative data. 
Observation method in data collection is based on perspective dimension, Patton (2002), which 
covers (1) the role of observer (spectator); (2) dominant approach of external party (ethic); (3) 
individual and collective observations; (4) closed observation (covert) on observed objects; (5) single 
and short observation; (6) narrow observation done only on particular elements in interactive 
behaviors. Observation activities are conducted on interactions in particular places, such as markets 
and religious places, religious events, socio-cultural events, existence of enclaves, and others. The 
data is recorded in the form of daily journal (field notes) completed by researcher every time they 
conduct observation.   
Lastly, the secondary data is elaborated from various sources including documents, reports, 
academic publications, magazines, and printed newspapers and online news. The secondary data is 
collected to complement the data obtained through interviews and observations, and become 
additional information in formulating questions and pave the way for data-adding initiatives (Patton, 
2002). Furthermore, Altheide (2000) stated that document analysis is intended to find and explain an 
incident with the purpose of identifying the meaning, patterns, and process of such incident. 
SAMPLING STRATEGY 
To get and determine informants, the sampling strategy used here is purposive and snowball 
sampling. The purposive sampling will mainly used in the initial phase of field data collection. If 
rapport has been built with initial respondents, then snowball sampling will be utilized to find more 
respondents based on the recommendations from the previous respondents. Key informants will be 
taken from the element’s representatives that are considered being relevant to the research topic. In 
general, key informants for this research are taken from three levels: 
Macro, it is represented by officials that represent the central government and local governments. 
Mezo, it is represented by government and non-governmental agencies operating in research areas, 
for example non-governmental organization (NGOs), community based organizations, 
District/City People’s Welfare Office. 
Micro, it is represented by community figures or representatives based on ethnicity, gender, 
religion, and others; as well as representatives from grass-root groups, for example village 
heads, religious leaders, youth leaders, and gender activists. 
 
Particularly, key informants will be selected based on representation of various Ambonese society 
elements by basing on data needs contained in each research questions as follows (Table 1). 
Table 1: List of Research Questions and Potential Informants 
No Research Questions Key Informants Output 
1 How does segregation 
emerge/ grow after 
peace in Ambon? 
Local academicians; NGO activists 
related to social issues, especially 
peace; religious figures; traditional 
figures; conflict actors (previous 
conflict perpetrators and victims); 
refugees 
- mapping of 
segregation 
- cause analysis on 
emergence of post-
conflict segregation 
2 What are the impacts of 
post-conflict 
developmental 
reconstruction policies 
on the emergence of and 
strengthened segregation 
in Ambon? 
Government elements (mayor, 
Bappeda, Social Affair office, 
Religious Affairs office, Spatial 
Planning office, Health office, 
Education office, etc.); security 
elements (TNI and Police, thugs); 
local legalization elements; 
movement elements (socio-political 
- evaluation on 
policies 
- identification of 
stakeholders 
No Research Questions Key Informants Output 
and gender activists); economic 
elements (trader and business people); 
society elements accessing education, 
health services, etc. 
3 What is the relationship 
between segregation and 
emergence of violence in 
post-conflict Ambon? 
Local academicians; security 
elements; traditional elements; 
religious elements; youth elements 
problem analysis 
4 What is the role of non-
governmental 
organizations (NGOs) 
and civil society 
organizations in 
managing segregation 
and the impacts on 
emergence of violent 
conflicts in Ambon? 
Religious elements (FKUB, Islamic 
organizations, Christian organization, 
etc.); civil society elements (NGO 
activists related to social issues, 
especially peace); youth elements 
(youth leaders, youth organization 
karang taruna, etc.) 
- NGO participation 
data 
- Segregation 
management 
strategy and the 
impacts 
 
The data collection was conducted in two phases. The first phase was held from 10 December to 
18 December 2012. The second phase was from 13 May to 23 May 2013. From both data collection, 
the total number of respondents was 74. 
  
C H A P T E R  I I  
Overview of Ambon City 
D E M O G R A P H I C  P I C T U R E  O F  A M B O N  C I T Y  
PICTURE OF AMBON CITY 
Geographically, Ambon City is located in most of Ambon island territory covering the width of 
377 Km² according to the Government Regulation No. 13 Year 1979. The land wideth of Ambon City 
is 359,45 Km² based on the 1980Land Use Survey. If seen from the topographic characteristics of 
Ambon City, the area composition consists of hills (73%) and low lands (17%). 
From the administrative aspect, Ambon City is the center of Maluku Provincial government since 
its establishment as the capital of Maluku Province in 1958.10 Therefore, bureaucracy centers are 
located in Ambon City such as offices of governors and related provincial offices, Maluku Provincial 
Legislative Council office, Indonesian Military Headquarters (TNI) as well as Indonesian Police 
(Polri) Headquarters. The existence of such power centers have made Ambon City strategic for doing 
coordination of government affairs and policy making in Maluku Province. After the 1999-2002 
communal conflicts, the previously damaged governmental offices and centers have been renovated. 
Not only that, the security condition is relatively conducive so that this has pushed governmental 
activities in the Maluku Province capital to return to normality.  
Ambon City consists of five subdistricts namely Sirimau, Nusaniwe, Teluk Ambon, Teluk Ambon 
Baguala, and South Leitimur subdistricts. There are 50 kelurahan/villages divided into those five 
subdistricts (see Table 2). 
Based on the above table, Sirimau subdistrict is the area that has the most villages/kelurahan  if 
compared to the other subdistricts. The subdistrict is the capital of Ambon City. The existence of 
villages in Ambon City tends to be dominant in Teluk Ambon, Teluk Ambon Baguala, and South 
Leitimur Subdistricts. The distribution an location of subdistricts and villages in Ambon City can be 
seen more clearly in the above Ambon City map (see Map 1 page 143).  
Table 2: Subdistrics and Villages and Kelurahan in Ambon City11 
Subdistrict Villages Kelurahan 
Sirimau 4 10 
Nusaniwe 5 8 
Teluk Ambon 7 1 
Teluk Ambon Baguala 6 1 
South Leitimur  8 - 
 
Source: BPS (Bureau of Statistics) of Ambon City 2012 
PICTURE OF AMBON CITY POPULATION 
In the last three decades, the population growth of Ambon City have had fluctuating trend 
(Graphic 5). In 1990 the Ambon City population totalled 275,888. The number decreased in 2000 by 
191,561, and increased in 2010 totaling 331,254. Such trend was related to the outbreak of communal 
                                                             
10 Establishment of Ambon City as the capital of Maluku Province was based on Law No. 20 Year 1958on Formation of First-Level 
Autonomous Region of Maluku. 
 
11 This composition is based on the Local Regulation (Perda) of Ambon City No. 2 Year 2006. 
 
conflicts between 1999 and 2002 which claimed thousands of lives and tens of thousands people 
displaced (see Graphic 5).12 
Almost one decade after the communal conflicts, the Ambon City population growth tended to 
increase. The 2010 BPS census data shows that the Ambon City population growth reached 5.65%, 
per year, the highest of all districts/ cities in Maluku Province. The population growth came from the 
urbanization which tended to increase and return of the people to Ambon who took refuge. 
If seen from the Ambon City population distribution, Sirimau subdistrict is the most densely 
populated, followed by Nusaniwe, Teluk Ambon Baguala, Teluk Ambon, and South Leitimur 
Subdistricts (Graphic 6). 
The villages (customary negeri) or kelurahan that have the highest number of population are Batu 
Merah Village in Sirimau Subdistrict, Passo Village in Teluk Ambon Baguala Subdistrict, Kelurahan 
Kudamati and Benteng in Nusaniwe Subdistrict.  
Population density in some areas (subdistricts or village/kelurahan) is influenced by several things. 
For example, population density in Sirimau Subdistrict occurred because the area is the capital city in 
which there are many markets, offices and other public facilities. Beside that, population density in an 
area is also influenced by previous conflicts. For example, population density in Batu Merah Village 
is affected by many Muslim refugee locations who moved from areas both inside and outside Ambon 
due to security reasons and previous communal conflict trauma. Similar cases are also found in Passo 
Village and Kelurahan Kudamati as the destination of settlement for Christian community from inside 
and outside Ambon that previously took refuge when the communal conflicts occurred. 
The population growth of Ambon City is closely related to the revival of society activity centers. 
This can be seen in some economic centers such as Mardika market and rows of shops with house 
above (ruko) in A. Y. Patty street. Beside that, the presence of new economic centers such as Ambon 
City Center area and Transit Bus Terminal in Passo Village has become one of the driving factors for 
the speedy economy growth which result in the increased population in Ambon City. Post-conflict 
relatively conducive situation also supports the educational process. Pattimura University becomes the 
magnet for the people inside and outside Ambon to access higher education. Those things have made 
Ambon City more fortunate than other areas. 
Seen from religious aspect, the Ambon City population consists of Christians (59%), Muslims 
(39%), Catholics (2%), Hindu (0,13%), and Buddhists (0,04%).13 The population composition based 
on religion in Ambon City does not have signicant change in the percentage if compared to the 
population composition in the previous communal conflict period. Both large communities, namely 
Protestants/ Christians and Muslims, are still dominant in Ambon City. The distribution of population 
by religion can also be seen based on the subdistricts in Ambon City (Graphic 7).  
Based on the above picture, the distribution pattern of the population by religion tends to  
demonstrate people concentration in particular subdistrict. For instance, Muslims tend to live in 
Sirimau, Teluk Ambon, and Nusaniwe Subdistricts; while Christians dominate Nusaniwe, Teluk 
Ambon Baguala, and South Leitimur Sub districts.  
T H E  L A T E S T  S I T U A T I O N  O F  A M B O N  C I T Y  
SOCIAL SITUATION  
The social condition of Ambon City people currently cannot be separated from the previous 
communal conflict experiences. The problem of distrust in the social relationship becomes one thing 
that is difficult to erase, both in the Christian community to the Muslims or vice versa, as told by an 
informant: 
                                                             
12 The conflicts claimed approximately 1,413 lives and tens of thousands people had to take refuge outside Ambon, Maluku. Seet Barron et 
al. (2012). 
 
13 Population Census 2010. 
 
... katong (we) Muslims still live next door, katong (we) Christians still live next door. [...] we live in a frame of 
Pela Gandong, living in brotherhood, but bordered by wall of distrust.14 
One of the manifestations of the distrust is obvious in the people’s actions that tend to choose 
tolive in settlement with the community of same religion. Not only that, conflict trauma becomes the 
reinforcer of inter-community partitions. Such condition got worsened when religious violence 
recurred such as 11 September 2011 riot and clash at Pattimura Torch Relay of 15 May 2012. Such 
incidents often become the trigger of revival of strengthened distrust between Muslim and Christian 
communities.   
Nevertheless, the distrust condition may be tenuous. For example, in the national event of 
Musabaqah Tilawatil Quran (MTQ) there was inter-community solidarity in Ambon City. Mutual 
trust and help between both communities of different religions were obvious in the event.15 However, 
this does not necessarily erase traumatic experiences among the Ambonese society, especially the 
previous communal conflict victims.   
In the other side, uncertainty of law enforcement process has triggered social unrest. The death of a 
public van’s driver with destination to Kudamati on December 15, 2011, for instance, does not yet 
find an answer although it has been under investigation by the local police. Until now the police has 
not found the assassin yet. The implication is that since the incident, drivers and owners of Kudamati-
destination public vans that are used to passing through Waihaong street agree not to go through the 
area until the police succeed in finding the murderer.16 Consequently, the public transportation route 
of Waihaong–Silale to Benteng–Kudamati, Nusaniwe, is disturbed until today.  
Another prominent social condition in Ambon City is related to the refugees of the previous 
communal conflicts. Unfinished refugee management process generates various further problems. For 
example, refugees in Warasia live in The Hatalas’ land.  A problem emerged when the land owner 
wanted to execute the land inhabited by the refugees, so that they felt threatened of not having a place 
to live. Beside that, unclear population identity issue has become an obstacle for refugees, especially 
when they want to access People Business Credit which requires identity completeness as citizens.17 
POLITICAL SITUATION 
The political map in Ambon City cannot be separated from the 1998 Reform momentum. Since the 
fall of the New Order regime, constellation of political parties dominating the map of power in 
Ambon City has also changed. Secular parties rule various general elections and Ambon City mayor 
election. Beside that, PDI Perjuangan (PDI-P) as a party identical to the fighting symbol against the 
New Order appears as the influential political actor. The existence of PDI-P in Ambon City has close 
relationship with Christian communities in the area. Moreover, some of the party committees and 
members are functionaries of the Maluku Protestant Church (GPM) in Ambon City (Klinken, 2007). 
The following picture shows explicitly the strong relationship between PDI-P and Christians (Photo 3 
page 137). 
Furthermore, the political map in Ambon City as seen in the composition of seats in the Local 
Legislative Council (DPRD) shows that secular parties are still dominating. PDI-P and Golkar Party 
still become two dominant parties in the seat competition in the DPRD in every general election 
(Table 3). 
Table 3: Composition of Political Parties in Ambon City Legislative Council (1999-2009) 
1999 General Election 2004 General Election 2009 General Election 
                                                             
14 Interview with one of the Christian community activists, 17 December 2012. 
 
15 Interviews with some informants in Ambon City, Ambon, 14-16 December 2012. 
 
16 It was suspected that the driver was stabbed to death Waihaong area. Provocation then occurred, claiming that the Christian driver from 
Kudamati was killed by a resident of predominantly Muslim Waihaong area (interview with informant, Ambon, 14 December 2012. 
 
17 Interview with Maluku young employers organization’s figure, Ambon, 13 December 2012. 
 
Political 
Party 
Number of 
Seats in 
DPRD of 
Ambon City 
Political 
Party 
Number of 
Seats in 
DPRD of 
Ambon City 
Political 
Party 
Number of 
Seats in 
DPRD of 
Ambon City 
PDI-P 16 PDI-P 8 PDI-P 5 
Golkar 6 Golkar 6 Golkar 5 
PPP 6 PKS 4 PKS 3 
Fraksi ABRI 4 Partai 
Demokrat 
3 Partai 
Demokrat 
3 
PDBK 1 PDS 3 PDS 1 
PKP 1 PPP 2 PPP 3 
 
Source: Elaboration from various sources 
Beside the constellation of political parties, the execution of Maluku Governor election also colors 
the political dynamics in Ambon City. This can be seen one the eve of Maluku Governor election 
execution in June 2013.  Along the streets from Pattimura Airport to Latuhalat Village at the end of 
Ambon City, a number of banners and billboards displaying the candidates of governor or vice-
governor were installed. In Sirimau area which is the center of Ambon City, the local election festive 
was marked with statements from community figures and political party members.  Even, Ambon 
City Mayor Richard Louhenapessy joined and supported one of the candidates through billboards and 
banners installed along the Ambon City roadside. 
The issues offered by the candidates were welfare improvement, distribution of development, 
poverty reduction and transportation improvements.18 Beside that, security issues are still raised by 
candidates through various campaign media such as backdrops and local newspapers. Issues on 
togetherness and solidarity surfaced in various statements by the candidates such as the tagline from 
the incumbent candidate Said Assegaf–Zeth Sahuburua: “Maluku for All” (Photo 4 page 137).19 
Configuration of governor candidates is still filled with power sharing spirit between Muslims and 
Christians.20 Almost each of candidate couples put governor candidacy from Christian community and 
vice-governor candidacy from Muslim community, or vice versa. This pattern has become a trend in 
the local election at the provincial and/or district/city levels in Maluku.21 Like in the 2008 Governor 
election in which four couples of governor and vice-governor were always Christian-Muslim, or vice 
versa. The sharing also shows an understanding among some communities that after two periods the 
Maluku Governors were always from the Christian community, now it is time for a governor coming 
from Muslim community.22 Such statement does not represent the Mollucan society entirely, but gives 
confirmation that power sharing between communities has been an integral part of political peace 
process in Maluku.  
However, the execution of the democracy festive cannot be separated from various problems. One 
of them is some fear of political maneuver which ends up with violence, as stated by civil society 
representative as follows: 
We see that potential violence on the eve of the Local Election still remains, such as previous conflict in 
Porto–Haria, an incident in Batu Gantung, and some others. We do not know whether or not those were 
                                                             
18 Quoted from the delivery of vision and mission by Governor and Vice Governor candidates in a candidate debate program organized by 
the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences (FISIP) of Pattimura University (Unpatti), 21 May 2013 
 
19 Pranala http://www.siwalimanews.com, 20 February 2013 
 
20 Power sharing between Muslim and Christian communities especially in the strategic positions in the political, economic and social affairs 
in Maluku has been post-conflict phenomenon. 
 
21 See Tomsa (2008). 
 
22 Interview with one of the Muslim activists, Ambon, 13 December 2012. 
 
designed on the eve of the Local Election. but we as civil society (NGO) here have already told the people to 
protect each other and not to be easily provoked by SMS-SMS... because we here are very easily provoked.23 
The phenomenon emerging on the eve of the Governor Election, especially in Ambon City, is the 
mushrooming of forums or family ties based on ethnicity or particular areas. Such forums usually 
stage demonstrations or express their aspirations through newspaper or banners/ billboards. Usually 
they are utilized by governor candidates to voice out their interests and simultaneously attack their 
political rivals.24 Frictions often emerge although they are not in large scale nor spread to other areas. 
ECONOMIC SITUATION 
The economic condition of Ambon City shows a positive trend. This can be seen from the 
economic growth of Ambon City in 2012, namely approximately 6.77%.25 This figure was higher than 
the other districts/cities in Maluku Province. The development of the Regional Gross Domestic 
Product (PDRB) of Ambon City after the communal conflicts also demonstrated a positive trend and 
keeps on increasing every year (Graphic 8).  
In 2011 the Ambon City’s PDRB reached IDR4.2 trillion. The service sector was the biggest 
contributor to the regional revenue (nearly 27.81%) so that the economic growth rate of Ambon City 
was made positive. Then, the trading, transportation and communications sectors respectively 
contributed 27.38% and 18.05% of the total of Ambon City’s PDRB.  
According to Ambon Mayor Richard Louhenapessy, the positive economic growth in Ambon City 
was caused by high life expectancy, namely around 73.16%, which was the highest in the Maluku 
Province. The Human Development Index (IPM) of Ambon City is also the highest in Maluku 
Province, namely 78,94%. Positive trend of the economic growth of Ambon City could not be 
separated from the short-term developmental priorities applied after communal conflicts (2002-2011). 
The Ambon City government prioritized security stability as part of development programs.26 This was 
intended to revive society routine, including economic activities. 
According to an Ambonese employer, the Ambon City economic condition has far increased if 
compared with the initial post-conflict period.27 This can be seen in the busy selling activities in A. Y. 
Patty street. Even according to him, some sellers and owners of shops with house above (ruko) from 
Chinese ethnicity have returned to carry out economic activities in Ambon like in A. Y. Patty street 
and Passo Village. Beside that, other migrants such as Butonese, Bugis, and Makassarese (BBM) 
people, also return to informal economic activities in Ambon City.28 Currently the BBM groups 
dominate street-vendor trading and stands in Mardika Market, Batu Merah, and in Ambon Plaza 
(Amplaz) area.  
Ambon economic revival cannot be separated from the opening of new economic spaces in various 
territories, not only in Sirimau. For example, the construction of trading centers (such as mall) in Passo 
village which also colors the economic sector distribution in Ambon City. Since the construction, Passo 
area has been busier because the visitors come not only from Passo but also from other areas. Initially 
they were afraid when the area is designated as new economic space, because Passo in the conflict time 
was the biggest Christian basis.29 However with time passing by, this does not de-motivate people from 
outside Passo, especially from the Muslim community to participate in the economic activities there.  
                                                             
23 Interview with one Muslim, Chairperson of an NGO in Ambon,15 December 2012. 
 
24 Interview with Director of an NGO and church leaders in di Ambon, 15 December 2012. 
 
25 Pranala http://www.beritadaerah.com, 21 November 2012. 
 
26 Interview with an Ambon development planning official, Ambon 14 May 2013. 
 
27 Interview with Maluku young employer representatives, Ambon, 13 December 2012. 
 
28 According to Ambon City government official, Butonese, Bugis, and Makasarese people are one of violence targets in the previous 
communal conflicts (interview, Ambon, 13 December 2012). 
 
29 Interview with young Mollucan employer representative, Ambon, 13 December 2012. 
Construction of the new economic spaces was also the priority of Ambon City development. As   
mentioned by an official for Ambon City development affairs, one of the developmental priorities is 
to develop new areas for economic activities, such as markets, malls.30 In the near future, the focus 
will target the development of economic zones, such as markets in Nusaniwe. Not only that, 
construction and renovation of various supporting infrastructures such as roads and bridges will be 
targeted to support economic activities in Ambon.31  
Nevertheless, behind the increased economic activities in Ambon City, there are also some 
problems. Unemployment is a big problem in Ambon City. According to data from Ambon City BPS, 
there were approximately 22,738 people who do not get jobs (open unemployment) or approximately 
15.67% of the total work force.32 The rate is the biggest compared to all districts/cities in Maluku 
Province. 
Unemployment issue is not only economic problem, such as lack of job opportunities or law level 
of education among the people. The issue is important to note as many jobless community members 
are the victims of previous communal conflicts. In this context one of the Ambon City political 
activists said: 
Many of our young people here were victimized by the conflicts; [...] their parents died or [...] could not go 
to school because they lived in a refuge. So they, who are now adults, find it difficult to get jobs. Even if 
they work, they just do casual jobs. And many of them got drunk in alleys of these kampongs here. They are 
easily provoked to get to conflict. Like in the September 2011 riot, they were in the front.33 
After the communal conflicts, Ambon City has recovered. Governmental bureaucracies run 
normally; social, economic and political conditions have relatively experienced some increase. On the 
other hand, portrait of Ambon City still has some problems namely tendency of  religion-based 
settlement concentrations, phenomenon of distrust between Muslim and Christian communities, as 
well as unemployment, especially among young people. Those problems have the potential for 
harming peace consolidating process that has been fostered in Ambon City. 
  
                                                             
30 Interview with an Ambon development planning official, Ambon, 14 December 2012. 
 
31 Like the construction of Merah Putih bridge, renovation of Mardika market and terminal, and construction of parking area in Sirimau. 
 
32 Total work force in Ambon City in 2011 reached 145,072 people.  
 
33 Interview with one of the Ambon City political activists, Ambon, 17 December 2012. 
 
C H A P T E R  I I I  
Refugees, Relocation, and Formation of Post-Conflict 
Segregation 
B R I E F  H I S T O R Y  O F  S E G R E G A T I O N  A N D  P O S T - C O N F L I C T  S E G R E G A T I O N  
P A T T E R N S  I N  A M B O N  
BRIEF HISTORY OF SEGREGATIOIN IN AMBON CITY 
Segregation phenomenon is not a new issue in the life of Ambon City society. This indication is 
demonstrated by the settlement patterns of the Ambon City people before the communal conflicts, in 
which there were religion-based groupings. For example, Passo area was identical with Christian 
negeri, while Batu Merah was identical with Muslim negeri. There were also Mount Nona area with 
Christian majority and Leihitu peninsula with predominantely Muslims. This was affirmed by a 
respondent’s statement: 
... if we talk about segregation, it is not today’s issue [only], but from long time ago our settlement patterns 
were segregated. It means, in the old days, there were negeris with the Christian population and negeris with 
the Muslims.34 
Looking back in the old days, those religions including Islam and Christianity, and Hinduism were 
the religions brought to Ambon by Asian and European traders who were interested in Maluku wealth 
of spices, at least since the Roman period. However, Hinduism only has small impact or influence in 
Maluku, while Islam and Christianity have been planted deeply and played a major role in the life of 
the Mollucan society. It is estimated that Christianity arrived in Maluku in the 16th century in the form 
of Roman Catholicism introduced by the Portuguese. When the Dutch expelled the Portuguese in 
early 17th century, they changed Catholic villages into Dutch Reformed Protestant ones.35 However it 
should be noted that over the course of the history in Maluku, those religions have experienced 
modifications with the local culture and wisdoms as well as local people’s custom.36 
Segregation condition in Maluku cannot be separated from the colonial society structure formed by 
the Dutch government at that time.37 The colonial Dutch Government provided opportunities to 
Christian Mollucan people to get western education and became administrators. It can be said that the 
position of Islamic Ambonese in the Colonial Dutch era was slightly pushed out before it re-emerged 
during the Japanese invasion.38 Discriminatory politics developed by the colonial government affected 
various sectors of the Ambonese society’s life. According to a respondent: 
For basudara Christian people here that was true, said our grandpa–grandma in the old days, even I still 
enjoyed it too, [...] easier to go to school and get into governmental bureaucracy compared to basudara Muslim 
brothers here.39 
Discriminatory politics generated the assumption that Christian community was more educated and 
identical to bureaucracy, while Muslim community’s positions were traders and plantation people. 
                                                             
34 Interview with one of the religious figures and Mollucan peace activists, Ambon, 15 December 2012. 
 
35 Bartels (2003b). 
 
36 Bartels (2003). 
 
37 Colonial society structure divided the people by particular race or ethnicity. Furnivall (1957). 
 
38 Dieter Bartels (2003); Ibid. 
 
39 Interview with an Ambon development planning official, Ambon, 14 December 2012. 
 
This can be seen in the people settlement patterns based on their daily activities. As explained by one 
of the informants, before conflicts usually Muslim communities preferred to live in the “lower” areas 
(near coastal areas), while Christian communities live in “upper” areas, associated with hilly areas.40 
Furthermore, border change factor also modified area configuration in Ambon City. Through 
Government Regulation No. 13 Year 1979 on Change in Area Borders of Ambon Municipality, the 
Ambon city area got wider than before. The policy opened up spaces for new comers to Ambon. In 
the eras of  Governor Hasan Slamet to Governor Akib Latuconsina, around 1980s to 1990s many  
migrants from Sulawesi, Java and Sumatra entered Maluku, including Ambon City. The policy was 
related to the national transmigration program in the New Order regime, and Ambon government 
efforts to add the number of human resources to fill in local socio-economic spaces. Both policies 
changed the dynamics of the society in Ambon City. Economic centers like Sirimau was then filled up 
with migrants who lived near their business locations. 
Despite being dominated by particular religious community, some areas still provided spaces for 
communities of different religions to live in the area. Before the conflicts, there were no area that was 
exclusively inhabited by a particular community. Even, in Batu Merah Village/Negeri dominated by 
Muslims there were Christian communities.41 Although there was clear demarcation between 
Christian and Muslim communities in Ambon, social interaction between the community groups of 
different religions did not encountered significant disturbance or friction in the area before the 
conflicts. Often was found inter-community cooperation in two villages/negeris to carry out a task. 
For example, during the construction of a mosque in Batu Merah Village dominated by Muslims, the 
Passo Village with predominantly Christian people participated in providing materials and physical 
energy to construct the mosque.42 The phenomenon of the harmonious cooperation also occurred in 
the traditional ceremony organizing. When Laha Village inhabited dominantly by Muslims organized 
a traditional ceremony to appoint a king, the people from Amahusu Village with Christian majority 
participated in the ceremony. 
The phenomenon is closely related to the deep-rooted culture that has been uphold by Ambonese 
society namely Pela and Gandong.43 Before the previous communal conflicts, this cultural instrument 
could break through geographical partitions and Ambonese people’s beliefs. Despite of segregation by 
Muslim or Christian villages/ negeris, with the existence of Pela and Gandong the people could 
continue to interact each other. 
Bartels (2003) added that the conflict starting on 19 January 1999 did surprise many parties, 
especially the Mollucan people, given the fact that they have Pela tradition inherited from generation 
to generation. Bartels emphasized that even though accusation of provocators as the sources of the 
conflicts was raised by many parties, Ambon condition itself has already provided a space for 
conflicts to happen. Such symptom, according to Bartels, were felt since 1970s with the coming of 
Muslim migrants to Ambon city, especially Bugis, Butonese, and Makasarese people from Sulawesi, 
as well as rapidly sharpened polarization between Muslim and Christian communities. Beside that, the 
violent conflict coincided with the weakened role of Pela. In Bartels opinion (2003), the weakened  
Pela and kinship system in Ambon City were mainly caused by internal things such as continuous 
Christianization and Islamization, as well as Indonesian policy on uniformity which was started in 
1970.44 
                                                             
40 Interview with one of NGO activists and Church activists, Ambon, 13 December 2012. 
 
41 See Adam (2009). 
 
42 See Brauchler (2009). 
 
43 Pela and Gandong are one social tie based on blood relashionship between two communities of villages/negeri. According to Ambonese 
belief, Pela and Gandong are the driving motor in cross-border-and-religion social interaction. See Bartels (1977). 
 
44 Bartels (2003b); Ibid. 
 
POST-CONFLICT SEGREGATION PATTERNS 
The current demographic condition of Ambon City cannot be separated from the previous 
communal conflict experiences. Population segregation pattern based on religion is very obvious at 
the village or kelurahan level.  The same religion embraced becomes the strong reason for the people 
to settle down in an area and to leave the area.45 As stated by one of the informants as follows: 
Due to conflicts, our houses are destroyed to ground. We have to take refuge to refuge place. But this cannot 
continue like this... Eventually, in 2005 I moved to Benteng area (Kelurahan Benteng). I moved there 
because it was impossible for me to get a house in the area which our family continue to fear as (being).46  
Not only that, the conflict impacts have brought about changes in the characteristics of 
villages/kelurahan which were previously inhabited by heterogeneous communities by religion and 
now become more homogenous. For example in Batu Merah Village, in which before the communal 
conflict yang there were Christian population, especially in Batu Merah Dalam area, currently it is 
hard to find Christian community members.47 Similar case happens in Kelurahan Waihaong, in which 
Christian population, both in forced and voluntary fashion, had to move out from the area. On the 
contrary, Muslim community also experienced similar thing in some areas. For example in Kelurahan 
Kudamati in which before the conflicts there were still Muslim population, the composition of the 
post-conflict population is mostly dominated by Christian community. This phenomenon of 
segregation in mind48 also tends to occur in some villages/kelurahans in Ambon City. 
Population segregation by religion in Ambon City not only happens at the village/kelurahan level.  
In Kelurahan Wainitu, especially in Waringin and Talake areas Muslim and Christian people live in 
one Community Unit (RW). Although living in one area, division between the two communities takes 
place. For example in Waringin, usually Christian community lives in Neighborhood Unit (RT) 3, 
while Muslim community in RT 4. The phenomenon cannot be separated from the Waringin context 
which before the conflicts was a slump area and not an interesting option for Ambon City people to 
live in. After the conflicts, the situation changed. The area becomes an option for the people to settle 
down. One of the factors for this  is the fairly strategic location of the area which easily accesses 
downtown and various public facilities, such as school, hospitals, and markets. Beside that, 
information from the people showed that the area is not dominated by a particular community so that 
there they do not feel as a minority group. The area is usually called the border, because it is located 
between the “upper” part which is the Christian community settlement such as Kelurahans Benteng 
and Kudamati, and the “lower” part which is the Muslim community settlement such as Kelurahans 
Waihaong and also Silale.  
Population segregation patterns in Ambon City also demonstrates reintegration phenomenon 
among the people in one area. For example, in Poka and Rumah Tiga Villages, Christian refugees 
who in the conflict times left the area could return back there. This can be separated from 
cooperation between Maluku Provincial and Ambon City governments supported by traditional and 
figures and local communities. This step was considered quite a success;49 there have been no 
problems between Christian and Muslim communities living in the area until today.50 Similar 
phenomenon also occurs in Latta Village. Muslim people, the majority of them coming from  
                                                             
45 This is caused by the fact that previous communal conflict nuance was strong with religious symbols.  
 
46 Interview with one of the Christian people in Waringin, Ambon, 15 December 2012. 
 
47 2010 BPS Data on Population Census shows that in Batu Merah area almost 99% of the population is Muslim. 
 
48 See the concept “perceived segregation/segregation in mind” in T. D. Pariela, response paper in Semi Workshop of NVMS-THC, Ambon, 
23 October 2013. Particular areas in Ambon have been perceived as Muslim or Christian areas in general, even though there are another 
community in the areas. 
 
49 Repatriation of Rumah Tiga Christian community could not also be separated from support from traditional leaders of Muslim negeri, 
especially from Leihitu peninsula area. 
 
50 See Pariela (2007). 
 
Buton, Southeast Sulawesi, in the conflict times had to go out from the village where the majority 
of the population was Christian. But in October 2005, these Butonese refugees could return to the 
village and rebuild their housing.51 Another phenomenon in which inter-community segregation 
does not relatively happen, occurs in Wayame Village. In the conflict times, this village did not 
experience huge waves of refugees both from Muslim and Christian communities. Until now, 
composition of Wayame Villagers is relatively balanced, namely Muslims 52% and Christians 
48%.52 
R E L O C A T I O N / D I S P L A C E M E N T  P R O C E S S  
MANAGEMENT, DATA COLLECTION, VERIFICATION OF POST-CONFLICT REFUGEES  
As mentioned above, Ambon is one of the areas in Indonesia that has had a long history of 
Muslim-Christian community segregation, both before and after the conflicts. In the study on 
segregation growth in Ambon must be differentiated between segregation which occurred before and 
after the conflicts, both based on the background and formation process.53 Segregation which was 
formed after the 1999 conflict can be called as unintended consequence from government’s relocation 
policy to deal with post-conflict refugees. The post-conflict segregation model, therefore, can be 
called planned segregation (intended segregation or segregation by intention).54 The background of 
the previous conflict which accompanies the growth of the segregation often strengthens the growing 
sentiment and fanaticism of the groups. Condition and situation of post conflict segregation growth 
has become the particular basis for consideration and attention in the development of 2006-2026 
Long-Term Development Plans (RPJP) of Ambon City.55 
Generally, the growth of post-conflict segregation is closely related to the relocation process 
initiated by the government. In the outbreak of Ambon conflict, many people from Muslim and 
Christian communities took refuge to the places they considered to be safe. After the conflict abated, 
various places became the concentration of the refugees, such as schools, mosques, churches, Ambon 
Athletes House, and others. Overall, the number of refugees in Ambon City reached at least 3,824 
households (KK).56 Based on the ICG (International Crisis Group) data (2002), almost one third of the 
Ambonese people took refuge after the conflict broke in 1999.57 After the 1999 conflict abated, the 
government collected the data on the refugees and offered some resolution options.58 
The management of refugees is one of the programs mandated by the Presidential Instruction 
(Inpres)   No. 6, Year 2003. Through coordination of Coordinating Ministry for People’s Welfare 
(Kemenkokesra), the refugee problems are expected to be resolved very soon. The refugee 
management covers (1) identification and inventory of the needs for rehabilitation, development of 
damaged houses and settlement due to the conflict; (2) rehabilitation and rebuilding of damaged 
houses and settlement due to the conflict; (3) construction of refugee houses because of the conflict; 
(4) clean water facilities and environmental sanitation in the refugees’ settlement. More than that, 
solution to refugees’ problems has also been mandated in real and firm fashion in 2006-2026 Ambon 
                                                             
51 See Pariela (2007). 
 
52 BPS’s 2010 population census. 
 
53 Interview with one NGO activist and Ambon church activist, Ambon, 15 December 2012. 
 
54 Read T. D. Pariela, response paper in Semi-Workshop, NVMS-THC, Ambon, 23 October 2013. 
 
55 See Local Regulation (Perda) of Kota Ambon No. 4 Year 2006, page 13.  
 
56 Interview with an official from Ambon Social Affair office, Ambon, 14 December 2012. 
 
57 See Jeroen Adam (2010), page 403. 
 
58 Interview with a Maluku Human Rights activist, Ambon, 14 December 2012; and Ambon NGO activis, Ambon, 15 December 2012. 
 
City RPJP (Long-Term Development Plan), especially relating to their civil rights to avoid the 
occurrence of further conflicts.59 
One of the criticisms that emerge was pointed at the approach patterns of rebuilding people’s 
damaged or burned houses. The approach based on the “house spots” or “fire spots” was deemed 
unfair because the family type in Ambon is extended family, instead of nuclear family, in which more 
than one family live together in one house, especially with their children who have been married and 
gotten children but cannot afford a house yet. Since only the extended families who received 
compensation, previous houses which were relatively big was only replaced by a simple 5x6 meter 
house without kitchens,60 although the houses were inhabited by some households. From the 
government perspective, the “fire spots” or “by name by address” approach  was taken for the sake of  
evenness. This policy became effective during the term of Governor Karel Albert Ralahalu (2003-
2013). 
Beside that, there were accusations of many dishonest people, that caused the refugee management 
process went lengthily until 2009. There were always people who came and claimed as refugees so 
that every year the number of refugees kept growing.61 According to the government, however, the 
reason fot this lengthy refugee problem was the dynamic movement of the refugees from one place to 
another. For instance, initially refugees moved from place A to place B. when they were registered in 
place B, they turned out to have moved to C. Another possibility was that the refugees were travelling 
when the data collection was conducted. Another case, for instance, is disunited households following 
the conflict. In this case, the disunited household claimed themselves as refugees, although initially 
the refugees were their parents. The result of the complexity of the data collection process is that 
many refugees are not listed in the data, while non-refugees were put into the data through various 
ways or reasons.62 
The dynamics and various problems emerging in the refugee data collection process are admitted 
by various segments of the society. The problems included dishonesty, mark-up data, fictitious data 
et cetera.63 The refugee data collecting process often received criticisms, especially after government 
claim on the completion of refugee problems in 2009. Among those criticisms it was indicated there 
was mark-up data on refugees from, what was agreed, around 30,000 in all Maluku Province, into 
100,000 that were realized. Another criticism was related to indicators or limitation of refugees- if 
the problem was claimed to have finished, have they gone home and their houses been built? Beside 
that, another social problem related to refugees was not yet resolved and could be a timed bomb, like 
the problem of civil rights, education and health facilities, post-conflict psychic problem handling, 
and etc.64 
The Maluku Provincial Government and Ambon City Government claimed the problems or 
fulfillment of the rights of the refugees have finished. Former Ambon City Mayor, M. J. Papilaja, or 
the current Ambon City Government has firmly through separate Decision Letter (SK) determined 
the completion of refugee problems.65 More than that, based on the Ambon City claim currently 
through Deputy Mayor, Olivia Latuconsina, the management of Ambon city refugees reached 3,824 
                                                             
59 See Ambon Local Regulation(Perda) No. 4 Year 2006, page 16. 
 
60 Interview with one Maluku refugee figure, Ambon, 14 May 2013. 
 
61 Interview with Ambon law official, Ambon, 22 May 2013. 
 
62 Interview with another law official, Ambon, 14 May 2013. 
 
63 Interviews with several respondents, including Maluku Refugee Coalition, Lembah Argo Refugees, Maluku Province Social Affairs 
Office, and others, Ambon, 13-16 May, 2013. 
 
64 Interview with Maluku refugee figure, Ambon, 14 May 2013.  
 
65 Ambonekspres.com, 1,066 Displaced HHs Not Served. Taken from  
http://www.ambonekspres.com/index.php?option=read&cat=46&id=40569, dated on 14 February 2012. 
 
Households (KK) was settled in November 2009.66 Nevertheless, in reality, the rights of thousands 
refugees are still not fulfilled or handled yet. The government tended to let and consider the refugee 
problems just finish, even though there are many things unresolved. For example, the problems of 
refugees are not very few, and until now this becomes the debate among many parties.67 
The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the termination of refugee issues is the 
agreement from Minister of Social Affairs (Mensos), Minister of Settlement and Regional 
Infrastructure (Menkimpraswil), as well as Minister of Labour and transmigration (Menakertrans). 
All regents and mayors in Maluku Province supported the MoU. At that time only East Seram 
district (SBT) head and Ambon Mayor emphasized there are no refugees in their areas. The 
consequences of the agreement, if it turned out in the future there are refugees any longer, then the 
refugees will become burdens for each district/ city. Therefore, the relevant refugees will receive 
empowerment funds from district/ city governments.68 
After the issuance fo government claim that the refugees problems were finished, many 
community members emerged who claimed as 1999 conflict victims and their houses were burned 
down but they have not received their rights since four years ago. Many of them visited the Maluku 
National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) and Maluku Refugee Coalition to present 
their demands. Mediation between refugees through Maluku Refugees Coalition with Menkokesra 
staff and Minister of Social Welfare facilitated by by the Indonesian Commission on Human Rights 
were organized on 12 March 2012 at Maluku Governor’s office to discuss about the problems on data 
and the verification. From the mediation, it was found that more than a thousand refugees from all 
districts/ cities in Maluku who have not got their rights yet. In Ambon itself, the rest of the refugees 
whose rights have not fulfilled yet spread in many villages. The data is more based on refugees’ 
reports.69 The result was that the formation of the Refugees Verification Team which consists of 
Maluku Refugee Coalition, local government elements Baileo Maluku network, and the National 
Commission on Human Rights as a mediator. The legal basis for the establishment of verification 
team is the Governor’s Decision Letter No. 394 year 2010 on Formation of Integrated Team of 
Verification on Data of Remaining Refugees to conduct Verification in 7(seven) Districts/ Cities and 
Official Travel Order Letter (SPPD) Regional Secretary of Maluku Province No. 465.2/1169 dated on  
18 May 2012.70 
The set procedure was: when data are verified, the data must be legitimated by the district/city 
government with signature of regent/mayor, then it was submitted to the provincial level. Then, the 
provincial government will fight for the budget to the central government, although in reality there are 
often pulls among various parties in the process of data entry and approval.71 Based on the work 
report of Verification, team work mechanism includes three phases, namely conducting verification 
on the data findings of Maluku Refugee Coalition and the National Commission on Human Rights 
(Komnas HAM) with district/city data; the first verification result data will be continued by field 
verification to four districts/ cities that have been ratified together by the Team; then to the field 
verification result data, verification will be done with the data from Maluku Province’s SIMDA.72 
The following is the remaining refugee data until 2012 based on the Verification Team work 
results (Table 4). 
                                                             
66 Siwalimanews.com, November, Handling of Refugee Completed. Taken from  
http://www.siwalimanews.com/post/november_penanganan_pengungsi_kota_ambon_tuntas, on 14 February 2012. 
 
67 Interview with a Maluku Human Rights activist, Ambon, 14 December 2012. 
 
68 Interview with an Ambon City Government legal staff, Ambon, 22 May 2013. 
 
69 Interview with Maluku refugee figure, Ambon, 14 May 2013. 
 
70 Report on Verification of Data on the Remaining Social Conflict Refugees in Maluku Province, June 2012. 
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Table 4: Recapitulated Verification Result on The Remaining Data on Maluku Province Refugees73 
No District/City Initial Data Data not 
Valid 
Data Valid Remark 
1 Ambon City 1.335  - - Not yet verified 
2 Central Maluku  1.029 557 472 - 
3 Buru 363 79 271 13 Household are not 
diversified according to 
their existence in South 
Buru. 
4 West Seram  722 399 323   
5 Southeast Maluku 67       
6 Easter part of Seram  125       
Total 3.641 1.035 1.066   
 
The data shows that based on the work result of the Verification Team there were still 
approximately 3.641 refugee households (HHs) whose rights were not fulfilled yet until 2012. In 
Ambon there were still approximately 1.335 HHs. The refugees felt that their rights were not fulfilled 
yet accordingly, were treated unfairly, and thought they were deprived from their rights by the 
government. In such psychical condition all things might happen, both done by the refugees or by 
particular parties who tried to take benefit and advantage from the uncertain situation. 
If the refugee case was resolved, little by little the records would be gone. But if the case persists, when 
touched, the people would go back to their past—grieved, very bitter, poignant [...]. So the solution is,  such 
condition should be improved by the government. Must be thorough.74 
The neglect of the refugee problems through claims and issuance of particular Decision Letters 
(SK) without looking at the field condition will just construct problems and generate new potential of 
violence which can blow up at any time. On the other side, the refugees will continue to demand their 
rights, and if they gather that other refugees or refugees in other places have received their rights. This  
relative deprivation feeling, theoretically and analytically, often transforms itself into one of the 
potential sources of violence outbreak. More than that, as long as the refugee management is 
uncertain, it is likely that particular parties show up and take the advantage of the situation through 
provocations for their own advantage or interest. 
RELOCATION OPTION AND SCHEME 
Some options were offered by the government as part of post-1999-conflict refugee resolution, 
namely return to their place of origin, relocation or living in refuge place. Among those options, 
relocation was the favorite option for the refugees, even though they should have chosen the “return to 
the place of origin” option as the best option. However, relocation became the favorite option due to 
absence of long-term perspective concept. In the future, such condition might definitely have bad 
impacts if it is not well managed very early. In general, there is a problem in realizing good 
negotiation between host community and the refugees. Nevertheless, for a particular case like in Latta 
Village, for instance, it is proven that Muslim refugees could return and settle down peacefully until 
today.75 
Many refugees who became minority group in their place of origin preferred relocation for various 
reasons, especially related to security guarantee and trauma healing.76 For example, the relocated 
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refugees to Kayu Tiga are the Christian community coming from Batu Merah (see Photo 5 page 138). 
They decided not to return to Batu Merah because in the area they become a minority group. 
Similarly, the refugees in Ambon City coming from Mount Nona decided not to return to Mounty 
Nona as they become a minority group in the area. 
Interestingly, the local community divided the refugees into three categories based on their 
response to the government’s offer, namely those who wanted relocation, those who wanted to return, 
and those who were submissive.77 Here, the term of submissive refugees is more identical to those 
who completely submitted themselves to the government’s decision and/or live in the relocation lands 
whose ownership is still in dispute. 
In general, he relocation process scheme can be differentiated into two, namely the community 
providing lands and the government constructing houses, or vice versa. The mechanism generally 
applies both for the post-1999 conflict refugees and the refugees from sporadic violence after the 1999 
conflict, for example the ones occurring in 2011 and 2012.  Relocation in Warasia that was built in 
2005 is the example of the first scheme. There the government only constructed houses, while the 
land was taken care of by the refugees.78 The first mechanism seemed to be the most-preferred option 
by the refugees even though later many of them are still involved in land dispute cases. An example of 
the relocation whose land was provided by the government is the relocation in Passo.79 Beside that, 
there  are also relocation lands which are free grants by certain customary negeris, for example in 
Hative Besar.80 Beside the two schemes, many refugees ran into mountains during the conflict and 
settle down there until today.  Therefore, the refugee relocation process has been their own initiative, 
not from the government’s offered options. For them, the government only provided funds to buy 
lands where they would settle down and build houses.81 
For those who chose relocation option, the government provided funds, amounting to IDR2 
million per HH for transporting cost to their place of origin, and IDR12 million per HH to buy a house 
construction materials (BBR) and build it in relocation site. In practice, the IDR2 million fund was 
generally used for buying land in relocation site. Beside that, often times the BBR fund received by 
the refugees was not IDR12 million- some of them only received IDR8 million, IDR9 million, or 
IDR10 million. This was common in many areas.82 This indicated there were reduction/cuts along the 
BBR fund disbursement process. Even for the context of Buru Island relocation in Lembah Argo, 
from 202 HHs, none received BBR funds due to various reasons although they had applied it to the 
government. They underlined that the house support they received was only the direct assistance from 
the Dutch, instead of the local government. The prevailing reason relating to this was that they did not 
get BBR assistance as they had received the assistance from the Dutch.83 
Beside the Buru Island refugees, other refugees that claimed they did not get BBR fund are the 
refugees in Pita Samudra (Pitas) (Photos 6 and 7 pages 138-9).84 Many of them did get assistance 
during the leadership of Governor Sinyo Harry Sarundajang, but did not get it during the Governor 
Karel Albert Ralahalu period any longer.85 
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85 FGD with Pita Samudra refugees, Ambon, 16 May 2013. 
Another version mentioned that BBR assistance, assumed to amount to IDR12 million, was not in 
the form of cash, but materials/products such as iron sheeting, cement, plywood, mixed nails, and 
closets. Beside that, they also received fund amounting to IDR1,750,000 to buy timber for pillar, sand, 
and stones for foundation, as well as bricklayers’ fee. The fund was actually the refugee returning 
fund amounting to IDR2 million. The assistance provision in the form of construction materials was 
conducted through tender mechanism, so that the people got them from contractors.86 
RELOCATION AND COMMUNITY CONCENTRATION 
Relocation with various social and economic consequences became the government resolution 
option to deal with refugee’s problems after the 1999 conflict and violence following it.  The 
relocation program, unintentionally or indirectly, has created new community concentrations with 
resulting segregation in them. This occurs because the refugees tended to choose relocation sites close 
to or around the community of the same identity. This condition has raised criticisms from various 
parties on the relocation strategy initiated by the government. 
It is manifested like this: the people settle down according to their community patterns. The Christians tend 
to go to the Christians, while the Muslims tend to go to the Muslims. That is the first- the form. Secondly, 
public spaces which were mixed, now tend to be homogenous. It used to be heterogeneous. If we do not 
open up dialogical spaces or public interaction spaces in a bid to build social cohesion, that will be able to 
sharpen—and become potential for—conflicts.87 
However, the Muslim were relocated to the Muslim locations, while the Christian to the Christian locations. 
I really want the local government to pay attention to this. They should not be separated like that. We hope 
we are united as before, so that we can prevent unexpected things from happening. The local government 
could put their staff in each location. Muslims used to live here. After the riot, the Muslims moved. The 
Muslims sold their houses. So did the Christians. Now they are segmented.88 
The post-conflict movement patterns of the people tends to lead into the formation of segregation. 
The previous communities mingled (were mixed) and were heterogeneous, now they become 
homogenous. In other words, the 1999 conflict not only claimed lives, but also has deconstructed 
social order in social and economic fashion and sharpened the face of segregation in Ambon. The 
conflict has also generated inter-community suspicion, trauma, sentiment, and hatred. Some examples 
of the people’s movements are (1) the Muslims from Passo (predominantly Christian area) moved to 
Waiheru and Nania (predominantly Muslim areas); (2) the Muslims from Soya (Christian) moved to 
Kahena, Batu Merah (Islam); (3) The Muslims from Kudamati (Christian) moved to various places 
with Muslim majority; (4) The Christians from Batu Merah (Islam) moved to Kayu Tiga (Christian); 
(5) the Christians from Waihaong (Islam) moved to various places with Christian majority.89 
The sharpened segregation will definitely escalate the potential for conflicts. This was clearly 
confirmed by the Ambon Mayor, stressing his point that “... during the conflict the form of 
segregation got sharper. But it has the basis from the past.”90 Sharing the statement of the Ambon 
Mayor, hard criticisms were expressed by an NGO activist: 
But the government has never understood that  there is a problem resulting from the relocation options. The 
strategy that were implemented by the government (should be) to drive efforts to prevent (conflicts) or 
measures to (build) people’s resilience. So that if relocation option is chosen, it must be supported by 
recovery processes to build relationship, communications, and create better cross-community environment 
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[in interaction]. But what happens is that the [...] inter-community there is still feeling of suspicion between 
one another—they still feel suspicious, traumatic. What happens now, the fostered interaction is only pseudo 
interaction. Whenever there is a conflict, [each community] will draw themselves and hate each other again.  
[However,] the recovery process is not seriously taken care of  and the government does not have any pattern 
or strategy to handle such thing.91 
The relocation strategy initiated by the government as part of resolution to the post- 1999 conflict 
refugee problems is considered an instant solution which has not been followed by resolution efforts 
to any effects resulting from the relocation process. The relocation process is only seen as the moving 
of people from one place to another. But after carrying out the relocation there are far more urgent 
problems to be immediately resolved, namely the strengthening of and recovery of inter-community 
interaction and communications.  Unfortunately, the government is considered being less serious, 
even they do not have clear pattern and strategy on how to handle the problem.  
R E A S O N S  F O R  R E L O C A T I O N  
MINORITY GROUP 
Some main reasons pushed refugees to prefer relocation to staying in refugee place or returning to 
their place of origin. One of the reasons was related to the socio-cultural condition as minority group 
in the place of origin.92 Christian refugees tended to choose relocation if their places of origin were 
dominated by Muslim community, and vice versa. The unstable post-conflict condition made the 
refugees to think hard and be extra careful to return to their places of origin. Resistance of the 
refugees to returning because of minority factor as a community in their places of origin is the very 
common phenomenon, as stated by a respondent: 
So, it depends on them (refugees). For example: in Batu Merah, many people agreed to be relocated there. 
Like in Kayu Tiga, they are from Batu Merah. Since they were a minority there, so they agreed to move/ 
relocation.93 
SECURITY 
The second reason, still closely related to the situation as a minority in the place of origin is a 
sense of safety or security. Many refugees preferred relocation because there was no security 
guarantee if they returned to their place of origin. As a minority group in their place of origin, their 
position would be very vulnerable as violent target by the majority group. The minority-majority 
issue, in relations to sense of safety/ security, was very relevant during the initial phase of conflict de-
escalation. A respondent emphasized: 
They could have retuned there; because some (refugees) in some locations preferred to return to their places 
of origin. For example, some refugees from Buru in Lembah Argo have returned. This is really only (a 
matter of) guaranteed security from the government—can the government ensure, when they return, that the 
security can be fulfilled? Secondly, when they return, will they be faced with civil issues there or not? Some 
people really wanted to return, but they doubted if they would be safe or not.94 
With this security consideration, strong tendency emerged among the refugees to find relocation 
sites within the area dominated by the community of the identity similar to theirs. In the refugees’ 
perspective, security assurance can be obtained by living in the area whose population embrace the 
same religion or have the same community identity. Even though the consequence indirectly 
generates new segregation or at least sharpens the previous segregation. So the fostered segregation is 
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related to the sense of safety. Since the state is deemed not to give the sense of safety, people will 
prefer to live in the majority community... People prefer a sense of safety. And they avoid any violent 
actions, don’t they? So, [therefore,] it is normal when they do not want to return to their original 
settlement. The options were picked by the community along with all the risks. Despite long distance, 
they would prefer to (looking for) a sense of safety. They do not want any longer [if] they build 
houses and new life, then they would be burned down again. That will also [make] them feel such loss 
[...]— already spent their energy [to build], but they get burned down again?95 
In this context, the emergence of post-conflict segregation is clearly caused by the factor of 
security guarantee which is considered very fragile as the result of the prolonged conflicts. Once 
again, the minority-majority issue is closely related to this. For instance, one of Christian refugees 
chose Waringin as a new settlement because of similar religious identity and said that “It is safe too 
because here (Batu Gantung area) all community is Christian. GPM (Maluku Protestant Church) 
through the Synod Head also asked the refugees to come here.”96 
Strong tendency to choose an area in which the majority of the community has similar identity did 
not only happen in the collective relocation processes, but also in the individual relocation. Those 
people usually do relocation by selling lands/houses in the area of origin to buy lands/houses in new 
neighborhood.97 For example, the Christians from Waihaong sold their lands/houses, then moved to 
other areas because the area is Muslim community basis. The movement process, which mushroomed 
after the 1999 Ambon conflict, has indirectly transformed the areas which were previously 
heterogeneous into homogeneous ones. 
Theoretically, such condition can be understood as a survival strategy which is often times found 
in various forms in the society that is facing conflicting situation or pressure. Such condition often 
occurs when the state is absent in providing security guarantee so that every individual or group is 
forced to find new protection alternatives.  In a situation where the state fails to execute or is weak in 
executing the function, ethnic and religious networks often become alternatives for consideration. In 
the cases of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea, for instance, uncertain situation because the states 
cannot handle- even are involved in- the conflicts is also encountered by doing cross-ethnicity 
consolidation called poro (Sawyer, September 2004).98 
FAILURE TO RETURN TO AREA OF ORIGIN 
Not all refugees follow the relocation program. Some refugees decided to return to their areas of 
origin with various reasons. One of them was because they did not have other alternatives. For 
example, one Muslim refugee in Waringin preferred relocation or left Waringin due to frequent 
conflicts and violence. However, the person did not have alternative place to move or did not know 
where to move. Another reason that often motivated refugees to return to their place of origin was 
house certificate ownership—for those who took refuge during the conflict and kept/ had the 
certificate of the houses they left, returning to their places of origin was the best choice. For example, 
Sebagai contoh, in the 1999 conflict the Mardika refugees were accommodated in some places such as 
in Ambon Athletes House, relatives’ houses, and others. After the conflict abated, they who still kept 
their certificates decided to return to Mardika.99 
The last reason that encourages refugees to return is historical and cultural tie with the places of 
origin. Not only because there is emotional and cultural closeness they would feel very hard to leave 
their places of origin because they are usually family/ traditional land owners there. Beside that, 
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another consideration is the easy access to public transportation service to the place of origin. The 
issue of better access has become the strong driving factor for them to return.100  
Based on the finding above, we can see that lots of refugees who intended to return to their places 
of origin. However, due to failed mediation between them and the community in the places of origin, 
they eventually could not return. There were three requirements to meet if they wanted to return: (1) 
filling in checklist, (2) being accepted by the community in the place of origin, and (3) stating their 
willingness to return to the places of origin.101 From the requirements, rejection by the people in the 
area of origin often became the main reason why the refugees could not return. Such rejection can be 
caused by various things such as ethnic sentiment and prejudice.  
C O N D I T I O N S  O F  R E F U G E E / R E L O C A T E D  C O M M U N I T Y   
EMPOWERMENT OF  REFUGEE/ RELOCATED COMMUNITY 
Relocation is an effort to solve post-conflict refugee problems cannot easily executed; it is not 
sterile from various problems that cannot be solved in a short period of time, for example availability 
of livelihood. Relocating refugees is not just moving them to particular places, building houses, then 
letting them be and leaving them just like that. They also need facilities and infrastructures to survive 
and continue their life in their new place. According to a respondent: 
But how about the rights they left behind? [...] after being relocated [then] they were hunted with unfinished 
problems... Then, they had to find a new living. What is their living support in the new place? Previously, 
they had shops, rented houses, pedicabs, and others.102 
This is one of the hard challenges to be faced by relocated refugees. When they moved, they were 
forced to leave behind all established livelihoods, then had to find new yet not-easy-to-get livelihoods.  
They require long-term livelihoods and cannot rely on need satisfaction from temporary assistance or 
charity.103 This fact, on one hand, emphasizes the need of refugees for stable and sustainable sources 
of income, but on the other hand indicates that government-initiated relocation is no more than the 
taking of refugees from one place to another. There are no sustainable  efforts and initiatives to make 
them survive in new places. 
The absence of the initiatives to empower refugees in new places can be clearly seen from the land 
the refugees inhabit, which is only a narrow land for a house.104 For refugees who used to be farmers, 
this will definitely be hard for them because their skill is only farming skill. Beside that, such waste of 
this working skill is also caused by the relocation of refugees who used to come from mountainous 
areas to coastal areas, or vice versa. Not yet finished with the rights they left behind for taking refuge, 
they have to face similarly complicated facts. 
Many of the 1999 conflict victims do not have anything due to damaged houses, loss of income 
sources, and burned certificates of houses. Moreover, many refugees did not know where to live and 
how to rebuild their life. Therefore, potential efforts of empowerment and provision of livelihoods 
become very crucial. One of the 1999 conflict victims told the experience: 
In 1999 it was really a downfall —no more houses and properties, could not earn a living, always lived in 
refuge shelter under minimum condition. Our kids were late for education and their future... But it turned out 
that conflicts recurred. How can we live that kind of life? We kept on falling... Income decreased and 
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mentally depressed because of living in such location. It is lucky that we were allowed to live here. If we are 
not given the opportunity, what would we be? But returning to Mardika does not guarantee the safety...105 
PHYSICAL-HEALTH CONDITION AND POPULATION ISSUE  
Beside what has been mentioned above, other emerging issues are their house land dispute (will be 
discussed particularly in the next sub-chapter), house condition and refuge shelters which are deemed 
less decent, and other health issues, such as the leaked roofs of refuge shelters, muddy and inundated 
places, diarrhea, skin itches, and others.106 From the observation, it can be seen that many refuge 
places are deemed less decent, in terms of construction and facilities inside. However, some refugees 
felt that some facilities in the refuge place were fairly decent and even comfortable. According to one 
respondent: 
When we entered, we immediately [set up] lots. So we set up the lots on our own. Who came late, it means 
they looked for [places] upstairs. We never have difficulty in getting water because there is drilled well. 
Similarly with lamps, there is power network; day-night electricity is on. Bathrooms are also located on 
every storey. Upstairs there are two bathrooms, here in the back there are some bathrooms. Yes... since it is 
government’s building, it is complete.107 
Beside the physical health condition, the important thing for the refugees is the spiritual health. As 
the effect of the conflict, many refugees especially children experienced quite worrisome trauma. 
According to a respondent’s confession: 
As Muslims we used to walk upwards (meaning Christian areas). When I was attending school, there were 
still [many Muslims] walking upwards; but not any longer now. Muslims pass through Muslim areas, 
Christians passing through Christian areas. I myself, if Lin III car (Talake) passes upwards, [there is] worry. 
I fear being mentally disturbed, so I asked a colleague: where is the psychiatrist do? I need to have 
consultation. I don’t want [this worry] to disturb me to the heart.108 
Trauma is one of the serious problems emerging as the impact of prolonged conflicts everywhere, 
similarly for many victims of the 1999 Ambon conflict. Due to the previous conflicts, many refugees 
feel worried and anxious when passing through areas that used to be the basis of their enemy. 
The next problem to be faced by the refugees is the population issue. There are refugees who find 
it hard to get Identity Cards (KTP) after they were relocated and stay in new places. The difficulty in 
getting the population status, for instance, is experienced by a refugee from Buru Island in Lembah 
Argo: 
Since 2005 we have had the Ambon ID card. We tried on our own to meet with the city government [...]. He 
was there and stated that Buru refugees were Ambon City people. At that time five neighborhood units (RT) 
from one Community Unit (RW) were set up, and put under RW 13.109 
Even though later the refugee got the ID card, it was not easy for him to get back his population 
status. Unclear population status will make it difficult for the refugees to access public services, 
transportation, banks and others. 
DISTRIBUTION OF ASSISTANCE  
Uneven assistance given has become an issue for refugees. Many refugees admitted receiving 
assistance from the government, but some others claimed they did not get assistance at all, or if there 
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was assistance, the number was very few. For example, one of the refugees received assistance, telling 
that he had assistance in the forms of food, kerosene, noodles, rice and others every Sunday for three 
months. Children also received fund support for the poor, amounting to IDR.360,000 and 
transportation for poor children, amounting to IDR60,000.110 One refugee in Buru Island in Lembah 
Argo emphasized that this person did not receive assistance from the government at all. This person 
only got a 5x6m house, supported by the Dutch.111  
Unfortunately, many officials or politicians came to the location only to make these people as 
objects of practical political campaign by promising aid that will never come.112 Not only that, many 
refugees became objects of  the touts. These people intentionally sold the fate of the refugees for their 
personal gains. The the people like this, ”fighting for” the fate of the refugees was their business field. 
According to a respondent: 
... in a refugees managing process[there were] many touts, starting from the government level down to the 
community. There were so many manipulated data, also some were put into jail, [both] from the government 
people and community... The touts [conducted] data manipulation [so that] they could get the assistance 
fund. Like what happened to our Button colleagues that took refuge to Bau-Bau area- when they returned, 
many of their names were gone from the list [because of being manipulated by touts].113 
From the statement we can see that the touts may come from ordinary people, particular 
community or local government officials. The common way done in the “tout-business”: process was 
by manipulating data on the refugees entitled for assistance by adding fictitious names in the list or 
deleting certain names and replacing them with names of other people. Another way was by asking 
for rewards in particular amount when they managed successfully to help fulfill the refugees’ rights. 
I S S U E S  O N  R E F U G E E S  R I G H T S  A N D  C I V I L  A F F A I R S  
CIVIL RIGHTS TO HOUSING AND ASSETS THEY LEFT BEHIND 
The next very urgent issues to be solved soon are related to the civil rights to housing and other 
assets left behind by the refugees at the time of conflicts. When the conflicts broke, many victims 
escaped or took refugee to safe places by leaving behind their houses and assets. After the conflicts 
abated, they found that their houses were destroyed or burned down; their assets were gone too.114 
Many community members claimed their houses and assets were destroyed during the conflicts. 
This condition is related to the prolonged duration of the conflicts and the fairly high intensity and 
escalation. No wonder, as a result, many personal and public buildings were destroyed during the 
conflicts. The remaining civil issues after the conflicts also need resolving soon by the government, 
because if not, this situation will easily disturb and hamper peace building in Ambon that has been 
running quite well. Particular persons or provocators often emerge and disturb situation by taking 
advantage of the issues.115 
One thing to be remembered is that compensation claims and demands from refugees are more 
based on government’s promises that mentioned it would compensate for all of the people’s houses or 
assets destroyed by the conflicts. In Kudamati as the Christian community base, for instance, many 
Muslim people from Southeast Sulawesi and Java took refuge when the conflict occurred. When they 
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returned, they demand their rights on the burnt houses or lost assets to the government. Such cases 
often overlap with other unfinished problems.116 
LAND DISPUTE 
Another emerging civil problem is dispute between refugees and land owner over the land they 
inhabit as relocation destination. Until today, lands in some relocation areas are still in dispute. Some 
respondents explained: 
Until now, in Amahusu there are approximately 50 HHs coming from North Maluku [and] until this second 
they haven’t received any assistance from the government. Even their land status in Halmahera or Ternate is 
still unclear. These are the cases that should be considered because [the] potential conflicts are quite high. In 
Kayu Tiga there are land problems too. It is most likely that they are removed by the land owners.  This is 
confusing because the government does not bridge the dispute settlement process there. Problems must 
happen. Like in Waringin,  it may be a bit different. Waringin used to be flattened, then it was rebuilt.117 
After living here (Warasia, Batu Merah  negeri), there was a problem of the land we inhabit between the 
owner from Masawio and from Hattala.  PK was issued. At that time there was a decision from the court that 
Hattala won and the land belonged to Hattala, even though at that time [there was already] a deal between us 
and Masowoi [who sold the land with] land price per 10x15 [m] lot amounting to IDR3,500,000.118 
From the above statement it can be seen that land disputes occurred in some relocation sites such 
as Amahusu, Kayu Tiga, and Warasia. As a result, the refugees are potentially removed from the 
relocation sites. If this happens, there will be series of new problems due to immature and hasty 
relocation planning and design. For example is the case in Warasia. With the issuance of the decision 
of Judicial Review (PK) by the Supreme Court (MA) that caused Hattala to win, the houses standing 
on the land were then marked by Hattala people with a sign saying “to be executed” (Photo 9 page 
140). 
In the land dispute case, the government tends to be reluctant to intervene, especially in the 
settlement process. In the last case, namely the case of refugees in Lembah Argo, the land they inhabit 
is still in dispute between the government and traditional party that claims that the land belongs to the 
Simaus.119 Amidst the dispute process, the government that claims the land through the certificate 
they hold should have been able to solve it immediately, for example by certifying the lands already 
given to the refugees. 
In many cases, the government is deemed to often stay clear of them on the grounds that it entrusts 
the settlement process to the legal process. In reality, settlement through legal process often causes 
owners to win so that refugees will only have two alternatives, namely to be removed or move 
voluntarily, or buy the land they inhabit from the dispute winners with the price deal which may be 
different from the previous one, such as in Warasia. In Warasia there was exchange of claims between 
the Hattala and the Masawoi. When their dispute was submitted to the legal process, the Hattala 
eventually won the case, even though the refugees had made deal with the Masawoi before. Beside 
that, the money to be spent for buying the land tended to get higher than their relocation cost to the 
place of origin, namely IDR2.5 million. As a result, many refugees cannot pay off their lands so that 
some of them eventually pay in installments.120 
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LAND CERTIFICATION 
Land certificate also becomes a civil problem  that should be solved soon. When the conflicts 
occurred, many people’s houses were burned down and only land remained. At the same time, many 
land certificates were burned. As a result, many of people’s land borders are less clear and cause 
illegal land occupancy cases and land claim overlaps.121 
Re-certification of the lands must be carried out carefully and accurately by the government since 
the process can become a source of new conflicts and a vehicle for certain parties who want to take 
advantage for personal interest. Beside that, the condition even gets worse because the National Land 
Agency (BPN) of Ambon was burned when the conflict occurred. According to a respondent: 
In this city what becomes [the source] of civil problems: the data on land ownership are in BPN. When the 
conflicts happended, BPN office got burned, so data recollection should be done. Many  people’s lands or 
people’s settlements were taken by landlords on the grounds that previously [the people] were only lent with 
the use right instead of ownership right. The people’s houses were also burned, so they could not prove it 
[since ownership proofs were also burned]. In the conflicts, all were burned. The data is non existent. The 
landlords took the land again and sold it to other people. The Kayu Tiga [refugees] cannot return any longer 
because they cannot prove [the ownership claims].122 
In such situation, the government is definitely expected to be able to carry out mediation in order 
to find solution. The refugees who still have land certificates can sell their lands, but those who only 
have land use right cannot do anything because the land belongs to the landlord, like in Batu Merah 
Dalam.123 
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C H A P T E R  I V  
Post-Conflict Segregation, Inter-Community 
Relationship, and Reconstruction Policy 
D E V E L O P M E N T  P R O G R A M  A N D  P O S T - C O N F L I C T  S E G R E G A T I O N  H A N D L I N G  
RECONCILIATION AND RESTORATION OF BROTHERHOOD TIE 
In the first years after the 1999 conflict, the post-conflict development priorities were focused on 
inter-community reconciliation initiatives, especially in the leadership term of Mayor M. J. Papilaya 
(2001-2006). This program was strengthened through the issuance of Presidential Instruction (Inpres) 
No. 6 Year 2003 on the Acceleration of Post-Conflict Maluku and North Maluku Development. One 
of the instructions were: “carry out thorough rehabilitation in various development aspects and 
harmonize social relationship between conflicting communities again.” Such priority is considered 
being rational given the fact that the Ambonese people just got out from the bloody conflict that 
harmed their social relationship and togetherness. Reconciliation priority was earmarked for 
pacifying, strengthening togetherness tie again, and forgiving each other. 
The development priority after Ambon went through post-1999 conflict de-escalation, was 
adjusted to the vision of Mayor M. J. Papilaya, namely to create peaceful and secure Ambon,124 with 
the main priorities of the government programs that became the missions: development of damaged or 
burned infrastructures and at the same time the strengthening of reconciliation efforts. Many 
reconciliation efforts were carried out by facilitating inter-community relationship through various 
peace-building programs and practical trainings. Emphasis on the increased awareness of Ambonese 
people on the conflict construction as the result of external parties and improvement in brotherhood 
among the people became key elements in the reconciliation effort. All of these efforts were 
conducted with cultural approaches.125 Therefore, it can be assumed that the segregation management 
at that time was not fully a priority of post-conflict development planning in Ambon. 
Then in 2004-2005, to strengthen reconciliation efforts focused on the restoration of inter-
community brotherhood tie, post-conflict development was aimed at the construction of interaction 
spaces and meeting of the communities that were divided due to the conflict. Physical/infrastructure 
development must be able to help facilitate inter-community meeting.126 Here, post-conflict 
development priorities started to move towards segregation management along with the growing 
awareness among Ambon figures and officials on the post-conflict sharpening segregation. The 
awareness is strengthened by the belief that efforts to unite various communities in Ambon and 
restore their brotherhood tie will only be effective if followed by efforts to construct interaction 
spaces or inter-community meeting to reduce actual segregation impacts. This must be done because it 
is very hard for the relevant parties to mix segregated people settlements by various social engineering 
and short-term development. 
OPENING OF NEW PLURAL AND HETEROGENEOUS SETTLEMENT 
The following development priority related to post-conflict segregation management is the opening 
of new plural and heterogeneous settlements. The development priority has become one of the agenda 
and vision of the 2011-2016Ambon City Mid-Term Development Plan (RPJMD), which constitutes 
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the outline and implementation of the 2006-2026Ambon City Long-Term Development Plan (RPJP). 
The RPJMD mentions that in the context of spatial planning, for instance, regional development is 
divided into some sub-areas (SW) development concentrations, covering downtown and the 
surrounding area (SW 1), Rumah Tiga and the surrounding area (SW 2), Passo and the surrounding 
area (SW 3), Laha/Tawiri and the surrounding area (SW 4), and others.127 In the2006-2011 Ambon 
City Mid-Term Development Plan, the terms used to mention the development aeras are Sub-Area 
Growth Center (SWPP).128 
In this context the current Ambon Mayor Richard Louhenapessy has made Poka and Passo the 
areas to be built as new plural and multicultural settlement areas. The Poka development is expected 
to be the developmental model which is oriented to Ambonese people de-segregation. If the Poka 
development is successful with expected social-community development effects, namely occurrence 
of de-segregation and/or natural blending among various different communities, Poka then will 
become the model of social-community development in Ambon.129 
Beside Poka, Passo is the next pilot project target. Passo is regarded as the entry point to Ambon 
and has fairly strategic position due to urban density and centralized infrastructure development in 
Sirimau.130 The presence of new malls in Passo is expected to be interaction spaces between Muslim 
and Christian communities.131 Passo is planned to be new urban area in Ambon even though initially 
Passo development was earmarked to reduce density in the center of Ambon City or in Sirimau. As a 
new urban center, Passo is expected to become plural and multicultural area given that the area will 
become a transit or meeting point of various communities in Ambon. Like Poka, if successful, Passo 
will become one of the important model of social-community development with de-segregation 
orientation. 
CHILD COUNSELING, TRAUMA HANDLING AND INFORMAL MEETING 
The next development priority, especially relating to post-conflict developing segregation 
management is provision of counseling of and awareness raising among children or young generation 
more specific conflicts. Specifically, Ambon City Social Affairs Office is mainly responsible for and 
provides more attention to the development program and priority.132 Putting children as priority for 
providing post-conflict counseling is important as many of them witnessed directly various burnings 
and killings during the conflict, even many of their relatives were killed. Trauma, revenge, and 
horrible memories can be buried down in their subconscious mind. Therefore, this program may ease 
psychological burdens and trauma and neutralize revenge that still possibly exists. If not conducted 
simultaneously with the children of other communities, beside reducing psychological impacts the 
counseling can also become social investment. Therefore, the future de-segregation process of 
Ambonese community is commenced and the community unification through young generation can 
also be promoted. 
Various suggestions are raised by the Ambonese society related to the post-conflict development 
that should be the priority. One of them is the recovery of intercommunity trust and trauma healing. 
Both things are not easy and cannot be done instantly. According to a respondent: 
So, here it is: what we need to do first is the recovery of the Mollucan people trust. That must be the 
government’s concern. If seen from the prolonged riots compared to the current healing time, it is not 
proportional. But now, it is proportional, even [there has been] progress. Well, it is impossible in less than 10 
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years the people have restored their self-confidence. And there has been  recovery program on past trauma, then 
economic recovery program, and now development arrangement. These are all significant processes.133 
The economic and infrastructure recovery is very crucial and urgent in order to make the wheel of 
the Ambonese society run smoothly and progressively. But without mental recovery, trust building, 
and trauma healing, the Ambonese people will lose an important foundation in building sustainable 
economic and physical development. Economic development can only be executed well if social 
condition is strong and stable; and behind the social and community stability there is a sense of 
mutual trust and respect between communities in Ambon.134 
Formal-ceremonial informal meetings are organized with the main goal of re-uniting different 
communities in an association, discussion and meal. Beside that, another goal of the events is to 
breaking the tension and trauma as the effects of the conflicts and rebuild inter-community 
brotherhood tie. Therefore, the main agenda is more focused on the increased awareness on 
Ambonese people’s cultural tie, called Pela Gandong. 
SOCIAL HARMONY 
Another development program relating to post-conflict segregation management is Social Harmony. 
The program is more earmarked to improve togetherness and unity of two communities—Muslims and 
Christians—through various social segments and activities. More particularly the program is intended to 
prevent potentials for social conflict which can develop into open conflicts. The expected result is the 
realization of social integration—social acceptance in peaceful side-by-side living order through social 
harmony system and mechanism between conflicting community groups.135 Social Harmony can be 
understood as social balance, in which members of both communities can take or assume a position 
together, and carry out social activity together. The executed Social Harmony Program seems to focus 
on conflict-prone areas especially in border areas between both segregated communities, areas that 
experience social disasters, and concentration areas of social disaster victims.136 
The types of Social Harmony Program activities, especially in 2006, are development of 
infrastructures together and the shared use of the infrastructures. However, some people criticized the 
program as project-oriented program. As a result, the effects and contribution to the development of 
togetherness has not been felt fully. According to a respondent: 
... definitely the [development program] is also difficult because the government is still trying to find more 
effective format... for instance: Inpres. It [is] the Social Harmony [Program] that I just mentioned: project-
oriented. So it does not address [the community]. In my opinion it failed. In my opinion, the [program] like 
the inpres [only] becomes additional income for officials, both at bureaucracy, local legislative council 
(DPRD), and also employers. The Recovery aspect is ignored.137 
For example, in 2007, many constructions of paths for share use by different communities, 
construction of meeting hall in conflict-prone location, and others.138 However, many of the 
constructed paths are damaged because lack of maintenance, for instance a path constructed in 
Kahena (see Photo 10 page 140). 
The path in Kahena was constructed in 2005. After completion, the path was unfortunately used by 
one community, the Muslim one. Beside paths, other infrastructures built are drinking water 
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reservoirs. Now the drinking water reservoir is broken and leaks, and eventually is not used any 
longer, leading to useless program (Photo 11 page 141).139 
In the Kahena case, a Social Harmony Program facilitator named Syakir Kaliki was just appointed 
by local Community Unit (RW) Head. Kaliki then explained to the people that he got fund from the 
government to carry out the programs. He managed the fund without public involvement and 
supervision, so that the accountability was not transparent. The participating people only received 
salary from Kaliki. Then, he was one of the suspect of the fund misuse.140 
Principally, the Social Harmony Program implementation in Ambon was divided into two phases, 
namely the programs launched in 2006 and 2013. The above mentioned examples and various 
subsequent problems are part of the 2006 Social Harmony Program. In the case of program request 
and fund disbursement procedures, there was a very clear difference between the two phases. Related 
to program request, the 2006 Social Harmony Program was more determined by local government, 
while in 2013 program initiatives were suggestions/ proposal from the community who get the 
assistance. Therefore, the 2013 Social Harmony Program is considered more “community-based”. 
Related to fund disbursement procedure, in 2006 fund disbursement was conducted by the third party 
or contractor. In 2013, the program fund was directly channeled to village beneficiary.141  
Moreover, in 2013 program, the people formed forums to manage the program so that the fund was 
transferred directly to those forums. In Maluku Province, there are 15 villages that have received the 
Social Harmony Program assistance: 5 in Southeast Maluku District, 5 in Western Seram District, and 
5 in Ambon City. For Ambon City, the village beneficiaries are Latuhalat, Hative Besar, Poka, Silale, 
and Batu Merah. Activities in Latuhalat included construction of clean water facilities and roads, in 
Silale construction of clean water facilities, in Batu Merah construction of water channels and water 
catchment facilities, while in Hative Besar construction of multi-purpose building for a meeting place 
of both communities. Selection of the five villages were more based on their position as refuge places. 
From the five villages, only Hative Besar has two different communities.142 Geographically,  
Latuhalat and Silale are two Christian negeris in   Nusaniwe area that is very far from the border of 
Muslim community. Batu Merah and Poka are Muslim negeris that have closeness with Christian 
community. Hative Besar is also a predominantly Christian area framed by two villages: Tawiri 
(Christian) and Wayame (mixed). By considering the geographical position, the program effectiveness 
for the social integration achievement can be evaluated. 
Nevertheless, other criticisms are also raised against the mismatch between program realization 
and the real program motivation, namely social reintegration. The Social Harmony Program, initially 
called Social Reintegration Program, tends to choose forms of activities designed for each community 
rather than activities executed together by the different communities. Ideally, the form of those 
activities should be implemented in the border of Batu Merah village–Mardika, border of Air 
Salobar–Pohon Mangga, border of Poka–Rumah Tiga, Latta, and others,143 in which inter-community 
interaction often takes places. 
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BUILDING BROTHERHOOD (ORANG BASUDARA) RELATIONSHIP 144 
Related to the current RPJMD priority (2011-2016) on post-conflict segregation management, 
Ambon City government focuses on the improved relationship of orang basudara (brotherhood). The 
orang basudara relationship is one of the Ambonese people’s local wisdom legacy that needs 
protecting. The program definitely becomes the implementation from one of the mandates of Inpres 
No. 6 Year 2003, namely “revitalization of values and socio-cultural institutions.” Particularly, the 
Ambon City Government makes use of education as a astrategic place to program development 
through orang basudara curriculum design, in which the contents are taken from various Ambonese 
people’s local wisdom values.145  
Furthermore, Orang Basudara (Brotherhood) Program has become one of the important 
approaches in the 2006-2026 Ambon City RPJP, as outlined in the Ambon City Local Regulation 
(Perda) No. 4 Year 2006. The approach is called cultural approach in the Ambon long-term 
development. Various developmental efforts are expected to be able to strengthen the sense of “the 
Ambon quality of Ambonese people,” in which the Ambonese society are characterized by religious  
and cultural differences but they are still peaceful because of strong sense of safety and togetherness. 
In the cultural concept of Ambon Manise (Sweet Ambon) there is socio-cultural reflection in the forms 
of harmonious relationship and interaction of different communities, which are generally expressed in 
the Pela Gandong relationship pattern.146 
Orang Basudara program explicitly has shaped the vision and missions of Ambon City RPJMD 
(2011-2016) manifested into post-conflict educational curriculums especially for children. It is hoped 
that the children are able to overcome their bad experiences during the conflicts and can grow better. 
In the curriculum contents are inserted cultural elements and/or local wisdom such as Kalesang (care 
for environment), Pela Gandong, and others.147 In Pattimura University (Unpatti), for instance, is 
introduced a subject called “Mollucan Culture”. In the subject are discussed Mollucan culture and 
local wisdom, such as family concept which aims to maintain and create harmonious inter-community 
relationship. The presence of such subject is a follow-up from the 2002 workshop in Unpatti.148 
In the context of curriculum for children, a book was published by the Ambon City Education 
Office, called Educational Curriculum on Orang Basudara Maluku: Teachers’ Book. The book with 
psychosocial approach is the result of cooperation between The United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF) and Peace through Development United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The 
criticism then came up later that the book is more identical with module/ guide book that uses 
psychoanalytical approach to educate and provide treatment to children in post-conflict areas. In the 
book, there are almost no Mollucan cultural-local contents and/nor Mollucan local wisdom, because it 
contains more general knowledge which can be applied in any areas that experienced conflicts.149 
Ideally, the curriculum constitutes a combination between local culture/wisdom and universal 
values.150 
The Orang Basudara educational model were once practiced in State Junior High School (SMPN) 
2 and Muhamadiyah Junior High School (SMP). Both schools were selected because the teachers  
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were mixed. Unfortunately, the trial was terminated. The program weakness caused by absence of 
special training for teachers who would teach the curriculum. The Orang Basudara education has 
been designed since 2005 and assisted by Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA).151 
Another perspective said that the teachers were already given special training, specially in pilot 
schools. However, the government did not continue it due to various reasons, such as no special 
budget for paying the teachers.152 Another source said that the Orang Basudara Education curriculum 
has been developed through UNICEF’s program and Child-Friendly Schools through Save the 
Children, but it has not been used/ implemented well at schools.153  
Study on the Orang Basudara curriculum, for instance, especially and deeply have been conducted 
by Alpha Amirrachman (2012). Decentralization process has revived traditions and local wisdom in 
Ambon, which becomes one of the ways to strengthen peace in post-conflict Ambon. However, the 
revival of traditions and local wisdom bring dilemma; on one hand, it has strengthened identity and 
local political structure; on the other hand, it has created conflicts and exclusion from migrants groups 
in Ambon, especially Butonese, Bugis and Makassarese. In this context, the revival of Pela and 
Orang Basudara curriculum are believed to create potential for tension between local people (native 
Ambonese) and migrants.154 
One of the Amirrachman’s criticisms to the concept and practice of Orang Basudara education is 
the over-emphasis on Ambonese locality and lack attention to the migrants who have long lived in 
Ambon. Orang Basudara education does have potential to cause exclusion from Ambonese coming 
from outside Maluku. 
R E A L I Z A T I O N  O F  D E V E L O P M E N T  P R O G R A M  I N  P O S T - C O N F L I C T  S E G R E G A T I O N  
H A N D L I N G   
REALIZED PROGRAMS 
Among the development priorities above, what is considered being successfully implemented are 
reconciliation and recovery of brotherhood tie, formation of inter-faith informal meetings, guidance 
and counseling for children, social harmony and reconstruction of Mardika field. To measure the level 
of program success it requires special evaluation with various indicators and/ or valid measurement 
and focus on one of the strategic development programs. Nevertheless, qualitatively some parties 
opinioned that post-conflict development was relatively successful although there were weakness and 
emerging problems. According to a respondent: 
Regarding the leakage of [budget is] everywhere. We need to prove that there is really a leakage. [But] we 
cannot prove without any other indicators [in order to] measure the success of  [the] post-conflict [program] 
according to the existing reality.155 
First, the reconstruction of Mardika Field as one of the realized programs is deemed important 
because one of strategic open spaces for inter-community interaction. Beside that, various budget 
market centers have been built in Ambon City. The revival of the markets generally intends to attract 
various communities to come and foster communications as well as interaction through trading 
process. The construction of these budget markets is a breakthrough with wider effects to the 
reconstruction of brotherhood tie, amidst the limited existence of creative segregation management 
program, especially if conducted consistently and evenly in Ambon City.  
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Behind the successful reconstruction of Mardika Field, some Ambonese community elements 
regretted that this field was the only open space in the present time.156 In the segregated society it is 
necessary to have many public spaces for inter-community interaction as a strategic solution. In 
general, Ambon City Government is expectd to increase the number of open spaces and build them 
more creatively. Neutral open spaces must be built especially in inter-community border areas or 
conflicting areas. Therefore, Mardika Field construction must become the start, instead of the end, of 
the building of open spaces in Ambon City. 
The second implemented development program is the construction of schools in border areas such 
as SMPN 2, SD Latihan, and others. These schools were designed as joint inter-community schools, 
instead of previous schools concentrating on particular communities. However, based on the field 
findings, very many schools in Ambon are segregated, both between the teachers and students. When 
conflicts happened, some school teachers from a particular community were entrusted to other schools 
for security reason.157 
Beside that, school attendance zoning policy is considered supporting segregation emphasis in 
education. In State Senior High School of SMA Negeri 1, for instance, there were many Muslim 
students, although the number is reducing now. Religion-based settlement segregation is also 
confirmed by educational school attendance zone which makes many Muslim children unable to go to 
school located in predominantly Christian area. The segregation occurs particularly due to the push of 
policies n separate facility construction for both conflicting communities. For example, in the case of 
conflict between students from Porto Village and Haria Village in Senior High School of SMU Kota 
Saparua, which later triggered tension between the two neighboring villages, the district government 
decided to construct two separate senior high schools, each in Porto Village and Haria Village.158 
In the areas whose people are segregated spatially, the social spaces will usually be segregated in a 
natural fashion. Therefore, as a solution to the spatial segregation, the construction of schools in plural 
border areas becomes very strategic to reduce segregation effects in the social spaces. Beside that, 
schools are also one of social spaces that are very strategic in uniting youth generation from the two 
communities, especially in border areas which often become the places where conflicts and violence 
start. Therefore, the government may need to more consistently multiply the construction of the 
schools. 
The third post-conflict realized development is the provision of psychological counseling to handle 
trauma and fear resulted by the 1999 conflict. The post-conflict trauma healing is one of the mandates 
from the Inpres No. 6 Year 2003, under the coordination of The Coordinating Ministry for People’s 
Welfare.  The psychological counseling is generally carried out by the Ambon City Social Affairs 
Office by maximizing the function of  Community Health Center (Puskesmas). The people’s mental 
recovery due to trauma and shattered trust becomes a special attention, both by the government and 
the general public. As mentioned in the previous sub-chapter, such recovery requires a long duration. 
However, the strategic program did not run consistently because the number of psychiatrists was 
limited.159 Such shortage has been felt by the people and government. Even worse, the trauma center 
set up in Sirimau Subdistrict had to be closed because of operational cost and absence of psychiatrist. 
The trauma center only operated until 2004.160 
The government’s attention should be prioritized more to the sufficient availability of psychiatrists. 
In the context of operational termination of the trauma center and psychological guidance in the 
community health center, the government was considered to look down on the trauma impacts 
experienced by the people and to prioritize more physical construction, even though trauma is the 
                                                             
156 Interview with Maluku inter-faith communications activist, Ambon, 15 December 2012. 
 
157 Ibid. 
 
158 Interview with GPM Research and Development Head, Ambon, 5 September 2013. 
 
159 Interview with Ambon City health official, Ambon, 12 December 2012. 
 
160 Interview with Ambon City social affairs official, Ambon, 13 December 2012; and  female NGO activist, Ambon, 15 December 2012. 
 
fundamental issue in every post-conflict condition across the world. Trauma can hamper and prevent 
the recovery of inter-community communications and brotherhood tie. Eventually, psychological 
counseling or guidance and consultation due to the trauma resulting from the 1999 Ambon conflict 
tend to be more handled by NGOs. Looking at such reality, the government should take more 
initiative to deal with the problems rather than just leave them to non-governmental organizations.161 
UNREALIZED PROGRAMS 
Two untouched development programs, despite its inclusion in the future Ambon City 
development plans, are development of traditional markets and public transportation. Development of 
both sectors is considered being strategic because they become potential places of inter-community 
massive meeting and interaction. This condition was directly admitted by the Ambon Mayor by 
stating:  
There are some points we have not touched yet [...] especially [...] markets and transportation sector. And we 
will deal with them, because our policy: we take the measure [must] have solution. If we  [just] demolish 
them, we can do it. But it can create new problems...Because of so massive volume of social activities there, 
so that social clashes often occur [...]. So, that is the problem. My policy: [...] I push the development of 
subdistrict markets. In 2012, we had two or three [new markets] so that we drag out the volume of 
[transactions]  [in the markets] again.162 
The traditional market development program should be immediately realized given the intensive 
transaction volume in those markets. Demands of new market development must soon be realized 
under two important considerations, namely the strategic function of the traditional markets as inter-
community interaction spaces, as well as massive transaction in the markets will cause friction and 
clash between communities. 
There are also programs that have been initiated but not well realized yet. One of them is 
counseling for children. The similar program was implemented by the Social Affair Office in 2007. 
Unfortunately, the program was temporary, sporadic and unsustainable. Beside that, the program 
design and planning tended to be less systematic.163 Counseling and awareness-raising among 
Ambonese children, especially the conflict victims or who witnessed directly the conflicts must be 
done in systematic and comprehensive fashion so that it cannot be executed temporarily and in only in 
particular locations. Education and counseling for the children even need to be design in a special 
manner and included in school curriculum. Through the program the children are expected to be able 
to really understand and be aware of what really happened in the 1999 conflict.  
Awareness-raising and counseling are important especially in handling revengeful feeling that 
remained in the children’s heart. If the feeling is neglected, the children are feared to grow with full 
revenge and can become the main actors of future conflicts. More than that, trauma counseling and 
peace curriculum given to schools will simultaneously take part in the establishment of Ambonese 
future generation characters which are more sensitive, tolerant and multi-cultural. 
Because [when occurred] the 1999 incidents, the children who [live] here and now were still small and are 
between the golden age (1-4 year. So in the future and right now it needs internalization  or formation of the 
characters so that more harmonious inter-religion or ethnicity relationship is fostered. We must build that. 
Moreover,  [in the ] current segregation condition, violent values are planted [which] was supported again 
with settlement pattern. So, they do not know and [do not] recognize their brothers and sisters who are 
Muslim or Christians.164 
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It is very obvious that peace and brotherhood curriculum has become the attention and demand of 
the general public. As a response to the demand, the Ambon City Government through the City 
Development Planning Agency (Bapekot) has design the newest RPJM which gives emphasis on and 
priority to orang basudara curriculum development.165 It is hoped that the program can be 
implemented as soon as possible given that the post-conflict period has passed more than one decade.  
Special guidance and attention should be given to the Ambonese children and young generation. 
The phenomenon of the Ambonese young people is closely related to the context and dynamics of the 
conflicts, especially to jobless youth. The youth unemployment issue has played a particular role in 
the outbreak of the 1999 conflict.166 Therefore, it is well grounded to give special attention and 
guidance to them, not only because many of them suffered from conflict-generated trauma, but also 
because their socio-economic condition can be potential for future violence. 
The next program that is considered to give lots of positive contributions to the creation of peace 
and restoration of inter-community brotherhood tie is the social cohesion through various religious 
events. Unfortunately, such program is still in the proposal phase by various parties and is not a post-
conflict development priority yet.   
That’s right; we need physical reconstruction, but without constructing social adhesives, it is in vain. [The 
fund]will be used up. Don’t they build social adhesives so that another project occurs? I don’t know. This is 
the difference between the way they think and we think as society. The maximum facilitation we do, our 
limitation is only on our community, and does not go through Muslim community.167 
Development and construction of border areas, both physically and psychically also become post-
conflict programs that are deemed important and urgent to realize. Border areas are those very prone 
to violence and conflicts; not only inter-community that live in the border areas, but also inter-group 
clashes in other places which are most likely to spread and trigger subsequent clashes in the border 
areas.  
Yes in the future, in our city planning, later in the border zone there will be no settlement to be constructed. 
Such as in the border of Batu Merah–Mardika; we will build parking area there or we build public facilities 
there. We just compensate for the people/ their houses/ lands. We buy the land, then we just relocate them? 
Because the area [tends to be an area] of burning conflicts. Like [in] the Pattimur Day, that [conflict] will get 
sparked there again.168 
The above statement clearly confirms two things: (1) border local development design should have 
been one of the post-conflict development priorities, even it has been included into the master plan of 
future Ambon city arrangement; however (2) those priorities are still in the planning phase and no 
realization nor implementation is done. Practically, border area development is not earmarked for 
settlement but more intended to public facilities which can be utilized together by different 
communities. The facilities—bedrooms, parking lots, traditional/modern markets, community health 
centers, schools, city parks etc- can become public spaces for inter-community interaction. 
Eventually, post conflict development priority balance needed, between physical, social and 
mental/ psychic developments given the 1999 conflict. Not only impacting physical infrastructures but 
also social infrastructures so that it inherits psychic trauma. Emphasis on more than 2 development 
aspect will only emphasize distortion and very partial development in Ambon City. 
S O C I A L ,  E C O N O M I C  A N D  P O L I T I C A L  D I S C R I M I N A T I O N   
Another important which is generally related to segregation is discrimination, both in social, 
economic and political sectors. In other words, in segregated areas whose people composition is 
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minority-majority, the discrimination phenomenon often occurs as the effect of very fierce 
competition in getting access. Similarly Ambon; as one of the areas in Indonesia where the people are 
segregated, the city is also closely related to discrimination phenomenon. In Ambon City, 
discrimination also takes place in public services, although the Ambon City Government has so far 
tried hard to eliminate the discriminatory practices. The Ambon City Government effort is reflected in 
the health services, as stated by a respondent: 
The health service does not differentiate whether a person is Muslim or Christian in providing health 
[service]. This provides a picture for other people that the Health Office staff in providing the service do not 
select even though during riots. That was done in the Community Health Center (Puskesmas) and  [...] in 
Muslim and Christian border areas. The Health Office often organize free medical treatment in Muslim-
Christian border areas and attended by Muslims and Christians.169 
The public services given by the Ambon City Health Office above describe an effort to eliminate 
discrimination, as the city government confirmed that they do not differentiate in the service delivery, 
both to Muslim and Christian communities, to the local people and refugees. However, it turned out 
that the discrimination happened in the provision of assistance to refugees. When floods hit Ambon in 
August 2012, for instance, refugees from a particular community felt the assistance received was less 
than the assistance that another community received: 
... because we have good relationship, so we want that the assistance should not only go to the Christians. But 
only a little [that we asked]. Recently, there were refugees from Muslim [community] that questioned why all 
Christian refugees got it while Muslim [refugees] did not. We explained that that was right they had it, but we 
only got a little, no more than 10 units of mattress. Hundreds of refugees may figh [because assistance 
distribution did not reach all people]. So, only we selected [the assistance recipients].170  
In the case, it seemed that flood victim refugees from the Christian community got priority more in 
accessing assistance rather than the refugees from Muslim community. From the nominal side of the 
assistance, the Christian refugees tended to get more assistance than the Muslims. Even many 
Muslims did not get assistance at all. Discrimination in accessing assistance or in other domain, even 
if well done by the government official, it will only destroy social structure and harmony long built in 
Ambon.  
Some other discrimination cases  are related to economic issues, for example project tender 
process and trading.  There are a number of cases in which particular ethnicity or groups are 
prioritized than the others. Chinese community, for example is considered having many privileges 
because they give “bribes” in a certain amount to bureaucrats.171 In small economic sector, for 
example, in Velentin Market which is the refugees’ relocation market, small vendors opinioned that 
local government pays more attention to traders in Mardika Marketn with set up more decent stands. 
Traders’ stands in Mardika are made from wood, while in Velentin Market from bamboo. But the 
renovation was done after the traders of Velentin Market asked many times to the government. As a 
result, they felt the Mollucan-native people as the majority of traders in Valentin Marget were 
marginalized.172 From the above cases, we can see discrimination in the economic aspect and may 
occur in other sectors, is often linked with ethnicity issues, especially if economic resource 
distribution is conducted through particular ethnic channels.173 
Some discrimination also happened in socio-political sector, for instance, related to some socio-
political position or governmental bureaucracy. In these cases people from a particular community are 
often prioritized than the others. One respondent in Unpatti, for example stated that: 
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The recruitment of lecturers are seldom announced two or three days before the test. Now [the recruitment] 
seems to explode again because [there is ] certification of lecturers. The data of many Muslim lecturers, 
including me, is obscured. Since the promotion until today, I have never failed my tasks to to carry out the 
university’s Three Duties (Tri Dharma). I have been lecturing since tens of years. Why does new lecturer 
who has just lectured for two years immediately get lecturer certification? What’s wrong with us? In Unpatti 
there is only one Muslim dean—from eight faculties; nine with faculty of medicines. The one person, 
[dean]of Faculty of Social and Political Sciences (FISIP); [then] Mr Madubun and Mr Udin, and PR 3 
(Assistant to President 3). ... The segregative life outside the university has been taken into [campus]—
symbolic things from outside go inside.174 
The above remark describes discrimination case in the recruitment of bureaucrats and lecturers in 
Unpatti. In this case, Christian. So do the promotion and lecturer certification. Lecturers from the 
Christian community are more prioritized even though those who come from Muslim community  feel 
they have met the requirements and are more entitled for a position or status. If closely observed, 
discrimination and segregation in the education sector in Upatti constitutes a reflection from 
segregation implanted in Ambonese society in general. In other words, spatial segregation in Ambon 
has entered social dimension.  
Still in relation to social-educational life in Unpatti as a case, discrimination turns out not only to 
happen in the recruitment and promotion, but also in the scholarship granting. The nominal value of 
scholarship received by Christian students is higher than what is received by Muslim students. In this 
case, Christian students can get scholarship amounting to IDR 7 million, while Muslim students oly 
get IDR 3 million. Similarly in the disbursement process, the scholarship for Christian students tends 
to be disbursed earlier than the scholarship for Muslim students. some examples above describe 
condition in which excess of segregation in Ambonese society has  reached social-educational sector 
in the forms of discriminatory cases related to services and public access.175 
Nevertheless, the discrimination phenomenon in Unpatti is denied y some parties, especially the 
university leadership. In terms of student acceptance quota, for example, it is deemed reasonable if 
many students accepted are Christian because the number of Christian student candidates who register 
are more than that of Muslim student candidates. Such ratio often applies at faculty level. According 
to the parties who deny the existence of discrimination, there is no priority given to students from 
particular community because the acceptance process has also been done through University Entrance 
Test (UMPTN) or Joint Entrance Selection of State University (SBMPTN) as well as through 
independent lane, and not based on proportion.176 
However, there is also another interesting finding in the university institution, namely the 
emergence of post-conflict positive change related to transparency in academic sector. Before the 
conflict, as admitted and felt in person by one of the leaders in Unpatti, there was sometime 
discrimination in giving scores, as well as difficult procedures to get bureaucratic service for students 
coming from particular community. Related to this, the 1999 conflict has provided  particular lessons 
learnt, grown openness, and created pressure against the university to avoid discriminatory and 
corruptive things.177 
In the context of filling in strategic positions in Unpatti, often times there is unwritten deal among 
the leadership to share positions. For instance, if the president is Christian, some deputies must be 
Muslims. Such phenomenon has occurred since the 2003 election of the university president. 
Similarly in the recruitment of lecturers, after the 1999 conflict the recruitment system has been 
improved and more transparent. Even though based on the testimony from one of the former Unpatti 
leadership from Muslim community, the people from Muslim community tend more to apply for jobs 
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as government employees rather than lecturers.178 After the conflict, scholarship granting is more open 
and competitive. Many have failed to get scholarship more because of English skills and academic 
potential, instead of priority or discrimination. Even though the discrimination occurred, it has been 
more casual.179 
Demand for inter-community power sharing, especially in relation to the power sharing type, once 
surfaced in the discussion process of Malino II Agreement. Some parties once proposed “pro-rate” 
power sharing scheme, 50-50. But many parties that refused the power sharing model because it will 
potentially set aside factors of individuals’ quality, compentencies, and professionalism. If the 
demand for “pro-rate” is too much followed, someone who does not have the required ability or skills 
can be put in a particular position for the sake of quota demand. Therefore, the balance which is then 
deemed fair is proportional, namely which considers individual’s capacity and skills.180 
P O S T - C O N F L I C T  I N T E R - C O M M U N I T Y  R E L A T I O N S H I P   
IMPROVED INTER-SOCIETY RELATIONSHIP 
Until now, post-conflict condition and situation in Ambon can be said to run well. The life has 
been normal, the people have returned to the initial life and activities, inter-community 
communications and interaction have run relatively well. Although not all, many of the community 
members have mingled after getting separated due to the prolonged conflict.181 The improved 
situation of Ambon City, which once experienced social distortion and weakened inter-community 
cohesion, has become one of the attentions and important considerations in the 2006-2026 Ambon 
City RPJP.182 
However, although inter-community interaction and relationship has returned to normalcy, it 
should be admitted that particular social segments still experience trauma, fear, discomfort, and 
others. There are still some issues due to the conflict and it requires a long period to solve them. Inter-
community stigma, as represented by Acang (Hasan) label for Muslims and Obet (Robert) for 
Christians, is one of the post-conflict problems. A respondent revealed: 
But nowadays there is still problem deep down in the heart especially for grass-root people. For example, for 
elderly people there are people [who] often say, “Who’s that? Acang or Obet?” Who do we still use the 
words like that? Acang (Hasan) is Muslim and Obet (Robert) is Christian. This is one stigma/ mark made by 
the Police. At that time the Indonesian Police asked Franky Sahilatua to create a song and the song was 
followed by a video clip in which Muslim and Christian children are in a shattered place, then they yelled 
out“… Acang … Obet ....” So, from that, the stigma on Muslims and Christians is still here until now by the 
calling of Acang and Obet. But in our community who really understand it we often put it in a joke like: 
“Oh, Acang, do come in, or Obet, do come in.”183 
Generally, trauma resulting from the conflict is still visible; inter-community sentiment and 
suspicion  are still experienced by various segments of the society. One of the result is when travelling 
many people choose to find alternative road to avoid the need of passing through other community 
area. For instance, Christian people who want to pass through Air Salobar to reach the Christian area 
which is located across the area, must take a speed boat. For Air Salobar people, if they want to go to 
Al Fatah Mosque located inside the city, for instance, also must take spead boat because they are 
reluctant to pass through their neighboring Christian area. Similarly with Amahusu Christian people, 
                                                             
178 Ibid.; and with one Catholic leader, Ambon, 13 May 2013. 
 
179 Interview with dean of a faculty in Unpatti, Ambon, 15 May 2013. 
 
180 Interview with one Unpatti leader, Ambon, 16 May 2013, and with one Catholic leader, Ambon, 13 May 2013. 
 
181 Interview with Ambon City senior official, 13 December 2012. 
 
182 See Ambon City Local Regulation (Perda) No. 4 Year 2006. 
 
183 Interview with Maluku Human Rights Activist and with Ambon Health Office head, Ambon, 12 December 2012. 
 
they must use speed boat to reach Benteng or go around the mountain to reach the center of Ambon 
City.184 The phenomenon is particularly caused by suspicion and sentiment built by the 1999 conflict, 
and it turned out that it would not just disappear. After the September 11, 2011 occurred, for instance, 
the phenomenon of “avoiding” in doing the travel recurred. Since there is still sentiment and 
suspicion, many relationships which ran well before the conflict, have really cut off after the conflict. 
[Previously] the Christians, would visit us in Lebaran day for gathering... I have lots of friends above (in 
Christian environment)—they even brought cakes. Later, [...] if they celebrated Christmas we would go there 
for gathering, bringing cakes. But now it never happens again [gathering]... Cut off... Previously in 
Christmas they invited as to celebrate Christmas together. Usually there was drama from the Muslim 
community, we joined. That was before 1999. So we participated. In Lebaran day, Biasanya we invited 
[them] again. [Now] they often pass through here, but no more greetings.185 
Although it should be admitted that in many places in Ambon inter-community relationship 
generally has improved, but the case told by a respondent above has also been experienced by many 
Ambonese people. The two communities used to help each other and work together in various 
religious events, now even there is no greetings any longer and it was as if they do not know one 
another. 
STRENGTHENED PUBLIC AWARENESS ON CONFLICTS 
Improved inter-community relationship is followed by strengthened public awareness on not being 
involved in conflicts. The people have learned from the 1999 conflict that it only brought misery and 
destruction to the Mollucan people, especially Ambon. This can be seen from various religious 
activities especially sermons, Muslim teachings, religious speeches, both from the Muslim and 
Christian communities, which contain the call for not being easily provoked and falling into 
communal conflicts.186 
More than that, the Ambonese society even get more aware that the 1999 conflict was not their 
will. The current Ambonese people, especially the traditional people, are aware that they are brotherly 
community since long time ago. For them, the conflict was engineered by external parties. A 
respondent stated: 
In my opinion, after the conflict we are truly brothers here and there is no problem. But actually external 
intervention or influences came in. So, if we see it in negeris, they usually will return if they have petuanan 
(traditional area). Even though they have several times experienced conflicts. What was built was burned 
down again. But they returned because it is their traditional negeri. The problem occurs in urban area 
because in the area the people have mingled. For us, as Ambonese people, there is no problem any longer.187 
Assumption that the 1999 conflict was external party’s construction and interest has made the 
intention of having conflicts slowly disappear from the mind of the Ambonese people. After the 
conflict, the Ambonese people really tend to return to their place of origin because of two things, 
namely the sense of brotherhood or traditional tie and no intention among them to have conflicts. 
That after the conflict their resilience now has been far better than before, namely when there was 
violence, they could easily localize and settle it shortly. Even though post conflict violence is often re-
linked to religious issues and sentiment by particular parties, but the conflict forms always happen 
only within a short period of time and in a particular location.188 The post-1999 conflict peace process 
has made the Ambonese people more mature and stronger in facing each emerging violence; like in 
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Waringin on September 11, 2011, and in Torch relay on May 25, 2012 in which the violence could 
instantly localized and settled.   
More than that, in border areas such as Waringin and Mardika, which often become the inter-
community violence and conflict sites, the people have been committed to living peacefully 
together.189 The Waringin people who used to take refugee following the 1999 conflict have now 
mingled with other community members and lived peacefully together. 
INTER-COMMUNITY COOPERATION AND COMMUNICATIONS 
Inter-community cooperation and communications in handling violence after the 1999 conflicts 
constitute another important fact that shows more improved and strengthened post-conflict inter-
community relationship. The communications and cooperation have greatly been fostered by the 
community leaders, for instance between reverends and Ulemmas, between GPM Synode and MUI 
both at the provincial and city level, etc.190 When violence occurs after the conflict, the figures of both 
communities always go down to the field, foster communications and provide explanation to their 
respective congregations so that they are not easily provoked or involved in any violence. 
People’s strengthened social resilience, better inter-congregation communications and cooperation 
should have been followed by reactivation of traditional and togetherness values, for instance by 
helping each other to build religious places and revitalize Pela Gandong.191 The cultural values and 
treasure must be revived as the prevention from all potential violences that can still threathen the 
Ambonese people. The Activation of Pela Gandong and teaching of history of inter-community 
togetherness culture are very important to strengthen the Ambonese young generation, which may 
forget or even be unaware about it. Until now, the very real post-conflict inter-community cooperation 
and communications in organizing several religious events such as Iedl Fitr, Christmas, Musabaqah 
Tilawatil Quran/ Qoran Recital Competition (MTQ), and others. According to a respondent: 
Just like my experience in Silo: every year at Christmas, the Mollucan Mosque Youth and Teenagers 
Coordinating Body guarded Silo Church. Every [any time] devotion/religious services, they will guard the 
church by wearing traditional Muslim hat (kopiah), koko shirt. That is a very beautiful condition. On the 
other way round it happens so; during the Ied prayer, we from the GPM Young Generation also guard the 
mosques like in [Mosque] Al Fatah oar [Mosque] Jami. But for churches, the ones that are often guarded 
[are] Silo Church,  Maranatha Church, Sidang Jemaat Allah Filadelfia Church, and Bethlehem Church. The 
four churches are regularly guarded by Muslim community every year.192 
Beside cooperation in securing religious events, young people from both communities consistently 
conduct creative and interesting activities to maintain peace in Ambon by utilizing social media, such 
as organizing “Kopi Badati” movement. Through the movement, they collect Christian-Muslim young 
people to carry out joint movement, for instance by giving coffee and tea to the posts built in border 
areas. They carry out this to build communications and discussions with security personnel and 
friends of another community in border area.193 Behind the “Kopi Badati” activity, an important value 
is promoted, namely unity and awareness of inter-community young generation on protection Ambon 
together for sustained peace. 
SOME INTER-COMMUNITY INTERACTION OBSTACLES 
Inter-community relationship and interaction have so far run quite well. However, some problems 
as the direct result from the conflict still require serious and systematic handling. If not handled, those 
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problems can disturb the on-going peace building or even harm inter-community relationship and 
interaction that run quite well. 
The intended problem, first is trauma and disappearance of mutual trust. In the context, a peace 
activist in Ambon, for example, emphasized that “before the conflict there were no[issue of trust]—all 
trusted one another. So, distrust occurred after the conflict happened. But [to deal with it] requires 
time, doesn’t it? We cannot just talk about it.”194 Another respondent revealed: 
If we go to the Christian community area, we are not afraid any longer, but we cannot stay long. That 
happened during the day. on May 15, we were afraid and cautious or alert, but did not leave Waringin 
because katong thought there was guarding personnel in the post.  But katong’s feeling was not calm because 
we felt that security personnel was no guarantee.195 
The story described the suspicion and distrust within the community members. The problems 
should be immediately taken care of since the 1999 conflict has really harmed mutual trust and 
triggered inter-community suspicion although another perspective believes that the disappearance of 
this mutual trust had been there years back before the 1999 conflict broke out.196 
The second problem that needs serious attention for maintaining  inter-community relationship and 
interaction is the demand for fair treatment by the government to both communities.197 Therefore, 
there are particular community segments which until today still feel discrimination and lack of power 
sharing between both communities.198 
The third problem which potentially harms well-maintained inter-community relationship and 
interaction  is unfinished law settlement of the violence emerging after the conflict. This law 
uncertainty may create mutual suspicion and accusations between them or between communities. 
Many parties still tend to think that if an incident happened to a Muslim, a Christian must be the actor, 
and vice versa.199 To avoid such suspicion, thorough disclosure of each case by security personnel is a 
crucial step to clear up the real problem and eliminate mutual suspicion and accusation between 
communities.  
POST-CONFLICT SOCIAL –ECONOMIC DECONSTRUCTION 
Beside the problems that may prevent good relationship between the communities above, after the 
1999 conflict there have been an interesting thing such as deconstruction of social-economic structure 
of the Ambonese society. Before the 1999 conflict, Christians were not interested in non-formal jobs 
and preferred formal jobs only, for example being civil servants (PNS), officials, or office employees. 
Meanwhile, Muslim community tended to choose non-formal sector or private sector jobs, such as 
being sellers, pedicab drivers or motorcycle taxi drivers. However, after the 1999 conflict there has 
been a shift within the Christian community; now they are not reluctant to work in non-formal sector, 
such as pedicab drivers, market sellers, laborers, house assistants, brick layers, and others.200 
Nevertheless, the different identity can still be identified between the non-formal workers from the 
diffirent community. For instance, pedicab drivers from Christian and Muslim communities can be 
differentiated based on the physical form and accessories of their pedicabs. Muslims’ pedicabs tend to 
look good, neat and well-maintained. Usually their pedicabs are equipped with rear tyre fender. 
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Christian pedicabs tend to be as they are, not well-maintained, and usually without rear tyre fender 
(Photo 12 page 141).201 However, day after day the physical characteristics of pedicabs as the 
indicator of identity of the drivers becomes irrelevant since pedicab drivers from one community may 
drive pedicabs with the characteristics which previously belonged to the pedicabs of another 
community.202 
The change in preference of Christian community’s livelihood is also related by a respondent: 
For instance: Christians, I said, used to be Ambtenaar. Now it changes. Did we ever see a Christian drive a 
pedicab? None. Did we see Christians sell in markets? None. Did they hang around? None. If yes, there 
would be people from my negeri—from mountains. Mothers with baskets that we called bakul, on their 
heads, just [now] are walking around selling door to door. Previously, there was none of them in markets. 
But now, all of our social structure has changed. Many Christian now sell in markets. Many [Christians 
becoming drivers of] pedicabs too, ... [drivers of ] motorcycle taxi too.203 
After the conflict, the relationship dynamics between Muslim and Christian communities related to 
jobs has changed too. During the conflict, the factor of the same religion became an important thing 
oto consider in the job recruitment. But now, the majority of the people have started to consider more 
the professionalism aspect rather than someone’s identity based on the community of origin.204 
F E E L I N G  S E C U R E :  V A R I O U S  P E R S P E C T I V E S  O F  S O C I E T Y ’ S  S E G M E N T S  
MOTHERS’ PERSPECTIVES 
In general, many mothers both who take refuge or not, have been relocated or not, stated that now 
they felt secure to travel to various places in Ambon. According to them, it is no problem for mothers 
from the Muslim community to go to Christian areas; and the other way around.205 However, it must 
be admitted that there are still particular segments of the society who have so far felt insecure and 
traumatic to come to  certain places, especially the mothers who now live in relocation areas. For 
instance, mothers in Kayu Tiga, whose majority is Christian refugees, underlined that they still felt 
afraid of going to Batu Merah and Kebun Cengkeh, dominated by Muslim community. One 
respondent stated: 
Until now [I] still feel uncomfortable because if for instance there is someone dead in Kayu Tita here, then I 
asked where is the funeral took place, then if the answer was the funeral in Benteng, I will would go there, 
but if they said the funeral in Kebun Cengkeh, I would go … But now I dare to go with the mournful people 
go [to] the a funeral in Kebun Cengkeh. If we have invitation from Batu Merah, for instance I will not go 
even during the day and moreover in the evening.206 
Other mothers from the Christian community emphasized that they dared to go to Kebun Cengkeh 
if together. However, will be afraid to go to Batu Merah, even during the day and in the evening. 
Beside the places, the other places they consider insecure to visit are Kairatu, Western Seram, in 
which they have to go through Liang, a location nof ferry piers where the majority of the people are 
Muslim. Such feeling has originated from the 1999 conflict experience and the resulting trauma.207 
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Different from the mothers in the Kayu Tiga relocation, the Muslim mothers in Latta who once 
took refuge during the 1999 conflict decided to return to Latta which is dominated and surrounded by 
Christian settlements. Social assets in the form of sense of mutual trust with the Christian community 
in their area made them willing to return. They emphasized that they had strong inter-community 
brotherhood tie as taught for generations in Latta. Even the Muslim community intentionally send 
their children to Christian schools to foster the sense of unity and mutual understanding.208 
UNIVERSITY STUDENTS/ STUDENTS’ PERSPECTIVES 
University students/students in general emphasized that they felt secure to travel to several places 
in Ambon which are mainly inhabited by the community different from them. However, some 
university students/ students feel insecure to travel to some places or in particular hours. The similar 
condition, like the mothers’ perspectives, is mainly shaped by traumatic feeling resulting from the 
1999 conflict which has completely disappeared.209 Muslim university students, for instance, stressed 
that since 2006 they have been often come to Kudamati area as a Christian area, to foster cooperation 
with the students from Chrstian organizations.210 
However, the university students who live in border areas have different experiences and feelings 
given that they often witness and experience violence or conflicts. Muslim university students who 
live in border area, for instance, stressed that they would feel afraid to enter Christian areas I the 
evening. The fear is often strengthened by awareness that identification of particular community 
membership can be easily done by anyone by only looking at dressing model, language and home 
address. Such condition also happens to Christian university students who live in border areas.211 
PEDICAB/ MOTORCYCLE TAXI DRIVERS’ PERSPECTIVES 
Both motorcycle taxi/ pedicab drivers in general underlined that they felt secure to enter various 
areas in Ambon, especially when they are operational or at work. Only in particular areas, many of 
them still feel afraid to enter them, many among them will feel afraid of entering in the evening. For 
instance, motorcycle taxi driver from Muslim community will avoid Kudamati and Batu Gantung in 
the evening and tend to operate only in Ambon city.212 
During the day I am not really [scared]. In the evening, I will refuse it. What I mean here is that we refuse it 
to be careful [so that] nothing will happen to us. If asked to go to border area [I] am willing to do it. Because 
we see: which area is the most vulnerable, so do enter it. I can also talk to my passenger that I can only take 
them here. I cannot take them there.213 
Christian motorcycle taxi drivers tend to feel secure if they operate in Christian areas and avoid 
operations in  Kebun Cengkeh and Batu Merah in the evening. Beside those areas, other areas which 
are often avoided by Christian motorcycle drivers are Air Besar, Waihaong, and STAIN. But 
motorcycle taxi drivers have their own communities- Muslim drivers in Muslim areas while Christian 
ones in Christian areas.214 
Special attention is mainly given to Kudamati area. The Christian public van (angkot) drivers, 
motorcycle taxi drivers, or pedicab drivers think it is the most secure place for them, after Batu 
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Gantung and Mangga Dua.215 In another side, for them Batu Merah is a place to be avoided, not only 
because the area is the Muslim community concentration, but also because there are increasing 
criminal cases in that area.  There are many jobless people in the area and many young people get 
drunk so that non-formal workers feel insecure.216 
SMALL VENDORS’ PERSPECTIVES 
In general, street vendors feel secure selling everywhere even though in certain condition and place 
we feel insecure to sell.  The insecure feeling originates from the trauma resulting from the conflict or 
violence experiences, so that the street vendors tend to feel secure selling in their own community 
area. In other words, Muslim vendors feel more secure to sell in area/markets whose the majority of 
vendors are Muslim; similarly also to Christian vendors .217 
Christian vendors in Velentin Market (Photo 13 page 142), for instance, who moved from Mardika 
Market and Matu Meja Market because of the 1999 conflict feel uncomfortable and insecure to return 
to  Mardika Market which is dominated by vendors from Muslim community (Photo 14 page 142). 
Many of them still admitted that they were still trauma and afraid of getting trapped into the same riot. 
But, going to Mardika Market will not be a problem as long as they only shop and not sell.218 The 
vendors who sell in Waringin feel secure ony because in the area there are security posts with 24 hour 
guard by 4 battalions.219 
EMPLOYERS’ PERSPECTIVES 
For employers, security situation is not a problem. They feel safe and comfortable to conduct 
transactions everywhere and with any body. Such condition is considered quite far different in conflict 
times and post-conflict periods.220 The problem really felt by employers, especially contractor 
employer, is the transparency of tender system in every project in Ambon. The corruptive practices 
are pointed out to apply by providing priorities to certain groups.221 
The security feeling includes some transaction of Muslim employers conducted in Christian areas, 
and vice versa. For instance, a young Muslim employer in Ambon smoothly and comfortably conduct 
some business transaction in South-east Maluku and Kisar, Western South-east Maluku, dubbed as 
Christian areas.222 
U N I F I Y I N G  A N D  D I V I D I N G  F A C T O R S  
UNIFYING FACTORS 
Ambon is known as one of the areas in Indonesia colored with tight segregation. However, there 
area some aspects or factors which have been so far considered taking important role in maintaining 
peace in Ambon. The main factor which is widely known is the cultural value called Pela Gandong. 
Thanks to the brotherhood system, the Mollucan people, especially the Ambonese, live peacefully and 
in brotherhood for years. After the conflict in 1999, the need for reviving Pela and Biking Panas 
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Pela223 is very urgent. Through the brotherhood culture, the intercommunity harmonious relationship  
is expected to realize quickly and well after the 1999 conflict. Sharing the statement, a respondent 
emphasized that “we live in the frame of Pela in Ambon, but it is still limited by the wall of 
distrust…. We are brothers and sisters. In Maluku, there are Muslims-Christians, but ‘salam–sarani’; 
salam means Islam, sarani means Christianity.”224 
Beside that, huge trust in Pela as inter-community brotherhood tie in Ambon has made most of 
Ambonese society believe that the 1999 conflict was only the construction of external parties who 
wanted to damage Ambon.225 The belief in the strength of Pela also takes the people to another point 
of belief that the source of the 1999 conflict is not related to the inter-community internal relationship 
in Ambon. Therefore, Pela is the main source of the disappearance of inter-community prejudice.   
Nevertheless, although there is a common belief that  the 1999 conflict was the construction of 
external parties from outside Ambon, the attention is still given to the absence of Biking Panas Pela 
in the last few year before the 1999 conflict. Biking Panas Pela is usually conducted every five years. 
For instance, when a Muslim village and a Christian village have Pela relationship, at one time 
Muslim people will visit their Christian neighbors. Then, in the next five years, Christian people will 
visit the Muslim village. On that occasion, there will be huge feast, big meal and others.226 Biking 
Panas Pela is an effort to maintain and preserve tradition and brotherhood tie between them. The 
occurrence of the 1999 conflict can be assumed as the turning point of the revival of Ambonese 
awareness to restart the routine event. Even, some respondents emphasized that Ambonese people’s 
strength to resolve and build peace is by using  the cultural approach or Pela Gandong.227 
However, the special position of Pela in the construction of peace and inter-community 
brotherhood in Ambon by some parties is considered being contraproductive, and even negative. The 
reason is that Pela can become a reson for a particular community to help the community that has 
Pela tie with it  when the community is involved in the conflict by the other community.228 The late 
2012 clash between Hualoy and Kamariang villagers in Kairatu subdistrict, Western Seram district, 
may become one example. Sepa villagers that have Pela with the Kamariang villagers were invited to 
attend the installation of Kamariang Village King. To come to Kamariang, Sepa villagers had to pass 
through Hualoy village. There was unclear reason for the clash between Sepa and Hualoy villagers 
that claimed 5 Sepa villagers’ lives, and Kamariang villagers that feel to have Pela with Sepa 
community immediately helped Sepa villagers in the clash.229 
Another important unifying factor is inter-community cooperation and mutual help in organizing 
various religious events. The togetherness in conducting various events is one of the strong and 
practical means to maintain and defend peace in Ambon. For instance, in the execution of the 2012 
MTQ in Ambon, the GPM women’s group (pelwata) designed social charity activity with Muslim 
women. In Christian areas like Galala, the Christian community produced lanterns bearing the 
pictures of star and moon. They also installed huge banners, for instance, with sentences like “Success 
to the National MTQ.” Similarly, Muslim community every year end install big banner saying “Merry 
Christmas and Happy New Year.”230 Cooperation between Muslim and Christian communities in the 
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MTQ execution that was opened by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono on June 8, 2012231  
becomes an important key to the revival of inter-community brotherhood that was once damaged due 
to the 1999 bloody conflict. 
The last unifying factor can be referred to the emergence of pluralistic point of view and people’s 
openness. The emergence of Ambonese special segments that are aware of the importance of 
pluralism and tolerance for  religious difference, especially from Christian or Muslim community 
figures, will greatly help out the process of maintaining and guarding inter-religious community 
brotherhood and peace in Ambon.232 Pluralism and multiculturalism can become deadly weapon in 
maintaining heterogeneous community harmony and having fairly high level of segregation. The 
understanding can also start to be developed seriously and consistently in school and higher 
education’s curriculum in Ambon.  
DIVIDING FACTORS 
Apart from some unifying factors, there are also some important factors that are often regarded as 
the sources of conflicts/ clashes or the source of inter-community divider in Ambon. One of them is 
provocation by particular parties that make use of sensitive issues and religious symbols to make the 
communities clash or conflict one another. Provocative efforts to the people often become debates 
because it is difficult for security personnel to capture the provocators. The goal of the provocations is 
relatively clear: playing one against another and confronting two different communities in order that 
conflicts/clashes occur.233 But the provocators’ interests may vary and are not easy to identify. 
Outside all the debates, provocations really become the trigger of the 1999 conflict and, in some 
incidents, of post-conflict violence. According to a respondent: 
On September 11, 2011 there were really many issues related to religious issues, in which religions were 
made as inter-community conflict trigger. It is the understanding to be revived in the life of orang basudara 
between Muslims and Christians. Christians and Muslims in Maluku are only one, all are brothers and 
sisters. But, with provocations that use religious elements, [people are prone to conflict]. So Latupati tries to 
strengthen traditional structure as orang basudara (brotherhood). Never be influenced by untrue issues234 
The statement above reveals there was provocation that brings sentiment and group fanaticism 
when a riot in Waringian occurred in September 11, `12011. Similarly it happened in the 1999 
conflict.235 
 
Another factor that is considered being able to divide community, and even potentially triggers 
inter-community clashes, is absence of respect for local tradition which has for years a role in 
maintaining inter-community harmony and. Such tradition especially refers to the communal 
construction of religious places, as well as permits given by particular communities to the other 
communities in constructing their religious places. 
Our fault and the government’s have been  social engineering. Previously, if we wanted to build a mosque, 
we agreed to build it together. The same is like church. All helps each other. But now suddenly I saw 
mosques in the all Christian (owned) area. Suddenly there is a mosque that is built across Silo Church, etc. 
Christian do not feel they own the mosque any longer. [Even though],  all existing mosques are not taken 
care of Christians. The architecture of the Grand Mosque [has been designed by] Christians, right.236 
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The important philosophy behind the tradition of building religious places together is the sense of 
ownership on the religious places built. Nevertheless, mosques do not only belong to Muslims, but 
also Christian because they joined the construction. The sense of mutual ownership can become the 
foundation of mutual care and inter-community respect. The absence of respect for noble values and 
traditions has clearly eliminated the sense of ownership, sense of togetherness and brotherhood. In 
line with the above statement, a respondent stated that Muslim community “build mosques”, but no 
Muslim community member are there. [...] This also must be attended to. Because when building 
religious places but not recovering social [togetherness], it may become a potential for conflicts.”237 
The last factor that is often considered being able to divide community is the growth of radicalism 
and strong religious symbolization in Ambon. Radicalism of religious understanding like this tends to 
oppose another understanding which becomes the Ambonese people’s unifying factor, namely 
pluralism and multiculturalism. 
If in Maluku what we criticize is [the opinion ] that we are not Muslim yet if we have not been Arabic yet. 
Similarly the Christians will feel not being Christians if they haven’t been the Dutch or Western people yet. 
And the clash of identities is very intensive. The cultural Islam has started to be shifted... She symbols are so 
strong. One community is showing the hijab, while the other community is showing the shalom off. It is like  
hitting religion, “This is my religion, that’s is your religion. Let compete which one is stronger!”  The 
Muslim area is called PLO area, and [Christian] is called Israeli area. If you enter a Muslim area, there is 
always a sentence saying welome in PLO area. And this things were much founded before the conflict.238 
Islam Arabization and Christian Westernization not only eliminate Ambonese people’s traditional 
religious culture, but also caused the clash of identity between the two communities to escalate 
Arabization and Westernization of both religions are very obvious from the increasingly strong use 
and exposure of religious symbols in public domain.  Consequently, cultural diversity of the Mollucan 
people is marginalized, and the potential for conflicts intensified; moreover if it is followed by 
competition of religious symbol strengthening in public spaces.   
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C H A P T E R  V  
Post-Conflict Segregation, Violence, and Role of 
Security Personnel and Leadership 
S E G R E G A T I O N  A N D  E M E R G E N C E  O F  P O S T - C O N F L I C T  V I O L E N C E  
BACKGROUND OF SEGREGATION  
As explained in the previous chapters, one fact that is considered as general knowledge that 
Maluku including Ambon, historically is a segregated area. Ethno-religiously speaking, there were 
Dutch Protestant and Catholic groups, native Mollucan Christian and Catholic, Chinese group, Arabic 
group, native Mollucan Muslim group, and migrant Muslim group from other parts of Indonesia.  
Geographically, these groups were segregated and settled down in areas where they are ethnically and 
religiously similar. Eventually, the formation of villages with particular religious group identification 
became an integral and accepted part of a necessity, so that Muslim villages and Christian villages 
spread in Ambon area.239 Below is the visualization of segregated Ambon city in the map. The 
numbers representing each of the colors were the range of number of Muslim or Christian people in 
the area. The stronger both colors (green and red), the more dense and concentrated were people of 
both communities in the area/village (see Figure 24 page 143). 
The spatial segregation was worsened by the Dutch colonial government policy that provided 
educational access only to Mollucan Christian and Catholic groups. This was done to prepare local 
civil servants to support administrative and security tasks. From here was born ambtenaar class, in 
which native Mollucan Christian and Catholic groups were identic to the professions of civil servants 
and soldiers.240 Another opinion said that in reality there were many Muslim figures who at that time 
received education from the Dutch, such as Abdullah Solisa (Opa Dulllah). Beside that, many Muslims 
tended to avoid the Dutch education because the curriculum did not contain religious subject and 
Arabic language subject. However, such condition turned around during the Japanese invasion, in 
which Muslim groups received more privileges.241 
In the Dutch colonial period non-Protestant and non-Catholic in Maluku did not get equal 
treatment. As a result, social segregation becomes the consequences because access to the facilities 
provided by the colonial government more targeted ambtenaar families. The legacy from the  
ambtenaar class causes particular consequences on the job options, although Maluku has been part of 
Indonesia. Therefore, no wonder, the Christians only wanted to work in formal sector, especially civil 
servants.242 
After the revolution period of the Indonesian independence, a number of Christian and Catholic 
group members affiliated to the Dutch emigrated to Netherlands. However, the socio-spatially 
segregated communities could survive. Inter-community social contract occurred, in which the 
brotherhood values of Pela Gandong becomes the norm that unifies their identity as the Mollucan 
people. According to a respondent: 
Before the conflict, settlements in Maluku had been separated. None was mixed. So for example, Tial, 
Tulehu, Tengah-Tengah and Waai villages, they are mixed in cities. In Dutch [colonial] period, those who 
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wanted to become Christian, they were separated, for instance in Waai atau Hulaliu…. Since long time ago it 
was like that, while in the city, they mingled.243 
Administratively, some government regulations have increasingly weakened the Mollucan 
people’s cultural defense, such as Law No. 5 Year 1979 on Village Government. Even though the 
content accommodates and considers village condition and prevailing customary provisions, in 
practice the Law is considered harming the diversity because of the emphasis on village system 
uniformity.244 As a result, the people with negeri system under kings do not have wider space 
administratively according to their functions and positions in the eye of the society before the Law 
was enacted.245 
Peaceful segregation without violence that had roots, in which inter-community society lived side 
by side,246 eventually led to destructive things when big conflicts occurred in Maluku between 1999-
2003. Communities have strengthened their ethno-religious identity, especially when external parties 
outside Maluku were involved in violent conflicts. The big conflicts have affected almost all aspects 
of life and  changed the Mollucan society’s life structure, both with Muslim and Christian 
backgrounds. Before the conflicts, all communities trusted each other. But then, the conflicts changed 
all of it and caused widespread inter-community distrust.247 
After Malino Peace Agreement was signed, negative peace248 could be maintained even though 
inter-community communications and interaction were not intensively conducted yet.249 Over the 
time, inter-community interaction started to intensify and trust started to be rebuilt by using holidays’ 
moments or religious regular activities.250 Beside that, in daily activities such as in economic 
activities, they have mingled.251 Nevertheless, post-conflict violence still often occurs. This is 
worsened by incomplete disclosure of violent cases by the authorities. According to a respondent: 
... in my opinion, the problem is not Muslim-Christian [conflict], but only by [actions] of persons. But since 
the disclosure is not thorough, eventually it is generalized. People think that if the incident happens to a 
Muslim, then Christian [person] must do the [action]. If the incident in Christian, [...] the one who does it 
probably a Muslim. This happens because the incident is not well disclosed. We want to say it pure crime; 
then who does it? Maybe that is the problem for the people.252 
POST-CONFLICT SEGREGATION AND EMERGING VIOLENCE 
Given that segregation becomes stronger during and after the conflicts, the condition has made 
violence likely to occur. As mentioned above, experiences during the conflict time may recur when 
inter-community violence takes place again. A respondent stated: 
                                                             
243 Interview with Mollucan Muslim organization figure, Ambon, 17 December 2012. 
 
244 Interview with Mollucan inter-fait cooperation activist, Ambon, 15 December 2012. 
 
245 Moreover, if seen from conflict experiences, group members in negeris will usually go back if they have traditional land. As a result, 
even though they experienced several conflicts in which their properties and houses were burned for several times, they would go back 
because that is their traditional negeri. 
 
246 Interview with Moluccas Human Rights activist, Ambon, 12 December 2012, and with one of peace activists in Ambon, Ambon, 12 
December 2012. 
 
247 Interview with one refugee empowerment activist in Ambon, Ambon, 17 December 2012. 
 
248 The “negative” peace concept refers to the idea of Galtung (1972), which means the peace is only limited to the absence of violence.  
 
249 Interview with a refugee in Waringin due to September 11, 2011 riot, Ambon, 15 December 2012. 
 
250 Interview with one refugee in Waringin due to September 11, 2011 riot, Ambon, 12 December 2012. 
 
251 Interview with Ambon City health affair official, Ambon, 12 December 2012. 
 
252 Interview with a village head in Ambon, Ambon, 12 December 2012. 
 
In the previous conflict, Muslim community did not go out and remain there, and they formed a force in 
there (Air Salobar). So, they were in the middle of Christian community. When conflicts occurred Christian 
people who wanted to pass through Air Salobar had to take sea route on speed boat to go to another Christian 
area next to Air Salobar. For Air Salobar people who did not go out, if they wanted to go downtown like to 
Al Fatah Mosque, they had to take sea route on speed boat because they could not pass through their 
neighboring Christian area. So, when conflicts happened, like 11 September [2011] [conflict], the condition 
was the same as in the previous 1999 conflict. At that time, (11 September 2011) the border was guarded by 
the Indonesian Military (TNI). So, Muslim people in Air Salobar had to take speed boats to go to the back of 
Al Fatah Mosque, while the Christian in Amahusu also had to take speed boats to go to Benteng area. Or 
they had to turn behind the mountain there in order to go inside Ambon City here.253 
Meanwhile, post-conflict violence was driven by some problems that emerged later on. For 
instance, uneven development between one community area and the other one.254 Therefore, it cannot 
be avoided that there would be demand for equal treatment, for instance the construction of facilities 
for one community must be followed by the construction of similar facilities in the other community. 
If it is not well considered,  such problems are often used by particular parties to get advantage from 
them.255 Furthermore, in Ambon city there are areas with point of contact which may trigger conflicts, 
especially in the area where the people are ethnically heterogeneous, like Batu Merah, so that the 
potential for conflicts is difficult to detect.256 
Once again, the intensified post-conflict segregation has contributed and played a particular role in 
generating violent cases.  Field findings show that many post-conflict violent incidents occurred in 
border areas between Muslim and Christian communities. The following map shows the connection 
between segregation and post-conflict violent incidents. 
According to respondents, there are several things that can trigger violence. First, external 
intervention that confront communities.257 Provocations by external parties can often trigger violence. 
Nevertheless, due to fostered communications relationship, in some cases, provocative efforts could 
be handled.  
The second is less harmonious relationship between local people and migrants, especially in urban 
areas. A respondent stated that: 
The problem [is] in urban areas because... the people mix with each other,... not really native Ambonese any 
longer. We as native Ambonese do not have any problem again. But the migrants, both from around Maluku 
Province or from outside, [are still problematic]. In city centers like Sirimau, Nusaniwe, [there are many 
migrants there]. Like what we see in Batu Merah, they have mixed with each other.258 
Efforts to protect their own interests, both social, economic and political ones, can cause clashes 
between the group.  
Thirdly, continuously-maintained suspicion of different community groups. In some cases, this 
directly created violence without any initial efforts to clarify the truth of news. A respondent said: 
So, the relationship there (Waringin) has been filled with mutual suspicion, not like in the old days. Because 
the Muslims think that the Christians burned their houses. It’s a must, it must be facilitated. The mothers there 
have proposed a dialog between them so that they have self-restraint and sense of security as well as 
communications or interaction.259 
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Fourthly, border problems which still have potentials for violence. One respondent said: 
Borders are borders and we dispute over them. But little was addressed, then dispute started again. This not 
only destroyed our properties, but also claimed lives. Who did the burning was not only [the people] who  
[lived] there, but also Muslims from outside.260 
Fifthly, easily-mobilized mass. In some cases, easy massive mobilization of people can escalate the 
potential for violence although the mass of people did not understand too much the cause of an 
incident. This is the effect of the segregation; although lately with increasingly strong people’s 
defense, the mobilization process will be very measureable so that the conflict will not spread to other 
areas.261 
POST-CONFLICT VIOLENT INCIDENTS 
In general, violence occurred several times in post-conflict Ambon. Among the violence, there 
were three big violent incidents that caused big number of victims and damage, namely violence on 
25 April 2004, 11 September 2011, and 15 May 2012. However, a brief explanation will only be 
given to the last two cases given the actuality. 
a. The September 11, 2011 Incident 
Inter-group violence occurring on 11 September 2011 was triggered by misunderstanding. 
According to the report by the Traffic Unit of the Ambon and Laese Islands Resort Police, the 
incident started from the death of a Waihaong motorcycle taxi driver, Darwis Saiman. It was further 
reported that: 
Darwis had a traffic accident in Gunung Nona area on Saturday night and was helped by Tatuhey family 
who took him to the hospital, but Darwis died on the way to hospital.262 
The incident is in accordance with the incident chronological report by the Police Headquarters.263 
The death of Darwis then triggered suspicion and assumption among the community group that the 
Muslim victim was killed by Christians. Because of the assumption and suspicion, violence broke out 
between Muslim and Christian groups. According to the police report, in the incident 3 died,264 24 
heavily injured and 65 slightly injured.265 Another report said that people’s houses in Waringin and 
Mardika were burned.266 Relating to the burnings of people’s houses, a respondent explained: 
Mardika as katong (we) call is “wick,” every time there is a conflict, it burns. If the Muslim community 
houses in other areas are burned and they cannot take revenge, then the revenge will be in Mardika to get 
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even. Mardika is like with Waringin, both are border areas. If there is a clash in any place, both location 
will be the revenge sites.267 
According to one respondent who is village level official, some handling measures were taken by 
relevant parties: 
At that time, the incident occurred at night, here. On the 12th we could not go in, then we [held] meeting with 
the Governor and all stakeholders, both from city and provincial levels. Then, on the 13th I went it, even 
though they really hated people from Kudamati because they always became attention.268  
From the aspects of violence handling and prevention after the September 11, 2011 conflict, one 
respondent mentioned some measures taken: 
After the September 11, 2011 riot we took some approaches to the people so that even after the riot, the 
communities could still mingled. In reality there was no problem inside. Maybe in the time of the conflict 
each of them returned to their communities. Usually the problem comes from outside. The last thing we did 
was to construct permanent posts. So far there have been BKO posts, but they use people’s house. But since 
there were already four incidents, there were huge concerns from the people. The resort police is really 
nearby, [but] during the conflict yesterday, there was distrust among the people to the resort police that what 
happens now is [the need for] Indonesian Military/TNI posts. After the September 11, there have been 
permanent posts now, the sense of security has recovered.  
b. The May 11, 2012 Incident 
The violence on May 15, 2012 occurred  at the celebration of the National Hero Day of Thomas 
Matulessy alias Pattimura. The clash occurred at around 05.30 WIT.269 The incident started when the 
Batu Merah village people took a torch relay from the torch burning place in Saniri, Tuhahan village, 
Saparua, Central Maluku, to Ambon City. However, one kilometer from the border of Batu Merah 
Village–Mardika, a group of Mardika young people blockaded the torch relay group and asked them 
to give the torch to be taken by the Mardika young people to the Pattimura Park. The blockade 
incident eventually ended up with inter-youth violence,270 which caused 3 houses and 5 motorcycles 
burned.271 According to the Ambon City Health Office report and Maluku Provincial Health Office 
report, the violence caused 34 people to be hospitalized and other 44 people to receive outpatient 
treatment.272  
According to a respondent, the May 15, 2012 violence implies some unfinished problems in the 
society: 
... of course there are unfinished problems in the community on the historical context, because there is 
difference between the written history and oral history in the society. The Government does not settle the 
difference thoroughly so that this becomes continuous problem in the society… about the claim if Pattimura 
is Christian or Muslim. So far the discussions about rectifying the history have always been ignored by the 
government.273 
                                                             
267 Interview with Mardika Christian refugee on September 11, 2011 riot. 
 
268 Interview with a village head, 15 May 2013. 
 
269 Report from Merdeka.com (http://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/tiga-rumah-dibakar-dalam-kerusuhan-di-ambon.html) 
 
270 Report from Tempo.co (http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2012/05/15/058403959/Sekelompok-Pemuda-Dicegat-Kota-Ambon-Tegang) 
 
271 Head of Public Relationship Division of Mollucan Local Police AKBP (Lieut.Col) Johanis Huwae 
(http://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/tiga-rumah-dibakar-dalam-kerusuhan-di-ambon.html). 
 
272 http://penanggulangankrisis.depkes.go.id/article/view/6/1630/KONFLIK-SOSIAL-DI-DELI-SERDANG.htm. 
 
273 Interview with a peace activist, Ambon, 15 May 2013. 
 
The unfinished historical problem, along with other social problems between the post-conflict 
Ambonese community groups can trigger the emergence of inter-community violence. Similar 
incidents once happened before, between two other communities, but did not end up with violence. 
There was information from friends that Mardika wanted to take the torch. It happened long time ago. 
Once, Suli did not want to give the torch to Passo and asked Passo to step back, but Passo did not want to. 
The King of Passo said: “Why should I step back? But if Suli wants to take the torch to Ambon, just do it, 
but no one will go home.” That was horrible too. Like it or not, the torch had to be passed. Every year the 
problem is the same.274 
Like in the previous violent incidents, some parties believed that the violence was a product of 
engineering by particular parties who had agenda to make Ambon insecure. A respondent stated: 
The incident was intentionally played by particular persons; that the Mardika people wanted to take the 
torch. The connotation is that the Mardika is Christian and Batu Merah is Muslim. Since I was a kid, the 
torch has been taken to Ambon City not by Mardika people, but the torch has been taken into the city by 
Batu Merah[people]. Not only because of traditional village, but the advice has been there, the torch is taken 
from Tulehu as far as Ambon, through what village, they (Batu Merah people) who take it…. There was no 
information from other stakeholders, soldiers, and police about the incident. It must be played by particular 
parties. The only one who knows it is intelligence. It is impossible for us to know. In reality, the riot was not 
in Batu Merah or Mardika, but in Galala and Hatiwe Kecil there. After all police has run up there, so the 
chaos occurred here.275 
c. Responses on Both Violent Incidents 
In response to both violent incidents above, a respondent expressed a suspicion that all was 
engineered to occur. According to this person: 
There was a group playing there, but there must be something to prove their presence at that time. Like after 
the September 11, some bomb throws occurred for several times in some areas. Some groups were playing 
there. Then, a grenade throw occurred in Pattimura Day on May 15.  [When] the perpetrator was caught, we 
knew that Wakano–Manuputy group captured in Latu–Hualoy was the player. They were products from 
Poso. There was another group. Beside that, dissemination of information using rotary formula and the 
others has become part of segregation factors.276 
The suspicion above was supported by opinions from some respondents stating that the violent 
incidents were the engineering of external parties who wanted to make Ambon insecure. According to 
a respondent, this can be seen from the actions and economic motives done by a group of people so 
that the conflict is sustained: 
... like the intentional circulation of photos in order that the conflict occur again. People can use conflicts as 
business opportunity... [...] but the impact is on the society.277 
Both cases above also shows that Ambon is still vulnerable to the emerging violence which is 
sometimes triggered by unclear news and small inter-community problems which can escalate into 
huge violent incidents that claimed lives and properties. 
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T H E  R O L E  O F  S E C U R I T Y  P E R S O N N E L  I N  H A N D L I N G  P O S T - C O N F L I C T  
V I O L E N C E  
THE ROLE OF SECURITY PERSONNEL IN THE SEPTEMBER 11, 2011 RIOT 
Although security personnel were on guard, burnings still occurred in Waringin. Some community 
members reported the burnings and proactively asked for guards from the security personnel, but it 
was not immediately responded.278 The following is the witness from a respondent: 
Near Air Mata Cina[village]. All of it had the same location. It was close to the resort police; starting from 
there, Waringin was burned. Before that, there were mothers asking for guarding support to the resort police 
but it was not realized. The reason was that all police officers were deployed to SBB for securing the 
installation of the regent. There was military dormitory in there. They were asked [for guarding support], but 
the answer was: no coordination yet. The time range between midday after midday prayer until 4 o’clock it 
was burned, at 6 the troop came in. [The riot] ended at that time already. In the evening is Mardika’s turn. 
There was a friend named Stanley, when his house was set on fire, he was still calling us. He went to the 
local police for several times, asking for guard support because Waringin was on fire. It is usual that both 
places become the targets. He asked for several times, but no security personnel came. Until the dawn, [still] 
burned.279 
Absence of response from the security personnel related to the violence and burnings by a group of 
people made the people distrust the security personnel.  Ironically, the burning location was very close 
to the resort police office so that there was a perception among the people that the presence or absence 
of the security personnel did not contribute anything to violence prevention. Beside that, there was 
accusation of letting the violence happen, either through intelligence party being inoperative or 
security personnel doing nothing.280 
According to some respondents, the reason stated by the security personnel to the people for their 
slowness was the need for coordination between security guards. Their coordination took long time 
and eventually do much harm to the people, because when the security personnel came, the situation 
was already late; the violence claimed lives, properties were damaged.281 In some cases, many 
security members even left their guard post when the violence started to break out.282  
No wonder if many parties blamed security personnel on the occurrence of the violence. An 
Ambon city government official, for instance, firmly stated that the big mistake was on the police side 
so that the September 11, 2011 incident took place.283 This was seen from the difference between the 
statement made by the police and the facts that people got, for instance, concerning the cause of the 
death of a violence victim.284 Therefore, decreased trust among the people in the security personnel—
in this case the Police—could not be avoided.285 Another factor that lowered people’s trust is the fault 
of the police for doing anticipatory measures against violence. This occurred because the Local Police 
was considered not having enough knowledge on the anatomy of the Ambonese conflicts so that it 
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could not identify which area is the most prone to violence and must be isolated.286 Beside that, 
security personnel were regarded not to take effective actions to prevent the violence as they did in the 
big conflict time, such as minimizing mass mobilization to prevent inter-group clash from 
happening.287 
Even though there were many criticisms on the security personnel’s responses, there was a 
respondent who gave appreciation to the quick actions taken by the personnel to settle the violence, 
given the fact that Ambon is a post-conflict area.288 The quick security personnel anticipation to 
violence could overcome old-time issues which were being raised by a certain group who wanted to 
trigger the conflict.289 
PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENT 
One thing that is worth considering in handling violence is the acceptance of particular security 
personnel rather than another security personnel. In some cases, police were less accepted and trusted 
by the people, so that the Indonesian Military personnel were deployed eventually.290 There was a 
perception in some communities that the Indonesian Military could act fast because of the response 
from the previous Local Military Commander in addressing people’s reports.291 
Nevertheless, in some cases, the deployment of the Indonesian Military personnel could not be 
accepted because the people thought that the occurring violence was related to the people’s security 
and order (Kamtibnas) which is the police’s duty. Beside that, their area was not a military emergency 
area so that Indonesian Military involvement cannot be justified.292 However, some community 
members did not reject the presence of the Indonesian Military’s BKO, because this could overcome 
the issue of personnel unavailability which became the police’s reason for being unable to respond to 
people’s report.293 Concerning the BKO, a respondent said: 
If the BKO here is under the command of the Local Military Command. Here the sectors have been divided, 
so if there is a conflict, each [troop] is already on stand by in their own sectors. The BKO in Waringin guards 
until the 500 meter radius. In Talake they secured the place around the radius. While [area] behind Warinin 
is secured by the Cavalry. If a mass of people gather, beta (I) will contact the head of neighborhood unit  
(RT), religious leader there, and ask where the people come from. If the mass of people come from 
Waringin, then community leaders, RT will take care of it. But if the mass of people are from outside, it will 
be taken care by the security personnel under coordination with the local leader and RT.294 
Appointment of the BKO from the Indonesian Military  for the guarding purpose as well as 
cooperation with grass-root leaders is considered fairly efficient in dealing with the emerging 
violence. Despite the fact that the people start to ask the existence, the Indonesian Military personnel 
under BKO are still needed to deal with security issues, given that information quickly circulates in 
the community.295 Meanwhile, the Local Military Commander stated that BKO was still needed 
because of some reasons, namely (1) conflict locations are located in outlying islands, (2) the presence 
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of personnel can improve people’s economy, (3) request from regent or local government, and (4) so 
that the soldiers can understand the local culture of other regions.296 Nevertheless, the presence of 
TNI’s BKO does give an impression that the area is still not secure yet.297 Even some parties question 
the presence of BKO because they suspect that Ambon City is perceived and conditioned to be not 
secure so that BKO is still required.298 Such accusation of the conditioning was denied by a military 
official in Ambon because according to him the BKO existence in Ambon and Maluku in general was 
based on the mandate and request from the people through the House of Representatives.299  
Even though the BKO existence is still deemed necessary, one respondent stated: 
During the clash, the military troop came in, which was the BKO, but it turned out although guarded, there 
were houses burned. We can also say, the personnel also [has] projects or how? We really want safety and to 
live, why do we have to fight again and again? BKO always does not take actions on the grounds that there 
was no order. So, if there is clash, they are just stand-by. But if the houses are burned already and they still 
wait for command, the burning will continue. The BKO personnel asked us to step back, then all of a sudden 
smokes went up and our houses were burned. What we wanted at that time was a blockade or prevention 
from people coming in. This happened not only in the night, but also in the clear morning. If we are asked to 
step back, then our house get damaged or burned. And that happened repeatedly in 1999, 25 April 2004, 11 
September 2011, and 15 May 2012.300 
Some criticisms in general are addressed to the Indonesian Military institution. In some cases, the 
Indonesian Military personnel did not do anything when violence occurred. According to a 
respondent, the Indonesian Military members only gave advice and made documentation on the 
violence. In a case it was told how the Indonesian Military members who passed through an area 
being hit by violence laughed when they saw community members run for their lives.301 Another 
criticism is related to the involvement of the Indonesian Military personnel in the attack of civilian’s 
house, like in Poka.302 The emergence of negative opinions is closely related to the assumption that 
the involvement of the Indonesian military in guarding Ambon  was not right because in Ambon there 
are no armed separatist movement like in Papua, for instance.303 
SECURITY PERSONNEL’S INVOLVEMENT AND PARTIALITY 
Allegations on the involvement of security personnel in triggering violence fairly spread among 
the community members and have a long history in the conflict dynamics in Ambon. Some academic 
studies show that security personnel from both communities were indicated to get involved and/or 
play certain role in worsening the communal conflicts. However, until today the problem do not need 
handling and legal process has never been taken against those involved.304 
People’s suspicion on the security personnel’s involvement in and the partiality in the conflict and 
violence are also caused by the history of conflicts and violence in the Maluku. A respondent stated: 
The military personnel came in the big conflict and were indicated to help the Muslims. The mobile brigade 
(Brimob) personnel came and were indicated to help the Christian. In the previous [riot] that was [the 
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situation]. So, no wonder if the Christians really hated the Indonesian Military and the Muslims really hated 
the Mobile Brigade.305 
Such claim was supported by another respondent who stated that the person believed more on the 
Mobile Brigade rather than the Indonesian Military because the person happened to come from the 
Christian community.306 Some respondents who are refugees also stated firmly that “[In] every 
incident in Mardika, security personnel always sided with, both police and soldiers. In the incidents, 
we were asked to step back while they let them move forward.”307 
As post-conflict area, Ambon is a violence-prone area so that troop deployment has been an 
inevitable issue. If the troop deployment is organized in an operation, the financial implication is 
real—every security personnel deployed here will get additional income whose funding is taken from 
the local budget. This is what some people believed as a respondent stated: 
So like a conditioning…. so that operations are conducted. When there is operation it[means] money. That’s 
the way to get money in Ambon... [like ] Mutiara Operation [for the purpose of] recovery. From April to 
May... the Mutiara Operation [was executed, so that] there were helicopters everywhere. Because there was 
operation, there was money. Then the money was taken from the local budget—the local government paid 
for the security personnel... Seven billion also for Mutiara Operation. Then each personnel got only 50 
thousand, multiplied by how many police personnel. If it was only for April 25, that was it; the local 
government money was used up for paying the operation.308 
Therefore, no wonder if an official in Ambon has this assumption that the security institution 
wants the conflict to get bigger for their personal benefits.309 The existence of conflicts can offer 
opportunities for security personnel to get financial benefits through guarding and rescue actions 
which require big funds.310 The motivation of the security institution to maintain conflicts for 
financial purposes has been the concern among all parties, because this will eventually given burden 
to the budget of the local government which cannot finance post-conflict development activities any 
longer.311 
EVALUATION ON PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE IN DISCLOSING VIOLENT CLASES 
One thing that becomes the attention of the people is security personnel’s performance in 
disclosing violent cases in Ambon. So far the people have only gotten information that a case was 
being investigated, but the follow-up investigation that ends up in the court almost never happens.312 
According to a respondent, unfinished investigation is caused by: 
It was said that there was consideration that if [the perpetrator] was caught, the problem would spread. But if 
the perpetrator was not caught, such problem will continue as there was no a lesson, even though the action 
has cause many people to suffer.313 
Unfinished disclosure of violent cases is signaled due to the security personnel’s partiality. 
According to a respondent: 
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The Resort Police also once said, recently, it was very hard to settle the conflicts in Ambon. Because they 
side with one component or community, both Muslims or Christians. The people suspected the police like 
that.  Because we once asked the Police before the Waringin incident, like Unpatti and Batu Gantung cases, 
and they replied it was hard to carry out investigation to the cases.314 
Another respondent also explained the roles of law enforcers and security personnel: 
So what can we say then? All solutions are not clear. In my opinion, what kind of solution should be taken? 
We already met the District Military Commander, Resort Police Head, and also the Local Police Head, 
[reporting] about Kudamati driver who died here. We were also accused of; they said the Waihaong people 
killed the driver. If the murderer was really Waihaong people, I would be the front-line person who would 
help hand over the killer. I said that in the meeting with the security personnel. Also I said, “You have many 
intelligence staff don’t you, I permit them to come in to find out who killed him.” But until now, what is the 
proof? None has been revealed.... I once proposed to the Resort Police Head when he came in here, I said, 
“If you want to normalize the route, you must be very careful, Sir.” At that time a Kudamati public van 
entered this place, then it was chased by the people here. So you must be careful. But insyaallah (God’s 
willing) I guarantee it, by chance the current Local Police Deputy is from Waihaong, maybe possible, maybe 
possible to normalize the route.315 
From the police’s perspectives, prevention and handling of such violent cases encountered many 
obstacles. For prevention, although the police have conducted isolation to the waves of people, inter-
group fights may get bigger and end up with burnings. This is partly caused by old-time trauma that 
show up again.316 To disclose violent cases, a respondent said: 
About the exchanged throws, it was the mass of people[who did it]. From the legal aspect, we are challenged 
with witness’ statement. Usually the witness that we ask does not want to talk. So if the case is related to the 
mass of people, we usually use the heaviest article to snare the persons, like what is resulted from the action. 
But we do need a witness, to [reveal] the case that involves mass of people. But here the people do not want 
to get involved if it deal with the police. So difficult is it, [the solution]? If the cases are like that, both 
parties like to claim that they are wrong, we are right, or vice versa. Or the witnesses that we ask are actually 
present in the location, but when we later ask, the witnesses say they don’t know. It is true that we have to 
take pressure initiatives so that the cases can be processed. The exchanged throws is common here in 
Ambon, but we see the resulting effects—either material [losses] or lives?—we will round them up.317 
The respondent stated that limited public participation in revealing violent cases, especially in 
giving witness, makes it very difficult for law enforcers’ movement in revealing those cases although 
initial investigation is executed initially. Law enforcers are aware that if they do not execute 
investigative efforts, they will receive public complaints. 
Like the September 11, 2011 case, the perpetrators were the mass of people. But as I said earlier, we have 
done initial examinations, because we were afraid of being complained of not being responsive.... We have 
examined some witnesses, but many of them said they did not know. Even though we also wanted to 
examine the witnesses in the place they felt secure, compared to coming to the police station. But, like I said, 
they said they did not know and blame each other party.318 
From the statement of the respondents, a conclusion may be withdrawn that cooperation with law 
enforcers and the people is absolutely required to disclose violent cases. However, this cooperation still 
faces many obstacles. Therefore, more intensive approaches by law enforcing institution may seemingly 
enhance public participation in solving violent cases. 
                                                             
314 Interview with women and children NGO activist, Ambon, 15 December 2012. 
 
315 Interview with a Waihaong public van  (Lin 3), Ambon, 15 May 2013. 
 
316 Interview with Ambon and Lease Island Resort Police official, 23 May 2013 
 
317 Ibid. 
 
318 Ibid. 
 
ISSUES OF BORDER POST CONSTRUCTION AND BKO TROOPS 
Relating to border area development, the construction of permanent security posts in the areas also 
become an important agenda. The construction of security posts in border areas, which are always 
identical to the violence and conflicts, is expected to be able to consistently prevent and reduce 
potentials for conflicts.  But more than that, if the occurrence of violence and conflicts is really 
expected to be prevented,  the local development should not focus only on the aspects of public 
facilities and security posts, but also the economic and the surrounding people’s welfare aspects. 
Therefore, economic problems are often one important thing in the cycle of conflict roots.319 
Nevertheless, the construction of security posts still generates particular debates among Ambonese 
society’s groups. 
The people who live in border areas, for instance Waringin, tend to want the presence of 
permanent posts with some BKO soldiers there. Even in the Waringin context, the people 
independently widened and constructed the post. More than that, they also emphasized that they 
preferred and trusted BKO troops than the police.320 The trust in the soldiers more than in the police is 
also identified in Waihaong people.  The soldiers are considered being more organized, faster and 
more responsive in handling violent cases in Ambon.321 
Nevertheless, in the context of September 11, 2011 riot some people who live in Waringin turned out 
to have opposite opinions. The presence of BKO did not give much contribution—they almost did not 
give assistance and only watched it.322 When the violence broke out, the Mollucan Governor gathered all 
stakeholders and decided to build posts in border areas. However, there were some problems that would 
emerge if the posts were constructed. The first was the development fund for the post construction. The 
second was the pros and cons related to the construction among the people’s elements. The third is 
issues related to the origins of the BKO personnel of whom the majority are from Java and Sumatra. 
Another segment of Ambonese people, especially academicians, believed that the presence of 
BKO soldiers would not make Ambon condition secure and conducive but will only create chaotic 
situations. They opinioned that the people did not need BKO soldiers even though military party find 
the people still need their presence. The security tasks should be given to the police, instead of 
soldiers who are earmarked more precisely for war conditions. Beside that, similar to the previous 
opinion, soldiers coming from outside Ambon are often assumed to bring doctrines, ideology and 
behaviors that are different from those of the Ambonese community. In other words, such concerns 
basically emerge due to many solders not knowing the characteristics of the Ambonese people.323 
People’s partiality to BKO soldiers, as in the context of Waai village, is more casued by the 
closeness between BKO soldiers and the people.  They tended to construct the posts in the center of 
the people, joined to construct religious place, collective work, etc. Meanwhile, the existence of the 
police office is relatively further. In this case, the problem lies more on the infrastruction construction 
and approach of security personnel in fostering intimacy with the people. 
The Mollucan National Commission on Human Rights has organized a public discussion in 2011 
on the issue of additional number of BKOs soldiers  which engages almost all segments of the society. 
The conclusion of the discussion emphasized, as mentioned by the chair, Ot Lawalata, that the 
addition to the number of BKO soldiers by the Mollucan Provincial Government was not wanted by 
the people because the presence of BKO soldiers was considered only making the people’s trauma 
preserved. Beside that, the addition to the number of BKO soldiers will reconfirm that Maluku was 
not secure, comfortable and peaceful. Not only the discussion participants, the Mollucan Regional 
Legislative Council (DPRD) has expressed its rejection to the addition to the number of BKO 
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soldiers. For the Mollucan DPRD, the addition to the number of BKO will make Maluku increasingly 
terrifying.324  
F A C T O R S  O F  L E A D E R S H I P ,  H A R M O N Y  A N D  P O S T - C O N F L I C T  V I O L E N C E   
The leadership aspect is an integral part of the initiatives to maintain the harmony and prevent 
post-conflict violence. In general, leadership can be divided into three groups, namely the leadership 
of religious figures, the leadership of local leaders, and the leadership of traditional figures. 
LEADERSHIP OF RELIGIOUS FIGURES 
The participation of religious leaders in the efforts to maintain harmony and prevent post-conflict 
violence in Ambon is a necessity, given their strategic position in the society. Nevertheless, the 
participation still cannot prevent violence that claims lives yet.325 For the Christian community, efforts 
to prevent violence from spreading are supported by the centralized church leadership over the 
congregation. One respondent said: 
Our command to the people is still listened to. I have a dialog with Muslim colleagues. They have limited 
figures to control [mass of people]... it’s different from us. Some incidents could have gotten bigger if we did 
not ask them not to get provoked, [and] we handed it to the legal process. For instance, on May 15, most of 
the victims came from us. That was a big reaction at that time, but we said, “Don’t! if we get provoked, we 
will lose again in the whole process we are doing. The players will be happy to see it.” [In] the incident 
where Kudamati public van driver was stabbed, in the morning there [would be] a huge reaction [from the 
Christian community]. But we told them, “If we go into it, we will fail again: the player will be happy since 
they know how to fish.” We were not sure if Muslims did the stabbing, not sure if the bomb thrower was 
Muslim, but there were people, either Christian or who was paid to so that we would fight each other. The 
large number of masses from the upper side (Christian areas) on May 15 [was] only a reaction—sometimes 
they just went to see, then [it looked] like consentration of masses.326 
The Church’s centralized leadership role becomes very strategic because with this, the synod 
leaders could be more effective in fostering communications with the masses or the society. This is 
done, for instance, to respond any violent incidents. A respondent stated: 
Pastors and the assembly would go down to the congregation. It is my experience; when there was that 
conflict, we communicated it to the Church Leader, “Reverend, there is a group and mobilization of masses.” 
So, the leader would communicate with the Synod. For instance, “Reverend, a throwing is happening here.” 
We usually communicate this. As congregation, we cannot communicate with security personnel, or Local 
Police Head or Resort Police Head. So we communicate with the Assembly Chair or GPM Synod Head. 
Then the Synod Head will communicate with the Local Police Head, Local Military Commander, or Military 
Resort Commander. Well, after the September 11, (2011) incident there was an incident in Air Mata Cina 
where Muslims’ houses got burned, approximately in October 2011. So, from there, we would communicate 
directly to the Church Leader.327 
Given the huge masses and Christian congregation in Maluku being under the church coordination, 
the appeal from the church leadership is usually influential.328 The reason for this obedience is based 
on two things; not only because pastors are regarded as figures who convey God’s words to the 
congretation, they also give services to the congregation, for instance by visiting congregations who 
are having family problems, and providing spiritual support. Therefore, when a pastor says something, 
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the words will be listened to and followed by the congregation.329 According to a respondent’s claim, 
for instance, if a church leader did not directly calm down the group of masses after the May 15 clash, 
the big conflict would happen again in Ambon. This may happen because church congregation has 
high fanaticism and strong root in church communities.330 
In building communications with community members who are not active in church activities and 
very prone to commit violent actions, Christian figures also attempt for any approach. A respondent 
stated:  
Not all Christians frequently go to church and not all Muslims go to mosque. I said to pastor colleagues that 
these people had to be embraced and asked to join religious services. They seldom go to church, but if 
something happens, their responses are bigger then the others—as if they wanted to defend church, even 
though defending church should not take that way. Defending [the] religion is by living good values. Even 
God does not need defending. Our task is really hard for this, [to raise awareness] among them who are in 
the streets.331 
The influence of church leaders over the congregation is admitted as one thing deeply useful in 
coordination efforts to prevent violence. This similar thing is unfortunately difficult to be build within 
the Muslim communities, due to various congregation’s affiliations to Islamic leaders and 
organizations. This makes people’s initiatives more dominant in the Muslim communities.332 
Nevertheless, Muslim leaders also do efforts to deaden flush of emotions and prevent violence. 
According to a respondent: 
If our position at that time kept on cooling down the congregation [so that] they were not provoked—it 
meant, through religious sermons, television, newspapers, and through other occasions such as wedding 
advice, parties in the community.333 
Besides the approach through informal forums, formal approach through education is also taken. 
The main goal is to calm down the emotion of the easily-provoked young people. Education is a very 
strategic part because it also takes part in preparing the young generation that can build their areas in 
the future.334 
Cooperation among religious leaders is absolutely required to foster inter-community 
communications. However, some respondents regretted the lack in meetings of religious leaders 
which had been previously done frequently. These religious leaders have a strategic role in providing 
directions to their own communities.335 If available, the forum is usually sponsored by the local 
government.336 Therefore, reactivation of dialog forums with support from the local government and 
the community initiatives should be enhanced.  
Inter-religious leaders forum  should be followed by formal cooperation among religious 
institutions. The engagement of religious organizations can help disseminate peace values to religious 
congregations that have different religious organization affiliations. Nevertheless, efforts to build 
inter-institution relationship are not that easy. A respondent stated: 
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We can build institutional relationship with MUI. [For] individual relationship, I can contact Muslim figures 
for this... Institutionally, MUI and church are different. MUI is not structural institution existing until the 
grass-root level. If churches from the synod talk to their congregations, it is still one [voice], so does the 
Catholic church. So that, process in Lata runs well. It is different in Batu Merah; who can be relied on?337 
Another respondent mentioned, MUI difficulty in participating in peace building is caused by the 
fact that MUI does not have structure or apparatus down to the grass-root level.338 Beside that, another 
problem that prevents MUI’s movement from building dialogs between religious groups is the attitude 
that forbids pluralism. However, according to the respondent, the sermons’ themes for MUI are 
arranged in such a way that they can give understanding among the people on the importance of 
bridging differences in order that peace is sustained. Meanwhile, for social movements, still according 
to the same respondent, what needs to get attention is Muhammadiyah because they are established in 
the education field, starting from Preschool, Elementary School, Junior High School to Senior High 
School.339 
For young generation, a Muslim figure stated the importance of developing morals to prevent 
violence from recurring.  The development consists of materials on peace, morals and faith. Beside 
that, it is necessary to build awareness to localize a violent incident so that young people from other 
areas are not involved in the violence.340 According to another respondent, engagement of seniors 
with the conflicting youth groups is required to prevent and stop violence.341 This is because: 
... seniors have emotional approach with their juniors and the process will surely happen. However, 
argumentation conveyed by the seniors, even if they can be accommodated, depends on the content. If it is 
good, we can accept because it is impossible seniors tell to just fight it. If the purpose is right and can be 
accommodated, then we can sit together, and we discuss it and decide it together and it is finished.342 
From the finding above, it cannot be ignored that religious leaders  still hold important roles in 
keeping peace and preventing inter-community violence from recurring. This is also reflected from an 
experience of a respondent when the September 11, 2011 incident happened. The respondent told: 
In the first day, we took refuge in a mosque [...] near the house. Then, there were persons from outside 
Ahuru who had a big house. Then we stayed there for three days. We then returned when the King of Batu 
Merah went up to Petro, meeting with the pastor, then they disseminated information through church’s loud 
speaker  so that the people were not provoked and it was done too by the mosque’s imam there. After that, 
we returned to our homes.343 
LEADERSHIP OF LOCAL AND TRADITONAL FIGURES 
Local figures who hold positions both formal and informal ones, have important influence within 
the society.  Even religious difference between the leaders and the people does not prevent them from 
doing their jobs without any discrimination.344 The leaders are in the Muslim and Christian 
communities, and actively participate in conflict-deadening initiative.345  
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As an example, one Ambon City official was not reluctant to go to the field to calm down the 
people, although openly expressed his fear of being a victim of wrong shooting by security 
personnel.346 Beside that, ethnicity-based community figures also have key roles in influencing the 
communities, especially for political interest. This can be seen in the migrant community figures 
which benefit from having communities with a big number of members, such as in Waiheru, 
Waihaong, Talake, Batu Merah, Wara, and Ahuru areas.347 
A respondent expressed an opinion on the Ambonese people’s shifting point of view on traditional 
institutions. According to this person: 
In general [participation of traditional institutions] still becomes a test because traditional leadership is not 
quite effective in overcoming various internal conflicts. This indicates that there has been actually a big shift  
in leadership orientation system within the society. So the people now actually live multi-values and multi-
identities. It is proven that various local conflicts perceived as inter-village/inter-kampong, the traditional 
institutions cannot effectively settle them, [so that] they need security personnel, require local governments. 
But this reflects that the people have changed and they do not obey the traditional institutions.348 
Beside that, traditional issues are often used by political elites to get legitimacy as representatives 
that intend to fight for the interest of particular traditional group even though this is actually just a 
maneuver  so that they are selected as public officials or members of legislative bodies in the election. 
Beside that, traditional leaders are sometimes suspected of having economic motives in the traditional 
settlement of inter-group conflicts in the traditional society.349 
Given the sociological aspect of the Mollucan people that still hold cultural tie, traditional leaders 
also have strategic roles in keeping peace and preventing violence.350 They do this by issuing 
announcement and disseminating it to the general public. Beside that, according to a respondent: 
We did coordination with the Mayor for a meeting…. Here there were also MUI, GPM Synod, Catholics, but 
the functions were different. They made appeals to the congregations in the church, mosque, but we are 
traditional [institutions] including kings. Religious figures, pastors from Christianity and imams from Islam  
and we had discussion and immediately gave announcement to the people …. So, yesterday we took more 
roles [although] they also took a role... They made appeals, but we can get down to the grass-root level—
Latupati—... We are, Latupati, could reach down. Including our brothers from other areas; they are here 
actually must obey  our local tradition and culture.351 
One of the power sources of the local figures and institutions is easy consolidation so that 
traditional villages are more easily handled.352 Nevertheless, despite big roles, traditional leaders must 
face some challenges. Firstly, lack in their legitimacy in the areas whose demographic characteristics 
are plural. A respondent stated: 
In Ambon City, areas of contact can trigger conflict, because if in traditional negeris it is very easy to 
organize them, but Ambon City [...] the people have mixed with each other, so that we cannot detect any 
longer. For instance Batu Merah. I communicated with Batu Merah King, “Sir, we have things to deal with.” 
But the King answered, “Sir, the people in Mardika (market) area and down to the lower areas cannot be 
controlled by us because they are not native Batu Merah.”353 
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Weak legitimacy in heterogeneous areas makes traditional leaders work hard to convince the 
people that local tradition needs to be considered in the conflict solution. The legitimacy issue is also 
caused by weak charisma of the kings among their people, so that their decisions may receive 
opposition and resistance. More than that, the kings are not immune from violent efforts conducted by 
the people against them. In several cases, the kings eventually have to obey to their people’s desire.354 
Secondly, many traditional leaders are suspected of being involved in political practices so that 
they cannot represent their traditional people. This, according to a respondent, will impact their 
sustained influence in the community: 
This is what I always say to the kings (Latupati): their voices are listened to. But I am afraid if they are more 
involved in politics. I said thet their tenure was only 10 years. The energy of regional autonomy has very 
negative effects for the kings. They are taken into an energy, namely in inappropriate political games. They 
are all involed in the stage of power.355 
Of course, it is to be regretted that the kings only think about momentary interests  and ignore 
negative consequences from their choices when they are involved in political practices. 
Thirdly, the absence of Latupati rules that bind all the kings has made problems in the 
communities difficult to solved. In this case, latupati is only an institution that cannot implement a 
decision to deal with conflicts in the communities. Beside that, the emergence of people’s suspicion of 
the participation of another king from another negeri solving their problems still occurs.356 A 
respondent stated: 
The traditional institution, in my opinion, only has a perspective on how to solve a problem. Because if 
Latupati as a traditional institution [protects] all kings, they should have Latupati rules that bind all the 
kings. But if there is no rule, so it is just an formed institution.357 
Given the big role and challenges faced by traditional leaders, cooperation among them and 
fostered interaction with the people have become a necessity. Therefore, their position in the 
communities can be protected in order to maintain people’s harmony based on cultural and personal 
approaches. 
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C H A P T E R  V I  
Roles of Various Elements of The Society in Handling 
Post-Conflict Segregation and Violence 
V A R I O U S  S O C I E T Y ’ S  E F F O R T S  T O  P R E V E N T  P O S T - C O N F L I C T  V I O L E N C E  
People’s contribution is a crucial part in the preventive efforts of post-conflict violence. In general 
those efforts have been done through social, cultural, religious, political and economic aspects.  
SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS ASPECTS 
Persuasive efforts to support peace through religions have been done much; not only by religious 
leaders, but also by government and community leaders. There area several programs that are 
executed. For example, engagement of another religion’s community in organizing religious events 
such as involvement of Muslim communities in the Church Choir Festival (Pesparawi) and Christmas 
or that of Christian communities in Qoran Recital Competition /Musabaqah Tilawatil Quran (MTQ) 
and Ied-al-Fitr.358 
Beside that, peace values in religion are also disseminated through education. Peace messages in 
religion are disseminated along with efforts to eliminate radical concepts circulated among the 
youth.359 The use of education sector is considered being quite effective in increasing community 
resilience in preventing provocative efforts done by particular parties. 
In each religious holiday, inter-community cooperation is conducted to protect the security of the 
event implementation, as stated by the following respondent: 
It is usually like that; Just before religious days we invite mosque youth and also young Muslim figures. We 
are in a united way. Dan as usual, just before Christmas and New Year, they will help guard and protect 
particular points, including churches.  Mosque youth are all ready. If for instance in the previous Ied-al-Fitr, 
when they had Ied prayers, the area surrounding the location of the Ied prayers was guarded by GPM youth 
members. There were police officers and military personnel, but the event was guarded by GPM youth 
members. And we build this continuously, this community.360 
A real description that I can illustrate here: like the tradition of Muslims in Ambon, in the recitation of 
laudation night before Ied-al-Fitr, the event was not only done by Muslim communities. Non-Muslim 
communities, especially Christian,  joined the event in rejoice. I don’t know whether it was motivated by the 
sense of rejoice or traditional relationship of Pela Gandong. We don’t know. But that’s not a lie. It’s true. 
Then, in the previous Christmas (2011) I was here. It was like that. Muslim Youth Organizations (OKP) 
united in working together to guard the event of the Christian brothers. Like services in churches, those who 
do guarding, beside the security personnel, we also asked OKPs. They are willing to do it in rejoice.361 
Beside youth engagement, the celebration of religious holidays is also attended by local figures 
and leaders that use the moment to foster relationship with religious leaders that celebrate the days. 
For instance, in the Ied-al-Fitri the Ambon City Mayor and the city government officials and wider 
society visited Muslim communities. So was it done in Christmas.362 
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So far engagement of various parties by utilizing religious aspects can build understanding 
between Muslim and Christian communities on the importance of peace keeping. However, dialog 
and communications forums that have been done for several years had to be terminated because of a 
halt to funds provided by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Consequently, inter-
faith dialogs has not currently resumed again.363 
Beside that, cultural aspect is also highlighted to keep peace. For instance a respondent stated: 
There have been efforts. Recently even the Governor demanded that Pela Gandong would be reactivated by 
panas Pela. There has been some panas Pela. But there are some suggestions. The Panas Pela is only for 
local people. However, at present there are lots of migrants. This should also be considered.  Not only panas 
Pela for native people; [for]  migrants how? We are still looking for a way that can unite them.364 
Efforts to maintain peace through cultural approach needs more support because it can be a 
foundation to the problem solution in the society. This is supported by people’s awareness that 
conflicts will only bring about losses. Beside that, bitter experiences have also made people more 
aware of provocative efforts so that they will consciously participate in violence prevention.365 
Awareness that all society members  are essentially brothers and sisters has made communications 
among them not cut off despite previous conflicts.366 A respondent stated: 
But there is collective awareness of the Mollucans, Ambonese, to resolve the conflicts. After the conflicts 
and in the emergence of the awareness, the Mollucans are really aware that the conflicts do not have any 
significance.  We don’t know what was the goal. Eventually the people are aware, and are supported by the 
local government and stakeholders in Maluku slowly resolve the conflicts.367 
Based on the findings above, it is seen that the Ambonese society actually have got a strong basic 
asset to improve peaceful condition in their life. Their awareness of the general public on the losses 
due to conflicts and violence, as well as engagement of elements of the society in its prevention, 
implies hope for the establishment of stronger resilience of the society.  In some cases, the society 
actively carries out preventive actions to anticipate any potential for violence. For instance, Pohon 
Pule community protects their border areas and checks outsiders who want to go in.368 
The role of community leaders is also very important in preventing young people from 
involvement in violence. A respondent stated: 
We protect and are open to each other, and this balance is maintained always. We advised the young people, 
if they want to live like refugees, they could join the conflicts. But if they want to live well and sleep on bed 
in house, let’s  maintain the security. If something happens here, let share information. We are old people 
here, if there is chaos, we provide guidance. If they got drunk, they will be handed to security personnel. 
This applies both in Muslim and Christian communities.369  
Starting from the initiative of some young people, violence-preventing efforts can also be done 
virtually. The virtual movement is followed up by real actions to support peace-building efforts and 
prevent violence. Regarding the anti-violence youth movement, one respondent stated: 
... Many now prioritize togetherness... through website, Facebook, and others. For instance, [through] “kopi 
badati” movement, they gather Christian and Muslim young people who carry out togetherness movement, 
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by giving coffee and tea to the posts set up in border areas. They do this to build communications and 
discuss with security personnel and Muslim or Christian friends in border areas. In social media there are 
campaigns for young to old people, like campaign “Let’s Stop Violence!”370 
It seems that the use of various virtual media can be effective in mobilizing support to strengthen 
peace and prevent violence. In this case active involvement of the young people is a good news, so 
that their initiatives must be supported by all parties. These efforts can become a sign that there is still 
optimism among the youth to recreate a peaceful Ambon. 
POLITICAL ASPECT  
Another approach to building and keeping peace is by power distribution in the political domain. 
This approach receives support from the society because power distribution is deemed necessary so 
that every community has representation in governments and political decision making process. A 
respondent admitted that the measure intends to : 
... to control the stability. Not absolute. Of course it is not regulated but actually there is a deal which we 
never promise at all. It means, we never promise that we proceed, [the one that becomes] the center of the 
local leader election has to be Muslim and Christian [figures]. We never promise. But that is the reality. So 
there is a kind of deal which we never deal, but it happens. If we dare to proceed in Ambon [local leader 
election] [by carrying] one community only, it is impossible to succeed.371 
If seen from the process and result of the local leader election in Ambon, the unwritten deal is able 
to create politically conducive atmosphere. Therefore, the people can believe that the policy made by 
the government will be inclusive and does not prioritize one particular group. However, composition 
of leadership which come from different communities can also bring about negative impacts if 
politically they must be split in the local leader election. In some cases, community representatives 
nominate themselves in the local leader election and compete with the incumbent. Beside that, if deal 
on power distribution among leadership candidates that represent different communities can be 
maintained, the negative impacts from the split can be avoided. 
Nevertheless, political competition still has potential for causing conflicts because they bring the 
names of the groups, collectivity, and communal culture to the power rivalry. The current political 
practices adequately colors socio-political dynamics in Ambon City.372 This elite-level competition 
eventually impacts grass-root level, especially when the competing elites starts to mobilize mass of 
people. 
ECONOMIC ASPECT 
Peace building efforts are indirectly conducted through economic activities. Given the fact that the 
people from a particular community still feel afraid of going to markets dominated by another 
community, the existence of surprise markets  has become an alternative solution to the problem. To 
get the goods nearer to consumers, vendors make breakthrough by setting up surprise markets in 
another community’s area. Indirectly this has increased intensified interaction and dialogs between 
vendors and people from a different community. A respondent told: 
... there is special surprise market [...] is set up in border areas, for instance. In general, we want to say that... 
those controlled the market are our Muslim brothers, in the riot time, but those who came here were not 
Muslims. Because they all sold things, who would buy? [...] The ones who usually buy were our people, the 
Christian. Therefore, we are afraid to enter the current markets—Mardika Market, Gotong-Royong Market. 
We are afraid to go there, so that the vendors put their goods nearer to Christian settlement. So appeared a 
market called peace market. Secure. [...] Bakubae Market... Why is it called Bakubae Market? Because in 
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there common interaction between vendors whose majority are Muslims and buyers whose majority are 
Christians.373 
From the above information, we see how the economic aspect that directly contacts with many 
people’s life needs has motivated the society members to accept the fact that they need each other, so 
that this will in turn have significant roles in the peace and brotherhood restoration. 
Based on the field observation in May 2013 it can be reported that in Ambon City market, despite 
groupings of sellers based on the community, the economic transaction process ran well. One 
respondent explained the post-conflict social economic change phenomena in the society as follows: 
... Christian women previously did not sell in markets, the seller were only Muslim [women.... Similarly the 
shops; previously shops were concentrated in port areas. But after the riot, shops and economics centers 
mushroom in Christian areas.....Initially was [ it as] conflict impacts—at that time appeared surprise markets. 
Christians needed vegetables, fish and others, while Muslims cannot sell to Christian areas. The Mothers 
took initiatives to get fish from Muslim people for resale here. Christians needed vegetables, fish and others, 
while Muslims cannot sell to Christian areas. The mothers took initiatives to get fish from Muslim people for 
resale here while they  bring vegetables to Muslim mothers for resale there. Over time they are used to it and 
the profession has changed. Yes at first it was forced situation or looking at opportunity. And over time it 
becomes their habit. Like the surprise market being evicted, they did not want it because it is comfortable 
and advantageous there. No other activities to get money [so that they kept on selling]—what is sold is basic 
commodities, and get money from that [so that] it gradually become part of their life.374 
V A R I O U S  E F F O R T S  F R O M  C I V I L  S O C I E T Y  O R G A N I Z A T I O N S  A N D  N G O S  T O  
H A N D L E  P O S T - C O N F L I C T  S E G R E G A T I O N  A N D  V I O L E N C E  
Civil society institutions and the general public play a strategic role in the effort to reduce the 
impact of segregation and intensified violence. To solve the segregation problem, some institutions 
carry out initiatives based on the orientation of the institutions. It can be said the initiatives are 
reactions to elite initiatives that turned out to be ineffective because they usually involve people 
within their circle.375 Initiatives are usually taken based on field analysis on whether an area needs 
intervention through religious approach, social approach, approach that involves women, or other 
approaches, because the characteristics of every area are different.376 Based on the data collected 
through interviews, in general the initiatives can be grouped into three categories, namely religious, 
social/educational and economic. 
RELIGIOUS CATEGORY 
Concerning the role of religious institutions, some respondents representing Muslim and Christian 
institutions include peace messages in their sermons and talks. “Intervention” into sermons’ materials 
is usually carried out every two months.377 For Christian group, when tension occurs, the sermons will 
contain the themes of peace, love, loving your enemies as taught by Jesus, and offering your right 
cheek when your left cheek is slapped.378 
For Muslim community, intervention is a bit more difficult to realize. This happens because 
Muslim institutions and Muslim praying places are not in one hierarchial structure so that intervention 
through one command is more difficult to conduct. Independency of each mosque and institution 
makes Muslim activists work even harder. For new areas hit by violent conflicts, they will intervene 
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through coordination with Ambon City government officials. They sometimes do checks to all 
mosques in Ambon and try to replace ustads who usually deliver harsh sermons.379 
In Muslim community, week consolidation in unifying and disseminating peace message is closely 
related to the less solid community tie with big Muslim organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) 
and Muhammadiyah. The Muslim community in Ambon tends to refer themselves to NU or 
Muhammadiyah only in socio-historical fashion. It means, they will identify themselves as NU or 
Muhammadiyah people if that relates to their families with NU or Muhammadiyah background; or if 
what is being discussed is traditional problems or particular religious rites, such as tahlilan, Qunut, 
etc. If related to political matters, they can refer themselves to NU or Muhammadiyah or none of them 
but to traditional group, another civil socity organization or even political party.380 
In the effort to reduce the segregation and violence impacts, religious organization triy to create 
interaction rooms through their activities such as dialogs, communal works, or health services. A 
respondent given an example of an activity: 
Every day before the lebaran (Ied-al-Fitr) dayin the fasting period, usually once a week they do collective 
breaking the fast event with Silo congregation and the surrounding people.  We do it regularly every year. 
So, we cooperate with Muslim figures behind the Silo Church to conduct the activity. We regularly get 
funding for that. So, before the breaking the fast event, at around 5 or 5.30 pm, we organize discussion on 
the community condition or problems around us.381 
The ‘collective breaking the fast’ event  is conducted to improve relationship with Muslim 
community around the church. This is conducted because historically the area was heterogeneous, 
even though the conflict has caused the people’s demographic condition to suffer from segregation. 
Another activity is communal work to clean up cemetery location and distribution of assistance to 
victims of the August 1, 2012 floods. 
Another important activity is seminars that invite figures of another religion to give understanding 
on their religious perspectives. This is done as a way to break negative stereotypes given by followers 
of one religion to other followers of another religion. A respondent provided this example: 
Well, the newest [activity] that we organize on December 4, [...] we organized a seminar in Silo with a 
theme “Getting to Know Humanistic and Peaceful Islam.” There we invited one expert of Islamic laws 
(fiqih) at IAIN Ambon [to] provide enlightenment of what is humanistic Islam like, so that no one will think 
that Islam is identical with terrorism or radical movements. But we also [cannot] set aside the fact [that] in 
Christian [community] here there is also indication leading to that such as radicalism. Everyone was 
surprised by the talk that the true Islam was like that, not like this.382 
Activities that invite figures from another religion become very strategic in the effort to build 
peace because they can plant more thorough and reasonable point of view when identifying and 
describing another group with a different religion.  Therefore, it is hoped that interaction and 
discussion spaces between community groups segregated due to the conflicts. 
Religious institutions conduct some breakthroughs to reduce segregation impacts. One respondents 
describes the activity they have done: 
One program named “Mollucan Children Meeting”; they used to play together without religious 
discrimination, but now due to this condition, they play in their own communities. [Therefore,] now we ask 
them to play together [again]. The Muslims learn about church, the worship place of their Christian friends, 
the Christians learn about mosque, the prayers place for their Muslim friends.383 
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At the internal level, religious institutions also implement initiatives useful to reduce segregation 
impacts, even though these initiatives are still local and adjust to the needs. For instance, in some 
churches, the internalization of pluralism values is not the priority because the congregation lives in 
the Christian-majority areas. The internalization of pluralism values is only conducted to the 
congregation which becomes a minority amidst a Muslim community.384 Nevertheless, for long-term 
period, the value internalization needs to be done for those who live in their own community which is 
the majority in an area. The goal is to internalize empathy to the community members to another 
community’s members as anticipatory measures when there is friction.  
Another initiative is conducted by organizing activities for teenagers who are vulnerable to calls 
for violence. For instance, the Silo Church organizes an activity called “Adolescents Creativity 
Week”. In this activity not only Christian adolescents are involved, so are Muslim adolescents.385 
Beside that, for Christian adolescents the church has done internal approach measures by: 
... provide “Catechism” or teachings for teenager towards adulthood. So, there for Silo context we try to 
provide materials which is not only talking about religious issues given by a pastor, but also another social 
context such as anti-violence actions and materials for Human Rights. So there, the people who give the 
teachings were experts in the area. Even though the portion is more on the teaching/ materials on 
Christianity, but we have opened up spaces for understanding and education that is in line with the contexts 
of Silo and Ambon, Maluku entirely.386 
SOCIAL/ EDUCATIONAL CATEGORY 
Some initiatives through social and educational sectors have been done by various parties to 
reduce segregation impacts as well as strengthen society’s resilience. In segregated areas, especially 
border areas, there is the need for increasing the number of peace activists so that they can work 
collectively and more effectively.387 
Regarding the September 11, 2011 violent conflict, another initiative was also taken by one 
institution in Ambon to gather kings in Latupati Council to discuss the steps to be taken so that the 
conflict would not spread. This meeting was supported by the local government and generated 
concrete measures such as: 
... road show to burned areas by using Damri buses. We went to Talake, and to market, port, then we visited 
Leihitu, walked together with kings. Well, we did peaceful campaign. We also brought Latupati 
announcement on Friday for Friday sermon (for Muslim group), and in church on Sunday services (for 
Christian group).388 
The activity was considered being able to successfully localize violence so that the conflict did not 
spread to other areas. Nevertheless, one thing to note: in those activities, funds sometimes hamper the 
implementation. Therefore, non-governmental organizations currently put more focus on the efforts to 
build people’s initiatives to carry out similar activities in self-supporting basis.389 This is also done 
because of awareness from non-government organizations to use minimum funds so that they can 
prevent the implementation of a program whose orientation is financial compensation. In this case 
community engagement is very useful to raise awareness among the community members that the 
activities facilitated by the institutions are for the interest of the community. 
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The initiatives in the advocacy of policies is also conducted by non-government organizations. A 
respondent stated: 
Together with the women network, we try to advocate policy on the execution of protection of women and 
children; and that has been stipulated through Local Regulation (Perda) No. 2 Year 2012. It has been in the 
local sheet. Well, we have tried to advocate to districts/cities how this Perda to be implemented. We also set 
up service posts for violence victims handling [of women and children] in collaboration with the National 
Commission on Violence Against Women.390 
Non-government organizations also cooperate with Bureau of Women Empowerment and Family 
Planning to help design gender-perspective budget. Beside that, there are still some other initiatives 
and activities such as advocacy of health service access like free birth delivery and posyandu 
(integrated health post) service, and educational services like Early Childhood Education centers 
(PAUD); help communities develop proposals for CSR program of some companies;391 conduct 
facilitation in trauma healing activities through cooperation with some universities like University of 
Indonesia’s Faculty of Psychology; conduct counseling for violence perpetrators to eliminate violent 
perspectives indoctrinated by their group. So far de-indoctrination activities have produced results, as 
seen from the transformed behaviors of the perpetrators.392 
Beside the initiatives conducted by non-government organizations above, peace movement 
initiatives are also conducted through educational institutions. Breakthroughs through educational 
way have become very strategic as they are aiming at children and teenagers who are in formative 
period, so that positive teachings and experiences can make them generation that respects the groups’ 
differences and cross-identity brotherhood values. For instance, some peace activists set up PAUD 
centers that accept children from Muslim and Christian groups. However, after PAUD center has 
officially been constructed by the government, the Christian students even moved there.393 Another 
respondent gives this example: 
We set up the “sister school” that adopts Pela Gandong in which Muslim students can also study in the 
Christian community school through exchange system. Well, now the Mayor is ready to support our “sister 
school” program. Through this program, Muslim students can go to school in Christian community, and vice 
versa- for around two or three months. They not only go to school but also stay in Christian or Muslim 
settlement. So, we hope at minimum, that they can understand the life of their brothers and sisters there.394 
When celebrating the 2009 Peace Day, Peace Goes to School activity was organized. The activity 
contained the screening of film on peace. Another activity was organized in Ambon Plaza to support the 
youth. The activity was also accompanied by musical programs. However, these initiatives could not be 
continued because of non-existent sponsor. Therefore, the roles of government and sponsors are 
absolutely needed for the sustainability of the positive activities.395 
ECONOMIC CATEGORY 
The initiative to reduce segregation impacts through economic sector is one of the strategic steps. 
The people are aware that conflicts will only worsen their quality of living due to increased 
unemployment and poverty. Therefore, society groups located outside city center foster 
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communications and coordination between them to prevent any violence from happening in their 
place.396 
Similarly, this applies to the community members who already have business and have fostered 
interaction with customers; they are worried if conflicts may happen in their area. That’s why 
business people take the initiative to involve young people in all economic activities so that they who 
used to be jobless and carry out negative actions can do productive actions. One respondent said:  
Now many of them are busy. Before now, they were just sitting and drunk in narrow paths, now they are 
busy [working as motorcycle taxi driver]. [I give working capital] in the forms of five motorcycles for young 
people to do taxi riding. Later, they will pay the installments... In markets, young people who did not work 
[we gave them jobs as keepers] of shops or counter [so that] they can return the initial capital [through] 
installments.397 
Initiatives through economic path in segregated areas are also done by utilizing cooperation with 
foreign agencies. For instance, a cooperation program between non-government organization and 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in four villages in Leihitu subdistrict and four 
districts in Salahutu subdistrict. Another example is a program related to credit disbursement in border 
areas between Waai, Tulehu, Suli, to strengthen women micro enterprises. This program is conducted 
after trainings are given to participants.398 
Despite the cooperation with some NGOs by conducting peace building studies,399 the local 
government is still considered not doing maximum efforts to prevent potential for violence due to 
segregation. One of the biggest criticisms over the government program is that the design is only 
based on project although the term used here is community-based project. Because they are designed 
based on project, problems often occur, namely absent sustainability soon after the project completion 
because the program does not come from the community.400 Usually no agents live in the community 
to facilitate the program sustainability, at least for one year. On the other hand, there is no guarantee 
that community representatives trained as peace agents can carry out their tasks due to pressure from 
the community.401 
According to a respondent, a program must be taken into the community in which an agent 
functions as organizer together with his friends in neutral areas. Therefore, peace building program 
that is conducted will be community-based. For this purpose, the financing management, for instance 
for consumption, must absolutely be well managed because this relates to “daily relationship that must 
be maintained”.402 
Another criticism aimed to the government is frequent mutation in the institutions such as The 
Indonesian Military (TNI), Indonesian Police, and local bureaucratic institutions. This will definitely 
disturb advocacy process. A respondent stated: 
...we we made a discussion, ... sometimes the participant was program bureaucratic leadership, but then the 
person is mutated, then we have to start over again. Well, this is tough. For instance we have often fostered 
communications to the Local Military Commmander (Pangdam) or Resort Police Head (Kapolres), suddenly 
they changed or are replaced. Then, our difficulty [is situation] that is in the bureaucratic system.403 
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Another thing to consider is the motivation of government officials in supporting peace process in 
conflict areas. The process gets difficult due to lack of sensitivity among the officials in their efforts 
to build peace because they are more oriented to personal economic interest which has nothing to do 
with people’s welfare.404 
The trust in an NGO should also be considered during the peace building program implementation. 
In general, the level of people’s trust in peace activist NGOs is quite high.  This is because the 
facilitation efforts are conducted consistently so that the activities sponsored by NGOs receive positive 
responses from the society. For instance a respondent stated that: 
They have organized dialogs, went in and out houses, and had meals together. In 2005, after the 2004 
incident in Waringin, we tried to conduct inter-community dialogs there. Even we set up a PAUD center for 
both communities. 
In the context of the activities told by the respondent above, the people have received facilitation 
for seven years so that the trust in the related NGO has been built. Therefore, NGO works have been 
easier because more initiatives to build peace come from the society then.405 
W O M E N ’ S  R O L E S  I N  P R E V E N T I N G  V I O L E N C E  A N D  S U P P R E S S I N G  
S E G R E G A T I O N  
The roles of women are very prominent in the efforts to reduce segregation and prevent violence. 
Involvement of women is considered effective in peace-enforcing process.406 Despite the need to 
involve men, the roles of women remain very crucial because they have attachment with family 
institutions. One of the efforts that require women’s role is trauma handling due to prolonged 
conflicts. For this purpose, activities to gather mothers from both religious groups are organized for 
some communal actions for two weeks. Another activity is visiting refugees from each group to build 
awareness on the sufferings resulting from inter-group violence.407 
A respondent shared a personal experience when trying to optimize women’s roles in preventing 
conflicts and preserving peace: 
The mothers groups... can generate understanding to their sons and husbands to suppress conflicts. What we 
did was that during and after the conflicts, we had dialogs and discussions to mothers [to] give understanding 
that the conflicts could make mothers become widows and children orphans, especially when the male 
members of the family [were victimized]. We did this and it was relatively effective to raise awareness in the 
family. For instance: in 2011 I also told mothers in the night after the riot to ask their husbands and sons not 
[to] return to Waringin to make revenge because they would die in vain, because we also did not know what 
really happened there.408 
In the Ambon Local Leadership Election (Pilkada) process  in 2011, many community members 
received  illegal and unsigned leaflets containing rumors on Islamization and Christianization among 
the segregated society. A respondent told: 
The discussions on the leaflets were conducted by mothers. I think it was very effective to talk about peace 
with mothers. So, [to] mothers in Waringin we said that, you as women maintained that there must be peace, 
but it must be discussed with men because it was the men who always did mobilization of mass of people. 
Has there been any [mobilization] from female group?409 
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Even though they do not play a role in the mobilization of mass of people, women at least can 
prevent their family members from participating in violent actions done by their group against another 
group. The women’s significant roles can be seen in several places such as Kayu Tiga, Ahuru, THR 2, 
Air Besar, and Waiheru.410 
Waringin’s refugee mothers have made breakthroughs through education where they build peace 
in their place of origin. Respondents mentioned: 
In Waringin we have a play group. There are also Christian children who go to it.  So, Muslim-Christian 
[children] go to the same school, It is one thing that we want to develop in Waringin so that we can unite 
again, [...] so that they trust each other. In order that people from outside can see it, that some Christian 
children can enter Islamic school. So, somebody has pioneered it.411 
The breakthrough should receive support from various parties including the government, and 
especially for funding purpose. Based on respondents’ testimonies, operational funds for the Early 
Childhood Education Center (PAUD) are collected from children’s tuition fees and irregularly-
disbursed fund support from the Education office.412 
N O N - G O V E R N M E N T A L  O R G A N I Z A T I O N S  ( N G O S )  A N D  P O S T - C O N F L I C T  
R E C O N S T R U C T I O N  P R O G R A M :  E V A L U A T I V E  A P P R O A C H  
PERCEPTION ON OTHER  NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS  
The key thing that often becomes the highlight and source of question related to credibility of an 
NGO is about issues related to fund raising and fund use for their programs. One respondent stated: 
... sustainability of activities for these humanitarian works must [be conducted by] those who are really 
volunteers and do not have any interest. But I cannot avoid the fact that the institution needs donors, needs 
funds. But what is really needed is voluntary spirit.413 
Volunteerism spirit according to a respondent now have vanished because many NGOs works are 
project-oriented. However, what is needed from the peace activists is their dedication and militancy in 
helping the society.414 The decreasing spirit of this volunteerism is worsened by many donor agencies 
that just channel funds without looking at the sustainability of a program when the project is 
completed. Another thing to consider by some parties is week driving force in all lines because few 
people are voluntarily willing to maintain and safeguard peace process dynamics, including in 
religious institutions.415 
Meanwhile, in the NGOs the issue of credibility has become inevitable problem. For instance one 
NGO that has problems with funding sources must accept negative labeling from other NGOs. A 
respondent who is also the NGO activist stated: 
Well, within NGO groups we are labeled as “red-plate NGO ”. But I said for the conflict works we cannot 
always position ourselves as opposition. We also have to see which we should criticize, what we must 
support and cooperate with the government.416 
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The statement clearly shows how funding and budgeting become sensitive issues. Related to this, a 
respondent stated: 
I also must say that many colleagues in NGO with much budget [must] be transparent to the community. 
[Transparency] that we have budget at this much and how about community involvement, it is still lacking. 
Colleagues at [NGO that] when there is funding, they are reclusive and when they run out of funds, they just 
leave the community. Whereas, but actually the fact is that either there is or there is no fund, we should 
make strategic plans to implement joined activities to build the strengthening of [inter-community 
solidarity]. And we hope the society can be more independent to advocate their rights.   
Another criticism that highlights some NGO activists  that have motivation to seek financial 
benefits through social activities that can lead them into being civil servants or political party 
members. A respondent who is concerned over the problem stated: 
... Now many NGOs/LSMs whose [funds] do not really come from donors any longer, but they are oriented 
[to] what they can get through officials or local leadership. [To get fund disbursement] they usually set up 
this forum [or] that institution. That’s the point which ends up with asking for money to local officials. If the 
officials do not give them, they said there will be case disclosure or demonstration.417 
Beside that, some NGO activists are indicated to get involved in activities full of political interests. 
Usually, by utilizing seniority approach and ethnic/ family approach, they pursue financial benefits 
from officials.418 
P E R C E P T I O N  O N  P E A C E  P R O G R A M S  E X E C U T E D  B Y  N G O  
One problem resulting from NGOs being mainly involved in project-oriented programs is low 
sustainability of a program. An NGO activist stated: 
If the NGO is project oriented, when a program is completed, they will also finish. But if [for] the program 
[they] think up to the sustainability phase, they will think about the sustainability after the program is not 
funded any longer. So that, the sustainability can eventually [build] the society [which] can be more 
independent. So, [they work] not because of many funds or less.419 
This concern actually implies a deep criticism of the works and agenda of peace activist NGOs in 
Ambon. A respondent who conducted evaluation on peace programs in Ambon stated, many things 
among the programs were not participatory because the initial ideas did not come from the people.420 
Nevertheless, facilitation efforts were still done by NGOs and peace activists in Ambon. The 
facilitation was mainly done to build trust between the groups involved in the conflicts and violence. 
According to a peace activist, the taken measures were: 
... to carry out approach to key figures there for joint activities (like communal work). But  what I proposed 
was things that faced us such as conflicts, peace, etc. If I proposed things that were not real issues here, the 
figures (like in Petra Church) would think that the suggestion was not useful. Usually my strategy for 
implementing the joint activities: we coordinated with the Neighborhood Unit (RT) Heads, after that we did 
approach to the Pastor in Petra.421 
One obstacle that usually occurs in the field coordination is reluctance of some parties to 
participate in self-supporting activities and without external funds. Another obstacle is the difficulty 
in raising understanding among community figures on the importance of the to-do activities. Beside 
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that, involvement of women also encounters some obstacles such as the difficulty in building 
awareness among low-educated mothers because their interest is also low, as well as mothers’ hustle 
and bustle of daily activities to do such as household chores, selling, and other things. Faced with 
such obstacles, one of the breakthroughs taken by peace activists is by implementing approach 
through majelis taklim (women’s gathering for religious teaching and performance). Through this 
gathering the husbands do not have any reason for forbidding their wives from joining religious 
activities.422 
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C H A P T E R  V I I  
Conclusion and Recommendation 
C O N C L U S I O N  
Since long ago Ambon has been recognized as one of the areas in Indonesia with the characteristic 
of strong segregation both socially and spatially, between Christina and Muslim communities. When 
there was a social conflict in 1999, the resolution was taken through post-conflict reconstruction 
policy. The policy has indirect and unintended consequence in the form of new socio-spatial 
segregation. The pattern of post-conflict segregation emergence mainly originates from refuge process 
and refugee solution mechanism, especially relocation. 
When the social conflict broke out in Ambon (1999-2002) between Christian and Muslim 
communities, many people from both communities took refuge to the areas where the people ethno-
religiously have similar identity with them. They did this to get the sense of security. When the 
conflict abated, the people are reluctant to return to their places of origin. The consequence is that the 
areas which were relatively heterogeneous before the 1999 social conflict has now become more 
homogeneous. 
Apart from the above mechanism, the growth of post-conflict segregation is also closely  related to 
the relocation process initiated by the government. The heavy task taken by the Ambon City 
government is to deal with refugee management which until today still becomes an issue; starting 
from the validity of refugees data, absence of refugee empowerment, uneven distribution of 
assistance, still deteriorating physical and health condition, inhabited land dispute, population 
problem, return of civil rights on abandoned assets, land certification, until the government’s claim 
that the refugee management had finished in 2009. 
Some options offered by the government as the solution to post-conflict refugees, namely returning 
to their places of origin, relocation, and settling down in refuge areas. Among those options, 
relocation was the choice of most refugees at that time.  However, unintentionally and indirectly, 
those relocations have contributed to the establishment of segregated new community concentrations 
because the refugees tend to choose relocation sites nearby or around the community with the identity 
similar to theirs. Three key reasons why the refugees tended to choose relocation sites like that are 
their identity as minority group in the places of origin, absence of guaranteed security if they return to 
their places of origin, and failed process of returning to the places of origin.  
Some policies then become local government’s priorities in the effort to rebuild Amon, both 
physically, infrastructurally and psychically. Beside that, various efforts continue to be taken in order 
to deal with rapidly developing segregation since the 1999 conflict. Among the various policies and 
efforts, beside thorough refugee handling are reconciliation and recovery of brotherhood tie, opening 
of new heterogeneous settlements, trauma handling, children counseling, social harmony, and 
development of  brotherhood (orang basudara) curriculum. Many of those programs are clearly 
contained in the 2006-2011 and 2011-2016 Ambon City Mid-Term Development Plans (RPJM) as 
well as, especially, the 2006-2026 Ambon City Long-Term Development Plans (RPJP).  
Some post-reconstruction policy programs have so far been relatively realized in a qualitative 
fashion, such as reconciliation and recovery of brotherhood tie both through gatherings, joined 
organizing of religious events, and inter-faith dialogs and cooperation; construction and development 
of new heterogeneous areas; development of public spaces for inter-community meetings, such as 
reconstruction of Mardika Field; Social Harmony; development of brotherhood (Orang Basudara) 
curriculum; development of border areas; trauma handling.  
Nevertheless, beside lengthy refugee handling, some critical-evaluative notes are aimed to post-
conflict development programs and other programs that have not been realized at all.  Firstly, the 
2006 Social Harmony Program suffered from many fund leaks and did not accord the target 
community, as well as had many project results that have been damaged and not functional. Secondly, 
trauma handling did not run optimally. Moreover, the constructed Center for Trauma is not functional 
any longer. Thirdly, public spaces development for inter-community meeting only focused on 
Mardika Field, and there is almost no development of other public spaces.  Fourthly, development of 
Orang Basudara (brotherhood) curriculum was still in the concept/ idea and no real implementation 
was done. Fifthly, construction/ renovation of traditional markets was not fully realized. Sixthly, 
development of border areas which often constitute the hot spots of violent conflicts has yet to be 
executed at all, both economically and socio-culturally. Seventhly, post-conflict children counseling 
tended to sporadic-ceremonial. Eighthly, frequency of joint organizing of religious events was still 
low. Beside those problems, special attention should be given different perceptions among community 
segments on the urgency of permanent posts construction in border areas and presence of the 
Indonesian Military (TNI) under Bawah Kendali Operasi (BKO) in Ambon. 
Generally, post-conflict condition and situation in Ambon are said to run relatively well, and 
particularly, inter-community relationship and interaction may be said to run quite well. Well-restored 
relationship is strengthened by shared awareness on conflicts and inter-community cooperation in 
managing conflicts/ violence which occur after the conflict. Nevertheless, it should be admitted that 
certain community segments still feel trauma, fear, or discomfort when they enter or visit particular 
areas where the majority of the population used to be their enemies, especially at nights.  In this case, 
we see particular things still often become walls of obstacle for inter-community relationship so that 
this requires more intensive and serious handling, especially trauma handling and mutual trust 
building  between communities. 
Some violent incidents occurred sporadically after the 1999 conflict and involved both 
communities, the Muslim and Christian ones. However, those incidents could be localized and 
relatively quickly handled, even though the legal process against the perpetrators still experienced 
failure. Strengthened post-conflict segregation has played a particular part in the process of the 
emerging violent cases. Some elements have been identified as the triggering cators of such violence, 
and have some connection with, or constitute indirect effects from, segregation. Some of the elements 
are intervention from external parties including provocation or playing both communities off against 
each other; social disharmony between new comers and indigenous people; suspicion between groups 
resulting from post-conflict effects; vulnerability of border areas as hot spots of emerging violence; 
and the society that is vulnerable to be mobilized by by using religious sentiments against a particular 
group. 
The role of security personnel, particularly the Police, in preventing and handling post-conflict 
violence receives particular critical-evaluative spotlight. In general, the society thinks that security 
personnel tend not to be responsive and slow in preventing and handling post-conflict violent 
incidents and even tend to fail in the legal process.  Consequently, the level of society’s trust in 
security personnel decreases, especially after the September 11, 2011 incident which occurred not far 
from the police guarding post. Such condition has an impact on the society’s preference in security 
personnel. They tend to prefer TNI to the police because TNI is considered faster and more responsive 
in handling violence. However, there is also another segment of the society which rejects the the 
existence of TNI/BKO in Ambon because the occurrence of the violence is deemed to be related to 
the society’s law and order which is the police’s duty instead of military duty. The role and existence 
of TNI/BKO in Ambon has so far still triggered controversy among the society, especially because 
there is allegation related to TNI personnel partiality and neutrality in handling inter-community 
violent cases.  
Some strategic efforts have been taken by the society in general to prevent and handle conflicts 
and post-conflict violence. From the socio-cultural and religious aspects, those efforts cover 
involvement of another religious community in organizing religious events, strengthening peace 
values through education and reactivation of Pela Gandong. From the political aspect, those efforts 
include inter-community power sharing. From the economic aspect, the society has set up a kind of 
markets in other communities, which very much enable the inter-community interactions and 
communications.  Beside that, group leadership, including religious figures, local leaders and 
traditional figures also takes an important role in preserving harmony and preventing post-conflict 
violence.  
In preserving peace and handling post-conflict violence and segregation, various elements in the 
society have demonstrated their roles both direct and indirect ones including the civil society 
organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and women’s group. Efforts taken by several 
civil society organizations such as MUI Ambon, Diocese of Amboina, GPM Silo, LAPPAN, National 
Commission of Human Rights (Komnas HAM), and the others have given contributions from the 
religious, socio-educational and economic aspects. The contribution of women’s group in preserving 
peace in Ambon is relatively significant, including by assisting in the handling of trauma from 
prolonged conflicts, visiting refugees from respective groups to strengthen awareness on conflicts, 
setting up educational facilities for children, etc. 
Leadership aspect is an integral part of the effort to maintain harmony and prevent post-conflict 
violence. This aspect generally can be divided into three categories, namely leadership of religious 
leaders, leadership of local leaders, and leadership of traditional figures. Participation of religious 
leaders in Ambon in the effort to maintain harmony and prevent post-conflict violence is a necessity, 
due to their strategic position in the society, even though such participation is not fully able to prevent 
violence yet. From Christian community’s perspective, efforts to prevent the spread of violence have 
been supported by centralized Church leadership in the congregation. Unfortunately this is not easy to 
be found in Muslim community due to various people affiliations to religious leaders and Islamic 
organizations. This has caused the people’s initiative to be more dominant than that of the leaders in 
Muslim community.  
Local figures who hold positions both formal  and informal ones, possess important influences in 
the community under their responsibility. Even, religious difference with the community does not 
prevent them from carrying out the tasks without any discrimination. The leaders exist within the 
Muslim and Christian communities and are directly involved in suppressing the conflicts. Beside that, 
ethnic-based leaders play major roles in influencing their communities, especially for political 
interest.  
Similarly with traditional leaders, they also have strategic roles in maintaining peace and prevent 
violence. They do this by issuing announcement and disseminating it to the public. However, there are 
some challenges faced by traditional leaders, such as limited legitimacy in the areas with pluralistic 
demographic characteristics, many traditional leaders getting involved in political activities so that 
they cannot represent traditional communities, and absence of Latupati rule that binds all kings, 
making problems in the communities hard to resolve. 
R E C O M M E N D A T I O N  
Based on the findings in the study, some recommendations can be formulated as follows:  
HANDLING OF POST-CONFLICT SEGREGATION  
1. Policies on post-conflict relocation have clearly created new segregation and homogeneity of 
areas which used to be mixed. To handle the existing segregation, the Ambon City Government 
should create strategic and more creative reconciliation programs so that both different 
communities, the Muslim and Christian communities, especially staying in relocation/ refuge 
areas, can interact and communicate each other more intensively. Beside that, the city 
government is expected not to develop programs that tend to be ceremonial and temporal. 
2. Spatial planning or construction of physical infrastructures and settlements must be sensitive to 
de-segregation and conflicts, and be oriented to the creation of civic engagement model.  Old 
conflict-handling policies offered by the local government which eventually have implication in 
the present time must be seen proportionally because in the past the local government did not 
have many options. However, the past outcomes can and must be immediately dealt with 
through the design of new Ambon spatial plans, which enable high intensity of cross-identity 
community meeting. In this case, it definitely requires good will, political will, and courage to 
find and realize a way out (breakthrough) which is oriented to the interest of the more secure 
and comfortable life of Ambonese society in the future. 
3. Some important policies on post-conflict development need revitalizing and improving by the 
Ambon City Government, covering (1) revitalization of trauma healing center and 
provision/training of experts to handle trauma; (2) increasing the number of public spaces—
beside Mardika Field—for inter-community interactions/ communications (civic-engagement); 
(3) developing and implementing Orang Basudara curriculum at schools by inserting contents 
of local wisdom values, especially Pela Gandong; (4) setting up traditional markets for inter-
community meeting and development of border areas which often become hot spots of 
violence; (5) improving inter-community cooperation in the execution of religious activities; 
(6) improving the implementation of Biking Panas Pela consistently. 
4. Ambon City Government and competent society social organizations need to conduct media 
campaigns in a sustainable fashion to introduce and institutionalize symbols of togetherness, 
and prevent the use of sectarian symbols. 
5. Ambon City Government and non-government organizations are faced with increasing cross-
community live-in activities, especially for school students and other concerned stakeholders. 
Therefore, those activities can grow expected de-segregation process and overcome spatial 
segregation. 
6. Beside the above reconciliation efforts, Ambon City Government needs to develop special 
programs to strengthen mutual inter-community trust (trust-building). This needs to be taken in 
order to overcome trauma, fear or discomfort felt by some society members when entering or 
travelling to particular areas in particular time. Beside that, this is also important to give 
balance to the tendency of Ambon City Government which emphasizes more on post-conflict 
physical development. 
7. Agencies related to education and manpower must take concrete actions to reduce/ eliminate 
negative perspectives concerning discrimination in accessing education, various public 
services, health access as well as jobs and promotion in government agencies in Ambon City. 
8. In the above context, Ambon City Government needs to consider “power-sharing” of both 
communities, socially, economically and politically, by still prioritizing the principle of 
competency. Beside that, Ambon City Government also needs to take measures to suppress 
identity politics among political elite that tends to increase group tension and sentiment, and 
unwittingly, open up spaces and opportunities for potential inter-group clashes at the grass-root 
level. 
9. In the past, the Maluku, especially Ambon had a number of figures who were accepted, listened 
to, and respected by anybody. Nowadays, Ambon has lost such figures. Therefore, one of the 
important approaches to manage the life of the already-segregated Ambon City society is to 
promote the characterization process of a number of persons to become local figures. 
10. Ambon City Government needs to continuously strengthen and build society’s psychological 
capacity and knowledge, especially those living in segregated areas, that Ambon conflicts 
occurred not because of the difference between Christian and Muslim communities, but 
because of intervention of particular group’s interest. Therefore, it is right and proper that they 
live together peacefully just like before the 1999 conflict. 
11. Given the strategic position of society organizations, especially religious and traditional 
organizations, in preserving peace in Ambon, it is proper that the Ambon City Government  
invite them and foster relationship and coordination with them in the implementation of each 
policy and activity intending to gather both communities.  
12. Ambon City and Maluku Provincial Governments are expected to synergize in executing post-
conflict development programs, and do not let the programs run separately. Such condition is 
required to maximize the results and targets of the development. 
HANDLING OF AND RESOLUTION TO REFUGEE/ RELOCATION PROBLEMS 
1. Fulfillment of refugees’ rights which is presently still a prolonged problem should be solved by 
Ambon City Government in wise and swift manner. If not, such condition could become a 
trigger of inter-community dispute which ends up with the emergence of violence. Such 
problem may also be utilized by irresponsible parties to create chaos and violence in Ambon. 
2. Ambon City Government needs to take intervention in the empowerment of relocated 
communities/ refugees and should not avoid the responsibility for them.  
3. Ambon City Government also needs to help settle various land disputes related to relocation 
and provide legal certainty  on them, and should not tend to avoid responsibility. Beside that, 
Ambon City Government also needs to solve various population problems (for instance, 
problems related to Identity Card/KTP), land certification, and return of civil rights of the 
refugees to the abandoned assets. 
4. Ambon City Government needs to develop special agenda which enables meetings and 
interaction between refugees and host community in the place of origin. For Muslims who once 
stayed in Batu Gajah, for instance, could organize an activity like “Batu Gajah Panggil 
Pulang”. Thus, attached sentiment of the refugees to their places of origin is preserved, even 
though nowadays they do not stay in one place as one community any longer. 
SECURITY PERSONNEL AND HANDLING OF POST-CONFLICT VIOLENCE  
1. TNI/BKO troops should be withdrawn gradually by adjusting to the needs and conditions of 
particular area in Ambon. So, the police needs to be more dominant and professional in 
controlling security in Ambon City.  
2. Every emerging violent case  must be processed through law in fair and professional fashion. 
Such firm action is needed to maintain and improve Ambon City stability after the conflict in 
the security, social and economic aspects. Thus, security personnel must be responsive and 
professional in handling every emerging violent case. 
3. Ambon City Government and security personnel needs to take preventive measures to keep on 
guard against and handle some factors that often become the trigger of violence such as 
intervention from external parties, provocation or playing both communities off against each 
other, disharmony of social relationship between new comers and indigenous people, inter-
community suspicion as post-conflict effects, vulnerability of border areas as sources of 
violence, and easy mobilization of the society by utilizing religious sentiments. Thus, the role 
of intelligence and early warning must be more strengthened to anticipate potential violence.   
4. To reduce potentials for post-conflict violence, it is proper that Ambon City Government  
focuses on the creation of job opportunities in order to reduce unemployment, and create 
various youth activities, including sports, arts and music, etc. 
5. Given the fact that border areas often become the hot spots of post-conflict violence, Ambon 
City Government needs to prioritize the local development, in the areas of social, educational 
and economic development, by creating various job opportunities, build and renovate schools 
and organize various youth activities which can connect inter-community young people. 
In general, to eliminate post-conflict violence, Ambon City Government needs to develop self-
defense mechanism built in the social structures to avoid people’s engagement in violent actions. For 
this purpose Ambon City Government can utilize the roles of traditional organizations and religious 
organizations including organizations which can gather joint cross-identity activities such as sports, 
music, and arts in general, and etc. Beside that, developing inter-culture dialogs also becomes a very 
crucial need. 
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Annexes  
A T T A C H M E N T  1 :  F O R M  I N T E R V I E W  T R A N S C R I P T  
Interview #  : 
Interviewee(s)  :  
Age   : 
Gender   : 
Occupation  :  
Affiliation  : 
Date and time  :  
Location of interview :  
Researchers  :  
A T T A C H M E N T  2 :  I N T E R V I E W  H O S T  
RESEARCH  QUESTION NO. 1:  
How did segregation emerge/grow after the peace in Ambon? 
Related Informants 
Local academicians; NGO activists related to social issues especially peace; religious figures; 
traditional figures; conflict actors (previous perpetrators and conflict victims) 
Interview questions: 
—For non-actor conflicts (local academicians; NGO activities related to social issues related to peace; 
religious figures; traditional figures tokoh adat) 
1. In brief, please describe your role and position in the organization?  
2. How do you see the inter-group relationship and/or inter-community relationship before and 
after the conflict?  
3. According to you how can these groups be formed? 
4. How do you see the solidarity built among group/community members?  
5. According to you, how does identity of each group increasingly get strong compared to before 
the conflict?  
6. What are the factors that contribute to the unification of the existing groups? Ethnicity? 
Religion? Geography? Others?  
7. What are the factors that contribute to the division of the existing groups? Ethnicity? 
Religion? Geography? Others?  
8. How does the division of the groups grow after the conflict? 
9. How do you see the dividing process of the groups after the conflict? 
10. How do you describe the type of group division after the conflict? 
11. What are the impacts of the inter-group division and distinction in this area on the services 
provided to them?  
12. What are discriminatory experiences already reported by groups in this area in the economic 
sector? Social sector? Political sector? Educational sector? Health services and others? 
13. For the present time, how is the geographical distribution of the groups after the conflict?  
14. What are the movitations and interests that support the existence of each group?  
—For conflict actors (previous perpetrator, conflict victim and/or whose group is segregated) 
1. In brief, could you describe your role and position in the society/ your group? 
2. How do you see your group identity in relations with that of the other group? 
3. According to you, why is your group separated from another group after the conflict? How do 
you see this?  
4. What are the impacts of the inter-group division and distinction  in this area for your group? 
5. How do you see the division process of your group with another group after the conflict? 
6. How do you describe the type of division between your group and another group after the 
conflict? 
7. What are the impacts of the inter-group division and in this area on the services provided to 
your group?  
8. What are discriminatory experiences already reported by your group in this area in the 
economic sector? Social sector? Political sector? Educational sector? Health services and 
others? 
RESEARCH QUESTION 2:  
What are the impacts of post-conflict development reconstruction policy on the emergence and 
strengthening of segregation in Ambon? 
Relevant Informants: 
Government elements (mayor, Local Development Planning Board/Bappeda, Social Affair Office, 
Religious Affairs Office, Spatial Planning Office, Health Office, Education Office, etc.); Security 
elements (TNI and Police, civilian security task force); economic elements (sellers and business 
people); society elements accessing health, education services, etc. 
Interview Questions: 
1. In brief, please describe your role and position in the organization?  
2. What are the programs already implemented after the conflict by government, LSM, or 
private sectors/ employers?  
3. What are the key priorities of post-conflict development?  
4. In your opinion, is the determination of the priorities in line with the society’s needs in 
general?  
5. In your opinion, how have the post-conflict development programs created group 
segregation? 
6. Could you describe or give examples of particular development programs that have 
contributed to the creation and strengthening of group division after the conflict? 
7. In your opinion, why is group division conducted as integral part of post-conflict 
development? 
8. How do you see that the post-conflict development has only benefited particular groups? 
9. What are the executed development programs but according to you are not conducive in 
the post-conflict situation?  
10. What kind of programs should have been implemented, but have not been realized/ have 
not been realized yet?  
11. In your opinion, among the divided groups, which one has bigger access to services and/or 
“cake” of the post-conflict development?  
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 3: 
How is the relationship between segregation and emergence of violence in post-conflict Ambon? 
Relevant informants: 
Local academicians, security elements; traditional elements; religious elements; youth elements 
Interview questions: 
1. In brief, please describe your role and position in the organization?  
2. How do you describe frictions between groups/ communities in the area?  
3. What are the factors that incite the post-conflict frictions?  
4. How do you see the violence occur between groups in the area after the conflict? 
5. How does the group division trigger inter-group violence? How often does it occur?  
6. How is the competition between the groups in accessing development programs?  
7. How far does the competition increase tension and even violence against the other group? 
Why? 
8. To what extent does the division hamper inter-group communications and interactions? 
9. How can you describe lack of or absence of inter-group communications and interactions  
as the result from division policy which increases tension and/or brings about inter-group 
violence after the conflict? 
10. What are the roles of each group in maintaining calmness and peace in the area? How do 
all the groups work together to defent such thing?  
11. How effective is the role of group leaders in calming down their members in the 
occurrence of inter-group violence? What are the measures taken by them to calm their 
members down?  
12. How much do group members believe in their leaders? What are the factors that make 
them believe? 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 4: 
What are the roles of civil society organizations (LSM) in handling segregation and the impacts on the 
emergence of violent conflicts in Ambon? 
Relevant informants 
Religious elements (FKUB, Muslim society organizations, and Christian society organizations, etc.); 
civil society elements (LSM activists related to social issues, especially peace); youth elements (youth 
leaders, karang taruna, etc). 
Interview Questions: 
1. In brief, please describe your role and position in the organization?  
2. How big is the society’s trust in the organizations which they considered helping the 
establishment of post-conflict conducive situation? Government organizations? Law 
enforcing organizations? LSM? Communications Forums?  
3. What are the organizations that actively participate in the creation of peaceful situation?  
4. How is the role of your organization in reconciling the conflicting parties?  
5. How would you describe your organization’s preparedness in preventing inter-group 
violence in the area?  
6. What are the methods used or applied by your organization to prevent and handle the post-
conflict violence?  
7. What has your organization done in managing the group division problems in the area? 
8. How do you see the position of your organization in overcoming the emerging inter-group 
problems?  
9. In your opinion, what are the interest, goal and purpose of your organization in handling 
segregation and violence resulting from it? 
10. So far, in your opinion, how effective and/or successful are the efforts taken by your 
organization to handle such segregation? 
11. In your opinion, how are cultural values and local traditions utilized by your organization 
or other organizations in helping overcome inter-group tension and in the area?  
12. How far has your organization involved women’s role in handling inter-group differences 
and violence? 
13. How do you see women’s roles in widening or bridging inter-group differences and 
violence?  
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The Habibie Center was established by Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie and the family in 1999 as an 
independent, non-government and non-profit organization. The vision of The Habibie Center is to 
create a structurally democratic society based on the morality and integrity of cultural and religious 
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NATIONAL VIOLENCE MONITORING SYSTEM (SNPK) 
SNPK is a breakthrough in the information system which provides data and analysis on conflicts 
and violence occurring in various regions across Indonesia. The SNPK projects are led by The 
Coordinating Ministry for People’s Welfare, with support from World Bank and The Habibie Center. 
The main activities of SNPK are firstly, detailed and regular collection of data on when, where, how 
and why violence occurs and what the impacts are. The SNPK’s data have been collected since 1998 
and updated on monthly basis and presented through SNPK portal (www.snpk-indonesia.com); 
secondly, analysis on the data collected and researches on conflicts and violence. SNPK is earmarked 
as a reference to the development of policies and programs of violence handling and prevention.  
To date, SNPK covers thirteen regions, namely: Aceh, Lampung, the Greater Jakarta, West 
Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, West Nusa Tenggara, East Nusa Tenggara, 
Central Sulawesi, Maluku, North Maluku, Central Sulawesi, Papua, West Papua. Currently expansion 
of the coverage is underway in order that violence data from all parts of Indonesia will be made 
available in the future. 
 
